From Causality to Freedom: Kant's Structural Response to Hume

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Abstract: This article examines Kant's conception of freedom through his critical engagement with Hume's problem of causality. While Kant's account of freedom is often interpreted within the framework of practical philosophy, this study argues that it must instead be understood as a structural outcome of his response to Hume's skepticism. By analyzing Hume's theory of knowledge and his reduction of causality to habit, the paper demonstrates how this challenge destabilizes not only metaphysics but also the very possibility of freedom. It then reconstructs Kant's response by showing how he transforms causality into a transcendental condition of experience, thereby re-establishing the foundations of both scientific knowledge and metaphysics. The central claim of the study is that the transition from causality to freedom in Kant is not merely thematic but structural: without resolving the problem of causality, freedom cannot be conceived within the framework of critical philosophy. In this sense, freedom emerges not as an isolated moral concept but as a necessary extension of Kant's solution to the problem of synthetic a priori judgments. By situating freedom at the intersection of epistemology and moral philosophy, the article offers an integrated interpretation of Kant's critical project and highlights its systematic unity.

Keywords: causality, David Hume, freedom, Immanuel Kant, synthetic a priori.

I. Introduction

In order to ground Kant's conception of freedom, it is first necessary to examine his critique of science. When comparing science with metaphysics, Kant emphasizes that science has made almost no progress concerning fundamental issues such as God, free will, and morality (Kant 1998). This tendency reveals science's inclination to treat the human being as an ordinary object – an approach Kant criticizes on the grounds that the human cannot be reduced to a mere thing.

Rationalist philosophers defended a mathematical method in which ideas, or concepts, are connected independently of experience. For instance, the statement "All unmarried men are bachelors" is certainly true, yet it provides no new knowledge. For Kant, this illustrates the rationalists' limitation: they remain confined to a priori propositions and ultimately adopt a dogmatic stance (Allison 2004). In contrast, Hume's empiricism introduced a radical skepticism, arguing that causal laws cannot be justified by reason alone (Hume [1748] 2000; Stroud 1977; Garrett 1997). This raises a crucial question: if causality cannot be demonstrated, how does science, which is founded on causal relations, continue to advance? Kant suggests that science proceeds by presuppositions, advancing

'as if' its principles were necessary. At this point, the problem arises whether metaphysics, like science, can generate valid knowledge and achieve genuine progress. Kant's critical philosophy – differing from both rationalism and empiricism – emerges precisely as a response to such questions and plays a decisive role in shaping his conception of freedom (Guyer 1987; Bird 2006).

While rationalism asserts the existence of innate a priori knowledge, Kant argues that it fails to demonstrate how such knowledge is possible. Without establishing its possibility, metaphysics loses legitimacy. Empiricism, on the other hand, maintains that although all knowledge begins with experience, not all of it derives from experience; some orientation must come from the mind itself. Kant, however, does not regard this as a mere psychological disposition but as a deeper transcendental issue. In this context, Hume's account proves, for Kant, both insightful and deficient. Hume is correct in claiming that causality cannot be derived from experience; however, his reduction of causality to a mere psychological habit is unacceptable to Kant. Hume's skepticism does not merely challenge causality; it destabilizes the very conditions under which freedom can be meaningfully conceived. This, in turn, prompts a series of critical questions: What if the human mind itself necessarily imposes the category of causality on all appearances? What if causality is an a priori feature of reason? This indicates that causality is not derived from experience but constitutes a necessary condition of experience through which all appearances are necessarily interpreted.

This article therefore investigates Hume's critique of causality and its influence on Kant's 'awakening from dogmatic slumber,' followed by an analysis of how this awakening shaped his conception of freedom in both theoretical and practical philosophy. Existing scholarship has extensively examined Kant's response to Hume, the transcendental status of causality, and the relation between freedom and transcendental idealism (Allison 2004; Guyer 1987; Watkins 2005). Other influential interpretations have primarily approached freedom through Kant's practical philosophy, particularly in relation to autonomy and moral agency (Korsgaard 1996; Wood 2005). The present study brings these lines of interpretation together by emphasizing the argumentative continuity between Kant's response to Hume's problem of causality and the subsequent possibility of conceiving freedom within critical philosophy. Against this background, the distinctive contribution of this study lies in its central claim: Kant's conception of freedom should not be understood merely within the domain of practical philosophy, but also in relation to the critical problem of causality raised by Hume. Freedom thus emerges as a necessary extension of Kant's solution to the problem of synthetic a priori judgments. Accordingly, this study argues that the transition from causality to freedom is not merely thematic but structural: without resolving the problem of causality, the very idea of freedom would remain unintelligible within Kant's critical philosophy.

