

Reading Section 81 on ‘Within-Time-Ness’ and the Origin of the Ordinary Concept of Time in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927).

Part Two

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Abstract: This article is Part Two of a two-article series. Part One introduced a twofold hypothesis regarding the incompleteness of Division Two of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927) and the possibility of constructing anew its missing Division Three. We commenced a close reading of section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two. To reiterate, the first part of the hypothesis is that a non-linear, non-circular, and non-rectilinear four-dimensional temporalization is buried beneath Heidegger’s articulations of the “equiprimordial, ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic, temporalizing of temporality,” (Heidegger 1962, 377-380) which derives both the ‘endless, infinite time of arising and passing away’ of now points in and as ongoing linear time (Heidegger 1962, 379); and that this linear time consists of past (no longer now), present (now), and future (yet to be now), in which the “ready-to-hand arises and passes away.” (Heidegger 1962, 379) In this article, as Part II of the two-article series, we develop the second part of the hypothesis. We assert that in order to excavate this four-dimensional temporalization-interrelations-movements-event, we must un-do Heidegger’s reductive treatment of Aristotle, particularly in section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two of *Being and Time*. This is a preparatory step before attempting an all-out deconstruction of Heidegger’s attempted critique of the ‘time-spirit relation’ (Heidegger 1962, 480) in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which is the penultimate section 82 of Chapter VI in *Being and Time*. To prepare the conditions for this deconstruction of Heidegger on Hegel, we will return to Heidegger’s brief treatment of Aristotle’s views on time in his *Physics* at the outset of section 81. Simultaneously, we will reinhabit section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two of *Being and Time*. We can, then, begin to gain a clearer picture of what might lie beyond the very horizon of *Being and Time* when it comes to understanding time in a radically different way from the Western metaphysical tradition. We would make a genuine restart on the path to answering the question of the meaning of Being, and, therefore, resurrect a project other than what remains as the incompleteness of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.

Keywords: Heidegger, fundamental ontology, metaphysics, time.

Introduction

As Part II of a two-article series, this article will develop the second part of the hypothesis on a potential understanding of a four-dimensional temporalization-interrelations-movements-event, which is buried deep inside the holes of

Heidegger's *Being and Time*. But turning on the light will allow us to navigate these impenetrable tunnels. In order to do so, we must un-do Heidegger's cursory, precipitous treatment of Aristotle, particularly in section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two of *Being and Time*. We will argue that this is a preparatory step in order to deconstruct Heidegger's attempted critique of the 'time-spirit relation' (Heidegger 1962, 480) in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which is the penultimate section 82 of Chapter VI in *Being and Time*.

The aim of this deconstruction is to take a part and put back together, again, a proper anchor to advance *Being and Time* beyond its own limits. We know this great work ends with a fateful encounter with Hegel. Hence, this is not a defense of Hegel or Hegelianism against Heidegger's attempted critique (Habermas 1985; Pippin 2025). In order to furnish the novel conditions for deconstructing Heidegger on Hegel, we will revisit Heidegger's brief treatment of Aristotle's crystalline reasoning in his *Physics*. This remarkable encounter with Aristotle's actual text occurs at the outset of section 81, two sections before Heidegger's whole treatise comes to an abrupt close. The ultimate goal is not to advance the defense of Hegel against Heidegger's critique but to reconstruct Heidegger's engagement to articulate a notion that neither could conceive.

While reading Aristotle, simultaneously, in a parallel dimension, we will reoccupy section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two of *Being and Time*. The aim here is to work in the maxima of Heidegger's descriptions of "primordial, ecstatic, unified, authentic, finite temporalizing of temporality." (1962, 380) What remains un-articulated and, therefore, underdeveloped is the mystery of the 'equiprimordiality' (Heidegger 1962, 480) of the ecstases; that is where each temporal ecstasy, for example 'making present,' (Heidegger 1962, 374) has a different relation with the other two, when we begin describing, phenomenologically, one ecstasy at a time. In principle, there could be up to three sets of six movements between the ecstases of "making-present, having-been, and coming to and towards." (Heidegger 1962, 372-374) The problem is how to distinguish the particular temporal ecstasy in question in relation to the other two, and what we mean by doing that one 'at a time.' Furthermore, we cannot start from a now-point or presence in general. We can ask – what does 'one at a time' mean since we are considering the interrelations of all three, each of the three as uniquely related to the other two in different ways? For example, think of the present in relation to past and future (as two movements), past in relation to present and future (two movements), and future in relation to past and present (two movements), but starting with the first direction of present in relation to past and future. And then, we can start with the past and its six movements, and then again, start with the future and its six movements. Regardless, this work does not assume a simultaneity on the one hand or a succession on the other when it comes to three sets of six movements.

