Volume IV, Issue 2, 2017

Volume IV, Issue 1, 2017

Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore’s Paradox (pages 151-173)

Michael Campbell ABSTRACT: In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt (CG) defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny ... Read More »

The Prometheus Challenge Redux (pages 175-209)

Arnold Cusmariu ABSTRACT: Following up on its predecessor in this Journal, the article defends philosophy as a guide to making and analyzing art; identifies Cubist solutions to the Prometheus Challenge, including a novel analysis of Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon; defines a new concept of aesthetic attitude; proves the compatibility of Prometheus Challenge artworks with logic; and explains why Plato would ... Read More »

Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity (pages 211-228)

Hili Razinsky ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character ... Read More »

In Defense of H.O.T. Theory: A Second Reply to Adams and Shreve (pages 231-239)

Rocco J. Gennaro ABSTRACT: In Gennaro (2016), I had originally replied to Fred Adams and Charlotte Shreve’s (2016) paper entitled “What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?,” previously published in Symposion. I argued that H.O.T. theory does have the resources to account for synesthesia and the specific worries that they advance in their paper, such as ... Read More »

Artefacts as Mere Illustrations of a Worldview (pages 241-244)

Terence Rajivan Edward ABSTRACT: This paper responds to an argument against a kind of anthropology. According to the argument, if the aim of anthropology is to describe the different worldviews of different groups, then anthropologists should only refer to material artefacts in order to illustrate a worldview; but the interest of artefacts to anthropology goes beyond mere illustration. This argument ... Read More »

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