II. Hume's Theory of Knowledge: The Critique of Causality

Coming from the empiricist tradition, Hume grounds knowledge in experience. According to him, all the contents of the mind derive from experience; experience provides the raw material arising from encounters with the external world (Hume [1748] 2000). In this context, Hume distinguishes perceptions into two kinds: *impressions* and *ideas*. The perceptions acquired through the senses are impressions, while the forms in which these impressions are preserved in consciousness are ideas. Therefore, no idea can exist without a corresponding impression. An idea lacking such a foundation is nothing but a mental illusion (Hume [1748] 2000, 1-7).

For Hume, ideas ultimately derive from impressions, although the imagination can combine and reshape them into complex ideas that have no direct counterpart in experience. Thus, an imagined object such as a 'winged horse' does not require a distinct corresponding impression, since its components can be traced back to previous impressions. This account reflects the empiricist foundation of Hume's theory of knowledge (Stroud 1977; Garrett 1997).

Hume further analyzes the process of human cognition and argues that the mind establishes relations according to three basic principles: resemblance, contiguity, and cause–effect. The mind relates objects that share similar features, associates events that occur close in time or space through contiguity, and from these associations develops the idea of causality (Hume [1748] 2000, 23-25). For example, when an apple falls to the ground, our attention shifts not only to the apple itself but also to where it has fallen; this is a consequence of the principle of contiguity. The apple's fall suggests the presence of another event, and this association gives rise to the notion of causality. In this way, the cause-effect relation becomes a basic mode of connection in the human mind, emerging as an inclination derived from contiguity (Kail 2007).

The principle of causality stands at the center of Hume's critique. According to him, the maxim "every effect has a cause" cannot be known a priori. For instance, the fact that heat expands metals can only be verified by experience; it cannot be deduced from the mere concept of 'heat.' (Hume [1748] 2000, 29) Thus, causality is not an absolute necessity but an expectation formed through repeated experience. When one event is constantly observed to follow another, the mind assumes a necessary connection between them. Yet the repeated occurrence of Y after X does not guarantee that Y will follow X in the future. However, for Hume, this belief is not grounded in reason but arises from habit. Causality, therefore, is not an innate and necessary category of the mind, but a habit formed by experience (Kail 2007; Stroud 1977). This insight already hints at a deeper philosophical tension between the empirical habit of connecting events and the rational demand for necessity – a tension that Kant would later resolve through the concept of the synthetic a priori.

This approach becomes even clearer in what is known as 'Hume's Fork.' Hume divides knowledge into two categories: relations of ideas and matters of fact.

Relations of ideas (for example, mathematical propositions) are analytic, necessary, and can be known a priori, independently of experience. In contrast, matters of fact are contingent, derived from experience, and can only be known a posteriori. Causality belongs to this second category, since causal propositions can be justified only by observation and do not contain absolute necessity (Hume [1748] 2000, 36-39). With this distinction, Hume seeks to show that while relations of ideas hold with necessity, matters of fact lack such necessity because they rest on experience. His objection, therefore, is not to the certainty of analytic and a priori truths – such as the proposition "A is A" – but to the claim that such truths are innate. In this way, Hume rejects the innateness of knowledge rather than its certainty (Allison 2004; Garrett 1997). Thus, while Hume distinguishes between analytic a priori truths in mathematics and contingent matters of fact grounded in experience, his skepticism goes further. He extends doubt even to demonstrative reasoning itself, questioning the reliability of human faculties in mathematics and logical inference. In fact, Hume's bifurcation of human knowledge between 'relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact' leaves no room for a synthetic a priori domain – a space that Kant would later open by reconciling the empiricist and rationalist traditions within the limits of reason itself.