We can, then, begin to gain a less opaque picture of what might lie beyond the delimited horizon of *Being and Time* when it comes to understanding time – in

a radically different way from the Western metaphysical tradition – as the answer to the question of the meaning of Being, and, therefore, reestablish the project of fundamental ontology, or a project other than the Heideggerean project that leaves fundamental ontology incomplete. Again, this is not stating that time is like any other entity or being or the foundation of being as substance. It inhabits the possibility of another side to the question of the meaning of Being. In short, we do not assume that there are only three aspects, namely past, present, and future, when considering the very being of time. We think of four aspects of time as a transcendental a priori, if you will, that still has to be defined.

Of course, in order to defend this claim, we cannot neglect the enormous effort that Heidegger put into works that try to build on the understanding of temporality in Division Two of *Being and Time*. These include *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927), *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1927), *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1928), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), and *Four Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929). In fact, making distinctions between propositions offered in those texts, which take Heidegger in different directions from *Being and Time*, and the re-occupation of *Being and Time* as a deconstruction of those later texts requires a justification in its own right. It may turn out that the impulses that continue to flicker in these later works carry seeds for germination that can be re-planted back into the framework of *Being and Time* to pick up and carry forward underdeveloped propositions in *Being and Time* itself. Yet, we do not want to arrive where Heidegger does in his post-*Being and Time* works.

For example, the problem of the 'equiprimordiality' of how each ecstasy has a different 'mode of temporalizing' with respect to the other two ecstases (Heidegger 1962, 378) can be expounded. An even more difficult task would be to take the protean developments on ecstatic temporality in section 65 of Chapter III (Heidegger 1962, 380), all of Chapter IV on 'Temporality and Everydayness,' (Heidegger 1962, 383) and the ontological problem of 'movement' in sections 72 (Heidegger 1962, 427), 74 (Heidegger 1962, 439), and 75 (Heidegger 1962, 441, 444) in Chapter V for an even more grandiose purpose than those chapters in isolation. One could reconsider the 'equiprimordial' set of concerns that bind them together as if one could write a whole new chapter that synthesizes all three of those chapters into a larger whole. That does not occur at all in *Being and Time* whatsoever.

Having said that, even in those rich and dense post-*Being and Time* works, there is no mention of a non-spatialized, four-dimensional temporalizing as a complex interrelations-movement-event that transcends the simultaneity or succession of two or more events; especially if one imagines six different movements within each ecstasy's relation to the other two, and therefore a total of eighteen possible movements in each of the three sets of relations of past, present, and future. Furthermore, deriving the traditional three aspects from four other aspects does not occur. However, we are getting ahead of ourselves. No

doubt, in question is the traditional metaphysical descriptions of how these three traditional aspects of time relate to one another in circles, lines, or something other, which, for Heidegger, includes, within the Western tradition, the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and Husserl. For Heidegger, none of these figures capture the complexity he seeks to disclose in *Being and Time*, and the physical sciences certainly cannot even think the question in an authentic way (Heidegger 1962, 499). Our thesis should become clearer as we traverse Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's text, Aristotle's text by itself, and then in parallel to both, Heidegger's own section 65 on 'ecstatic temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380) and section 72 on 'movement.' (Heidegger 1962, 427)

Before we reread Heidegger on Aristotle at the beginning of section 81, let us make clear a guiding assumption in this entire investigation. Time is not present as an existing thing, even in its relation to the phenomena of motion and change, which we witness in existing things, for example a moving train or an aging person. This is so for Aristotle, despite Heidegger's attempted critique of and separation from Aristotle, and, also, Heidegger's own articulations of 'ecstatic temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377) in section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two. In short, reimagining a phenomenological encounter with Aristotle's *Physics* while interweaving Heidegger's own novel formulations of 'ecstatic temporality' as a 'process' (Heidegger 1962, 377) brings us back to the problem of 'movement/Bewegtheit' and not 'motion/Bewegung' in Heidegger's pre-ontological framing in section 72 of Chapter V (Heidegger 1962, 427). But, before we can even resume the discussion of 'movement,' (Heidegger 1962, 427) we return to section 65 on 'ecstatic temporality.' (Heidegger 1962, 377) The ground by which interrelations inside Division Two's chapter III on time and Chapter V on movement lurks beneath Heidegger's own disparate formulations. There is no whole synthesis of a whole in *Being and Time*, and Heidegger admits it at the outset of Chapter V (1962, 425). Ultimately a retraversing of Aristotle's text becomes necessary to irradiate that ground. But the inner-necessity of this illumination only points forward to the ultimate encounter with Hegel, particularly his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), and then if our conviction holds, the gargantuan task of reckoning his *The Science of Logic* (1812-1816).

