Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences
Rajesh Sampath
ABSTRACT: This article is Part Two of a two-article series. Part One introduced a twofold hypothesis regarding the incompletion of Division Two of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) and the possibility of constructing anew its missing Division Three. We commenced a close reading of section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two. To reiterate, the first part of the hypothesis is that a non-linear, non-circular, and non-rectilinear four-dimensional temporalization is buried beneath Heidegger’s articulations of the “equiprimordial, ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic, temporalizing of temporality,” (Heidegger 1962, 377-380) which derives both the ‘endless, infinite time of arising and passing away’ of now points in and as ongoing linear time (Heidegger 1962, 379); and that this linear time consists of past (no longer now), present (now), and future (yet to be now), in which the “ready-to-hand arises and passes away.” (Heidegger 1962, 379) In this article, as Part II of the two-article series, we develop the second part of the hypothesis. We assert that in order to excavate this four-dimensional temporalization-interrelations-movements-event, we must un-do Heidegger’s reductive treatment of Aristotle, particularly in section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two of Being and Time. This is a preparatory step before attempting an all-out deconstruction of Heidegger’s attempted critique of the ‘time-spirit relation’ (Heidegger 1962, 480) in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, which is the penultimate section 82 of Chapter VI in Being and Time. To prepare the conditions for this deconstruction of Heidegger on Hegel, we will return to Heidegger’s brief treatment of Aristotle’s views on time in his Physics at the outset of section 81. Simultaneously, we will reinhabit section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two of Being and Time. We can, then, begin to gain a clearer picture of what might lie beyond the very horizon of Being and Time when it comes to understanding time in a radically different way from the Western metaphysical tradition. We would make a genuine restart on the path to answering the question of the meaning of Being, and, therefore, resurrect a project other than what remains as the incompleteness of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.