Consequently, Hume's theory of knowledge and his account of causality not only shaped philosophical debates in his own era but also laid the groundwork for Kant's famous 'awakening from dogmatic slumber.' (Kant [1781/1787] 1998; Guyer 1987) Hume's radical empiricism, by dissolving the notion of necessary connection, not only undermined metaphysical speculation but also created the very conditions for Kant's transcendental inquiry. Without Hume's skeptical challenge, the possibility of grounding freedom and causality within the structure of reason would never have arisen.

III. Kant's Response to Hume: Awakening from Dogmatic Slumber

Kant, taking Hume's arguments concerning causality into account, turned his attention to the limits of human reason. For Kant, the central problem of pure reason is how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. The resolution of this problem would determine whether metaphysics could stand or fall (Kant [1781/1787] 1998). Hume had explained the issue in terms of habit; yet for Kant, reducing causality to habit amounted to undermining the very possibility of metaphysics. According to Kant, among all philosophers, Hume came closest to this fundamental problem; nevertheless, Hume remained at the synthetic proposition which merely connects an effect with a cause and believed thereby to have shown that such a proposition is entirely impossible a priori (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A764/B792). For Hume, everything called 'metaphysics' is nothing more than notions borrowed from experience and granted spurious necessity through habit (Stroud 1977). Kant, however, argues that had Hume considered the problem in its full universality, he would not have been compelled to adopt such a destructive stance toward philosophy (Allison 2004).

In response, Kant developed what he called 'transcendental philosophy.' Here 'transcendental' does not mean transcendent but rather refers to drawing boundaries (Allison 2004; Bird 2006). In this sense, Kant sought to ground philosophy in an examination of reason's own limits. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant distinguishes between necessary and contingent judgments. Necessary judgments cannot be false, whereas contingent judgments, being empirical and relative, may be false. Necessary judgments contain a priori knowledge – knowledge that exists independently of experience. Kant further divided a priori judgments into analytic and synthetic. Analytic propositions have predicates already contained within their subjects and thus add no new knowledge. For example, "All bodies are extended" is analytic, since the concept of body already includes extension. Such propositions require no appeal to experience. By contrast, synthetic propositions add new knowledge. Of particular importance are synthetic a priori propositions, in which the predicate is not contained within the subject, yet the judgment is not derived from experience. Kant's classical example is '7+5=12.' (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A164/B205)

For Hume, inductive propositions lack necessity: even after millions of confirming instances, it remains possible that an exception could occur (Hume [1748] 2000). Therefore, such knowledge cannot qualify as certain (Garrett 1997; Kail 2007). Kant, however, insisted that metaphysical propositions – such as "Human beings possess freedom of choice" – must also be regarded as synthetic a priori. If such judgments are dismissed in metaphysics, then science too would face the same problem, for the very foundation of science rests on causality (Watkins 2005). This connection between metaphysics and empirical science reveals Kant's broader project: to secure the legitimacy of both moral and scientific knowledge by grounding them in the same critical framework of reason. It is for this reason that Kant's answer has often been compared to Copernicus's revolution in astronomy. The expression 'the Copernican revolution in philosophy' originates precisely here (Bird 2006).

According to Kant, the structuring activity of the mind is the foundation of our relation to the external world. By transforming causality into a transcendental category, Kant shifted the locus of necessity from the world to the subject. What for Hume was a matter of observation became, for Kant, a condition for the very possibility of experience. We do not apprehend things as they are in themselves but through the categories of the understanding. Among these categories is causality. Consequently, causality cannot be reduced, as Hume suggested, to a mere psychological propensity. Rather, it constitutes an a priori condition of experience (Allison 2004; Guyer 1987). In the Second Analogy, Kant accordingly argues that the succession of events can be experienced as objective only insofar as it is determined according to a causal rule (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A189/B232–A211/B256). At the point where Kant asserted that "causality is built into our reason," he experienced what he famously described as his awakening from dogmatic slumber. As Kant acknowledges, Hume's challenge interrupted his

'dogmatic slumber' and gave his investigations in speculative philosophy a new direction (Kant [1783] 2002, 4:260). In this way, Kant also answered Hume's central question: how is the progress of science possible? For Kant, causality is not given by experience but arises from the faculties of reason; it is therefore a synthetic a priori principle (Watkins 2005). As Kant himself states, "The difficulty disappears if we add another principle overlooked by Hume: that possible experience is itself restricted to the conditions imposed by our faculty of knowledge." (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A737/B765) Science, grounded in causality, depends upon the categorical structure of the human understanding. In this sense, Kant's solution to Hume not only safeguards the certainty of science but also opens a new path for understanding human autonomy – since the same rational structure that grounds causality also makes freedom conceivable. Thus, Kant's awakening from dogmatic slumber not only reshaped his inquiry into metaphysics but also profoundly influenced his conception of freedom.