Revisiting the Opening Moments of Section 81

We have to understand the entire backdrop of *Being and Time* even before we get to the bristling interpretation Heidegger makes of Aristotle's text: "For this is time: that which is counted in the movement within the horizon of the earlier and the later." (Heidegger 1962, 473) A renewed phenomenological description of the complex interrelations between this definition of time, the problem of counting and movement, and the presupposition of a 'horizon' cannot just happen in a vacuum. Even the juxtaposition of the terms of 'movement' and 'horizon' cannot be derived, arbitrarily, from fleeting senses or intuitions of what comes to mind first when we think of those terms. For example, a horizon is something fixed and

non-dynamic and movement in itself or of something is literally something changing either its location or itself. Horizons can shift but do they change in themselves is not obvious.

The entire architectonic of *Being and Time* – from the table of contents to the opening sections of the Introduction – reveal “time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being” (Heidegger 1962, 7) and Dasein, as the inquirer of that question, and its Being whose “meaning is temporality.” (Heidegger 1962, 38) One can say in Heideggerian language that temporality is the meaning of the Being of the inquirer into the question of the meaning of Being whose transcendental horizon is time. It seems circular on the surface, but that is not what is happening here. For Heidegger, there is no circle (1962, 27-28) in the relation between the two: namely ‘Time-Horizon-Question of Being’ (1962, 7) and ‘Meaning of Dasein’s Being as Temporality.’ (1962, 38) The circle breaks wide open, as miraculous distinctions between these terms, say time and temporality, will unfold throughout the text. The whole treatise works through all the paradoxes, aporias, and tensions as one massive attestation to the ontological consequences of the circle breaking open in *Being and Time*’s ‘Dasein-analytic’ (Heidegger 1962, 36) as a preparation to undertake fundamental ontology ‘anew.’ (Heidegger 1962, 19) It is hard to dispute that what Heidegger is attempting here is distinct from any previous figure in the history of Western philosophy (Thomson 2005). All of Division One and thirty-five sections of Division Two lead up to one last encounter with Aristotle, Plato, and then Hegel before work ends. The only way to break the circle is disclosing a complex movement-event as the being of time; the whole of this phenomenon is irreducible to presence, succession of now-points, irreversible, linear, spatialized flowing time (Heidegger 1962, 379), and ‘within-time-ness.’ (Heidegger 1962, 480)

Keeping this backdrop in mind, we can tackle Heidegger’s opening formulations in section 81 before he offers the Aristotle quote. Note the title of section 81 – ‘Within-time-ness and the Genesis of the Ordinary Conception of Time’ (Heidegger 1962, 472) – which will also have to be dissected during the course of our analysis. One can argue that Heidegger is going after a deep ground as a temporalizing ‘process,’ (1962, 377) which was stated earlier in section 65 before he comes back to Aristotle in section 81. This is not some permanent, fixed, eternal ground as substance from which everything else about being and time, their distinctions and relations, or their movements of one into the other and as the other, can be derived. Finding a timeless ground, be it substance or whatever, is not the point.

Rather, at the opening of section 81, Heidegger states:

If it has been a matter of such concern, Dasein calculates time in reckoning with *itself*, then the kind of behavior in which ‘one’ explicitly regulates oneself *according to time*, lies in the use of clocks. (1962, 472-473)

Suspend for a moment the reference to clocks. That will consume part of our analysis on the phenomenological description of interrelations of movement

and the self-showing of time, as far as Heidegger can see, whose early germination occurs in Aristotle before Kant picks it up again. We have to busy ourselves, first, with just this peculiar sense of Dasein 'reckoning with itself' (Heidegger 1962, 473); that is, as both the 'inquirer' (Heidegger 1962, 27) into the "question of Being in which Time is the Transcendental Horizon" (Heidegger 1962, 7) and the "meaning of Dasein's Being as temporality." (Heidegger 1962, 38) How time comes to occupy the question of Being, not just the entwining of time and being in traditional metaphysical notions of substance, is quite intriguing.

The non-circularity of this relation, as previously mentioned, dictates that whatever Dasein is concerned with, the very ground of its Being if you will, means that the public reckoning with time (how time is left on the clock before a task has to be completed) is purely derivative and thus remains at the surface of any ontological inquiry into the meaning of Being itself. And for *Being and Time*, this question cannot even be taken up until one first inquires into the Being of the inquirer (Heidegger 1962, 27); hence the need for a 'Dasein-analytic.' (Heidegger 1962, 65) Instead of being in and as time, the deeper issue is how the existential conception of reckoning with the feeling of anxiety of how time is passing (through clocks and calendars) in any spatialized and visible sense is itself part of a deeper problematic of the stretch of time allotted to a life, which can never be calculated spatially in terms of clocks and calendars. Furthermore, the relation between being and time, being in time and time in being, being as time and time as being is never a concept that is eternal or changing. For example, if one is a medically verifiable, healthy, young adult who has an unprovoked thought in their daily life about dying fifty years in the future, their relationship to that point cannot be derived from the linear time they are flowing in (say in the public calendar year) or the time that may be transpiring in them, say the aging of their cells. That occasional weird moment just happens to happen, and not because of the particular chronological time that the thought happens to occur. The time-death relation in Heidegger is obscure (Thomson 2025). That is the aporia to keep front and center as we move forward.

It is interesting to note that in this aporia the knot is hideously complex: what can never be revealed, spatially, as the derivative 'present-at-hand or ready-to-hand,' (Heidegger 1962, 375, 379) namely the 'ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377) as the ground of Dasein's Being is brought into a relation, if not implicitly here, in the statement about Dasein "reckoning with itself by calculating time." (Heidegger 1962, 473) It is this relation, which seems to be separated by a massive gulf, between section 65 in Chapter III and section 81 in Chapter VI that is key. We will try to build a bridge between the two sections in this investigation. That means passing out of *Being and Time* into Aristotle's actual texts while passing back into *Being and Time's* key sections of Division Two to expand them further. It is a strange, open-loop movement of movements, if you will, which is not circular or rectilinear. It is definitely not linear in one direction with some original starting point.

Transitioning from Section 81 of *Being and Time* back to Aristotle's *Physics*:

Let us return to Heidegger's opening statement in section 81. We can say, in preliminary fashion, that we should not assume that Dasein reckons with its own "Being whose meaning is temporality" (Heidegger 1962, 38) by looking at a clock or other human beings experiencing time in one way or another; that is by simply watching the second hand moving around to change from one minute to another, or more painfully, watching a minute shift to the next until a full hour is complete, and then twenty-four hours in a day, etc. This is so even if we assume that the viewer of the clock is also not undergoing change over time, i.e. aging, while looking at the clock. But, of course, that is impossible for finite, mortal human beings. (Imagine freezing cellular aging to a moment in time, which remains fixed, while the person is alive and conscious watching a clock tick off the moments of time.) Whoever would attempt to do that and for their whole life would either be some other being besides human or a human who has reached a level of indescribable transcendence, or, unfortunately, someone who would be clinically diagnosed with some mental disorder. For most of us, that would be utterly torturous.

In some senses, it might be prudent to suspend any ontic or everyday assumptions of how human beings experience passing time of clocks and calendars with regard to their own feeling of aging and, if the context presents itself, getting closer and closer to dying and eventually death. A more 'primordial temporalizing,' (1962, 379) as Heidegger says in section 65, would derive that ontic, ordinary sense of linear time and flow and by extension how we relate to the flow as entities in the world, namely humans, animals, plants, or other living organisms. Medicine, psychology, botany, zoology, or spiritual-environmental orientations can not help us in this investigation.

Returning to section 81 while keeping section 65 on the horizon, we can proceed with our analysis. Let us offer the full quote of the passage within which the Aristotle quote sits:

Dasein calculates time in reckoning with itself, then the kind of behaviour in which 'one' explicitly regulates oneself according to time, lies in the use of clocks. The existential-temporal meaning of this turns out to be a making-present of the travelling pointer. By following the positions of the pointer in a way which makes present, one counts them. This making-present temporalizes itself in the ecstatic unity of a retention which awaits. To retain the 'on that former occasion' 42 1 and to retain it by making it present, signifies that in saying 'now' one is open for the horizon of the earlier-that is, of the 'now-no-longer.' To await the 'then' by making it present, means that in saying 'now' one is open for the horizon of the later-that is, of the 'now-not-yet.' Time is what shows itself in such a making-present. How then, are we to define the time which is manifest within the horizon of the circumspective concerned clock-using in which one takes one's time? This time is that which is counted and which shows itself when one follows the travelling pointer, counting and making present in such a way that this making-present temporalizes itself in an ecstatic unity with the retaining and awaiting which are horizontally open according to the 'earlier' and 'later.'