IV. Freedom in Kant's Critical Philosophy

At this point, the transition from causality to freedom must be understood not as a contingent extension but as a systematic necessity within Kant's critical philosophy. If causality were merely an empirical habit, as Hume suggests, then all events – including human actions – would be reducible to contingent sequences lacking necessity. In such a framework, the concept of freedom would lose its intelligibility, since there would be no stable ground upon which to distinguish between determination and autonomy. Kant's reconfiguration of causality as a transcendental condition of experience secures the universality and necessity required for objective knowledge. However, this same move also generates a critical tension: if all appearances are necessarily determined by causal laws, then the possibility of freedom seems excluded from the empirical domain. This conflict is formulated explicitly in Kant's Third Antinomy, where the universality of natural causality appears to stand in opposition to the possibility of a causality through freedom (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A444/B472–A451/B479). Kant does not resolve this conflict by introducing an exception to natural causality. Rather, he restricts the validity of causal determination to appearances, thereby allowing the same rational agent to be considered both as empirically determined within nature and as intelligible in relation to freedom (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A536/B564–A541/B569). Thus, the limitation of causality to the phenomenal domain provides the conceptual condition under which freedom can be thought without contradicting natural necessity. It is precisely this tension that necessitates the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal standpoints. Freedom thus emerges as a necessary concept within this critical framework – not as an empirical exception to causality, but as the necessary counterpart that preserves the unity of reason across its theoretical and practical domains. In this sense, Kant's concept of freedom is not an additional doctrine appended to his

system, but a systematic consequence of the critical framework established through his transcendental solution to the problem of causality.

According to Kant, reason contains certain ideas that cannot be given in experience but arise from its very structure. He examines these under the heading of *transcendental dialectic*, defining them as concepts that "can never be given in any experience" but belong to the natural disposition of reason (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A298/B355). When reason seeks to attain knowledge through such ideas, it inevitably falls into what Kant calls a transcendental illusion. Unlike the positive sense of dialectic in Plato or Hegel, Kant employs the term in a negative sense, as a conflict of reason with itself. He emphasizes that every attempt to explain phenomena by natural laws inevitably raises new questions, leaving the mind unsatisfied. As he remarks, no one can be satisfied with mere empirical answers to questions such as the beginning or limits of the world, or the relation between freedom and natural necessity (Kant [1781/1787] 1998: A484/B512).

In the *Prolegomena*, Kant ([1783] 2002) identifies three fundamental ideas of reason – soul, world, and God – corresponding to the psychological, cosmological, and theological ideas. For the purposes of our discussion, the cosmological ideas are of central importance, since they lead to the antinomies of pure reason. Kant argues that pure reason inevitably falls into four such antinomies, of which the third, concerning causality and freedom, is decisive for his conception of freedom:

> *Thesis:* There are causes arising from freedom.
>
> Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything happens according to nature.

Kant maintains that both the thesis and antithesis can be supported, since causality is both necessary and valid. He therefore conceives of the human being as both a natural being, subject to the laws of nature, and a rational being, capable of freedom. As a natural being, man is determined by necessity; as a rational being, he is capable of autonomous action. This dual characterization illustrates Kant's attempt to reconcile determinism and autonomy, demonstrating that the concept of freedom can coexist with the natural order once it is grounded in the noumenal standpoint. Thus freedom belongs not to the phenomenal world of experience but to the noumenal world. Concepts such as freedom cannot be confirmed within experience, and reason therefore falls into contradiction when confronted with opposing claims. Kant's intention is to show that the very structure of reason generates such conflicting metaphysical systems (Allison 2004; Guyer 1987).