This, however, is nothing else than an existential ontological interpretation of Aristotle's definition of 'time':...“For this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later.” vii This definition may seem strange at first glance; but if one defines the existential ontological horizon from which Aristotle has taken it, one sees that it is as 'obvious' as it at first seems strange, and has been genuinely derived. The source of the time which is thus manifest does not become a problem for Aristotle. His Interpretation of time moves rather in the direction of the 'natural' way of understanding Being. Yet because this very understanding and the Being which is thus understood have in principle been made a problem for the investigation which lies before us, it is only after we have found a solution for the question of Being that the Aristotelian analysis of time can be Interpreted thematically in such a way that it may indeed gain some signification in principle, if the formulation of this question in ancient ontology, with all its critical limitations, is to be appropriated in a positive manner. (Heidegger 1962, 473)

Ultimately, we must avoid reducing the mystery of time, even if independent of considerations of matter, space, and motion (of a thing or in themselves), as something present. Furthermore, we must avoid the idea of a present linked to a now-point, however indisputable the now-point may seem. (For example, when I say “it is now 3:35pm.”) That is the case even if we question whether the now is never present or of presence; for example, there does not have to be an apriori now in order to say “it is now such and such time to go.” The steady, unchanging rate of a sequence of nows passing second by second cannot account for experiential time dilation. For example, let us say I am forced to wait two whole minutes for my laundry machine to finish because I arrived earlier, thinking it was already done, but the passing of the two minutes seems to take forever. (It would be a waste of time to leave the laundry room and come back because that too would also take two minutes, and therefore I might as well just wait.) However, if I am at my computer finishing an important email but only have two minutes left before I have to leave for a meeting, then time seems to be moving faster and faster as if I did not have enough time to complete my urgent task. The succession of nows in the clock becomes meaningless with those two examples since the spatialized movement of the clock keeps its rate of change constant. The constancy is what is unnerving because we do not understand it at all. We do not have recourse to the 'first analogy of experience' as the 'third principle of understanding' announced by Kant: 'substance as permanence' or time as “that which does not change in order for change of appearances to take place within it.” (1998, 300)

We cannot start with a now, but we are drawn to the question, not so much what time is or is not, but what the appropriate question should be when considering this question, hence a question about the question and the meaning of self-referential questioning (a question about a question): why do human beings care to figure out what time is – that is the question to be questioned. Merely telling time or even asking at what point did humans measure time in terms of 60 seconds, 60 minutes, 1 hour, etc., or use clocks and calendars is not

the same question as asking – ontologically – what we mean when asking what time is, not “what time is it?” or some other variation of time-telling. Furthermore, questioning why we care about the question – “what is time?” is itself a singular question. Any simple answer to both questions, the question and the questioning of the question, would compromise the phenomenological endeavor underway.

We seek the meaning of the question as to why we are drawn to the question of time. This is in contrast to Heidegger’s opening salvo, after quoting Plato’s *Sophist*, about having to raise the ‘question of the meaning of Being anew.’ (Heidegger 1962, 19) The distinction we make is unlike any heretofore distinction or relation between being and time in the history of metaphysics up to Heidegger’s ‘destruction’ (1962, 41) of the tradition. Instead, we set off in a different path from what is traversed in *Being and Time*: namely, “the Dasein-analytic, being-in-the-world, Being-with other Daseins, falling and discourse, Care, death, resolve, temporality, historicity, and within-time-ness.” (Heidegger 1962, 9-12) If we recall on that opening page of his treatise, Heidegger moves along a curious trajectory. He goes from an ancient prior familiarity and understanding about the meaning of being to being ‘perplexed’ by it (from the quote of Plato’s *Sophist*) to Heidegger’s historical present of not having an answer to the question of the meaning of Being but also not being “perplexed by the inability to understand the expression ‘Being.’” (1962, 19) In other words, no one in Heidegger’s time is thinking about not thinking about an inability to think. The tripartite layering of familiarity to perplexity to the inability to be perplexed is itself quite mysterious. However, a contrast can be made about how the question of the meaning of the being of time, time’s relation to that question, the question of the relation and disrelation between being and time in the first question (about the meaning of the being of time) is not posed; and not because endless permutations without aim can be generated, leading us nowhere and quite possibly into non-sense.