Freedom, for Kant, is not a theoretical object of speculative reason but the practical possibility of human action. The capacity to choose under the guidance of reason constitutes the foundation of his notion of freedom. This connection is made explicit in the *Groundwork*, where Kant describes the will as a kind of causality belonging to rational beings and defines freedom in terms of the independence of this causality from external determining causes (Kant [1785] 1996, 4:446). Since a free will is not lawless, this conception of freedom leads

directly to autonomy, or the will's capacity to give itself its own law (Kant [1785] 1996, 4:446-447). Human beings gain their distinct dignity precisely by transcending the chain of natural causality and determining themselves according to a causality grounded in freedom (Korsgaard 1996; Wood 2005). If they remained bound only within the circle of natural necessity, they would not differ from other beings. Accordingly, freedom belongs to the intelligible rather than the sensible world. The moral law, which cannot be found in nature but arises from reason itself, is the clearest manifestation of human freedom (Kant [1785] 1996; Rönnedal 2021). Kant's critical examination of the limits of reason transforms epistemological boundaries into the very foundation of metaphysical and moral inquiry (Zöller 2003). Kant's unity of theoretical and practical reason reveals interpretative dimensions that extend his philosophy beyond the epistemological domain toward the metaphysical and moral spheres. In this unity, the limits of knowledge determined in theoretical reason become the very conditions that make moral freedom intelligible. The boundary of cognition thus transforms into the ground of ethics.

As Kant states, if a being is rational and has a will, the idea of freedom must be ascribed to it; therefore freedom is to be attributed to every such being (Kant [1785] 1996, 53). At this point, practical reason provides the foundation of freedom. Kant, opposing the eudaimonist and utilitarian moral philosophies of his age, developed an ethics grounded in human freedom. He distinguishes between technical practical reason, which employs reason instrumentally for utility, and pure practical reason, which determines the will according to a priori laws. The latter corresponds to Kant's moral philosophy (Wood 2005).

Within this framework, Kant distinguishes between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives are conditional and therefore not moral: for example, "You should study, if you want to succeed." Categorical imperatives, by contrast, are unconditional: "You must not lie." Such imperatives do not derive from experience but from reason itself. They represent synthetic a priori laws of pure practical reason. Freedom, therefore, consists in the capacity to choose in accordance with these unconditional moral laws. The true value of freedom is realized in actions performed from duty, since only a will determined by duty can be said to be good in itself (Kant [1785] 1996; Korsgaard 1996).

For Kant, the moral law is a direct expression of human freedom. This law is not imposed externally but arises from the very structure of reason. Kant expresses this with the concept of *autonomy* – the will's self-legislation according to reason. Its opposite is *heteronomy*, where the will is determined by external laws. A being endowed with pure practical reason is autonomous, guided by categorical imperatives. Human beings should therefore regard themselves as members of the 'kingdom of ends,' in which rational beings legislate moral laws for one another in mutual respect (Kant [1785] 1996; Korsgaard 1996). Ultimately, Kant argues that without freedom and the moral law grounded in it, politics and law would be empty concepts. In grounding moral obligation in autonomy, Kant

simultaneously lays the rational foundation of legitimate authority. His moral philosophy thus becomes the ethical precondition for any just political order. As rational beings, human beings have the duty to realize the moral law through their freedom. The capacity to will, in its genuine sense, is thus nothing other than the exercise of freedom itself (Wood 2005).

V. Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that Hume's critique of causality, while aiming to ground knowledge in experience, ultimately exposes the limits of empiricism itself. For Hume, if a stone always falls when dropped, we assume it will also fall in the future; yet such inductive reasoning yields only probability, not logical certainty. As shown in the first section, Hume explains causal expectation as a product of habit rather than rational insight into a necessary connection. Accordingly, Hume maintains that all knowledge is derived from experience. Outside the domain of sensory impressions, no genuine knowledge is possible. Rationalist attempts to advance solely by reason are therefore illusions. At this point, Kant agrees with Hume's critique to a significant extent, but he also contends that judgments unconnected with experience cannot simply be dismissed as illegitimate. For Kant, Hume began with a valid problem but failed to demonstrate how knowledge itself is possible (Allison 2004; Watkins 2005). Kant does not reject the role of experience in the generation of knowledge, nor does he deny science's capacity for certainty. However, he insists that causality is not directly given in experience. From this perspective, a major flaw emerges in Hume's account of knowledge (Guyer 1987; Kail 2007).

For Hume, causality remains doubtful, and humans have no choice but to live with this uncertainty, since the mind has a psychological propensity to expect regularities. Thus, human beings live 'as if' causality were certain (Stroud 1977). Yet for Kant, this marks the point where metaphysics comes to a standstill. Unless metaphysics can account for causality, its progress will remain either impossible or unstable. Kant introduces the concept of the synthetic a priori precisely at this juncture (Kant [1781/1787] 1998; Bird 2006). Critical philosophy, by setting limits to reason, leads necessarily to science; but without critique, dogmatic metaphysics collapses into unfounded assertions or skepticism (Kant [1781/1787] 1998).

Kant's originality lies in transforming what Hume explained as mere habit into a necessary category of the mind. Freedom, as developed through the third antinomy, emerges not as an empirical fact but as an idea belonging to the noumenal realm. Human beings, as rational agents, are free insofar as they can will and choose. Since freedom has no sensory correlate, it cannot be known within speculative reason but appears within practical reason as an idea of reason, made manifest through the moral law (Kant [1785] 1996; Wood 2005).

As Kant demonstrates in the *Prolegomena*, grounding metaphysical concepts solely in experience leads pure reason into contradiction; attempts to

derive concepts of pure reason from an exclusively empirical origin are ineffective and ultimately fail (Kant [1783] 2002, 104). What Hume overlooked, according to Kant, was a 'principle of limitation' – that possible experience is itself conditioned by the faculties of the mind (Allison 2004). On this basis, Kant rejected both rationalist dogmatism and empiricist skepticism, and developed what he called *criticism*, a method that seeks to determine what reason can demonstrate independently of experience (Bird 2006).

There is no doubt that Hume's critique of causality played a decisive role in awakening Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Hume's analysis was a valuable starting point, but his solution remained incomplete. Kant completed what Hume left unfinished by grounding causality in the very structure of reason (Watkins 2005; Guyer 1987). Consequently, for Kant, freedom is an inescapable idea of reason. As he maintains, all rational beings are subject to natural necessity in their empirical actions, yet in relation to their rational will, they must be regarded as free (Kant [1781/1787] 1998, A533/B561).

In conclusion, freedom in Kant appears as an idea, inseparable from reason itself. Human beings act under the idea of freedom, and because they are free, they are also legislators of moral law. The moral law thus becomes a law of freedom. As this study has shown, Kant's conception of freedom was decisively shaped by Hume's challenge. By transforming Hume's account of causality from habit into a category of reason, Kant re-established the possibility of metaphysics. Freedom, therefore, is not an empirical datum but the necessary outcome of being a rational agent. In this sense, Kant's critical philosophy is not a rejection of metaphysics but its reconfiguration, and freedom stands at the heart of this reconstruction (Allison 2004; Guyer 1987).

Kant's engagement with Hume's critique of causality does not merely constitute a response to skepticism but a profound transformation of the very structure of reason. By grounding causality not in empirical habit but in the a priori principles of the understanding, Kant redefines the relation between knowledge and freedom. In this reinterpretation, the necessity of causal connection becomes a condition of experience rather than its consequence, enabling a new conception of rational autonomy. Through this transformation, metaphysics acquires renewed legitimacy – not as speculative dogmatism but as a reflective inquiry into the conditions of possible experience. The limits of science, as identified by Kant, are not the boundaries of reason but the framework within which reason can legitimately operate. Hence, Kant's critical project replaces the traditional metaphysical search for the absolute with a disciplined self-examination of the mind's faculties. Accordingly, this study demonstrates how the critique of causality functions as the conceptual bridge between epistemology and moral philosophy. By revealing freedom as the self-legislation of reason, Kant's critical philosophy unites the theoretical and practical dimensions of human cognition. This synthesis marks the core contribution of the paper: to elucidate the continuity between Kant's critique of Hume and his conception of freedom as

the foundation of autonomy and moral responsibility. In doing so, Kant not only answers Hume's skepticism but also redefines the meaning of philosophy itself – as the self-conscious pursuit of the conditions that make both knowledge and freedom possible. In this sense, Kant's concept of freedom is not an addition to his system, but its completion.

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