We have to come back to the non-circularity that sets up “time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being” (Heidegger 1962, 7) and the “meaning of Dasein’s being as temporality” (Heidegger 1962, 38) into a question that remains unresolved in *Being and Time* itself. We will attempt to inscribe a phenomenological theory of ‘finite, ecstatic temporality’ in section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the ontological question of ‘movement/Bewegtheit’ [not ‘motion’ as a change of place or a thing] in section 72 (Heidegger 1962, 427) into the reading of Aristotle’s *Physics* at the start of Section 81. This way we can try to fulfill what Heidegger only promises at the very last moments of *Being and Time*: namely the “formulation of the question in ancient ontology... to be appropriated in a positive manner.” (1962, 473) The announcement of how each of the three ectases – “having been futurally awakening the Present” (Heidegger 1962, 378) – relate to one another through ‘different modes of temporalizing’ in an ‘equiprimordality’ (Heidegger 1962, 378) cries out for greater exposition. But all this remains undeveloped. None of this derives from a now-point or sequence of now-points like the hand of the clock counting as it moves along from one number to another.

Obviously, neither does it from days, months, or years on a calendar. Furthermore, an elaboration of this complex amalgam of interrelations as a moving-event can inform our hypothesis against Heidegger about posing the question of the meaning of the being of time itself rather than leaving it undefined as the “meaning of the Being of Dasein.” (Heidegger 1962, 38) We are not interested in the further description of Dasein, which Heidegger did his best to exhaust in the two Divisions of *Being and Time*.

Now we return to Heidegger’s long passage about Aristotle while trying to open up the actual text of Aristotle. For Heidegger, any kind of ‘making-present’ is derived from something more primordial, which not only discloses a ‘there,’ it does so through “temporality manifesting as the ἐκστατικόν.” (Heidegger 1962, 377) That is, “Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-itself’ in and for itself.” (Heidegger 1962, 377) However, the distinction between the ‘outside-itself’ and the ‘in and for itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) remains unexplained, and, furthermore, only three ecstases as analogues to spatially intuited or perceived past, present, and future are used to discuss temporality. In our work, we do not have to assume only three aspects to time, and we highlight the need to focus on the problem of movement with regard to the interrelations of the ecstases. The subject-object distinction of Cartesian heritage is abandoned.

Being outside one’s self as suspended in, of, and within linear passing time is not an eternal state but a strange space in which the ecstases interact in highly dynamical charges; and being in and of oneself is not being a singular point in space-time, bounded and independent of any other entity, but highly temporalized enrapturing, not encirclement, to take on one’s ownmost possibility to be, which is never anything present or existent; the latter includes the event of physical-biological death as the terminal point of life. To show how this underpins the discussion of Aristotle’s “counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later” (Heidegger 1962, 473) is the goal; but we do so with an unrelenting focus on the problem of construing, ontologically, movement as a massive Event of ‘equiprimordial’ (Heidegger 1962, 378) interrelations. This remains unaccomplished in Heidegger’s first two divisions of *Being and Time*. Hence, even before we read section 81 in order to deconstruct and reconstruct its opening moments on Aristotle, we can engage in a thought experiment.

Let us not take an average human subject looking at a clock. Specifically, the hypothetical person is following the second hand moving from one second to another until sixty seconds pass by so that the minute hand goes from where it is to its next spot *during the exact same time* that the second hand passes through a sixty-second cycle to another cycle; when the sixty-second cycle is complete the minute hand continues to move, and then the minute hand moves through its sixty-minute cycle until an hour changes. (And the twelve hour or twenty-four hour clock completes one day.) Just watching the clock move along with no concern by that human subject about themselves, their aging, their approaching death, losing time, failing to achieve what one wants to by a certain age, etc., is not

the issue. Rather, there is already a problem of layering temporal movements between the second hand and minute hand, and then hour, which presupposes this dubious notion of a seemingly indisputable witnessing of an empirical simultaneity. (Quite frankly, it is not like one eyeball can focus on the second hand moving along while the other eyeball 'retains' a previous minute or hour that elapsed and 'awaits' the next minute or hour to come.) Yet, any relation between a now-point as a second and a now-point as a minute is incommensurable, because otherwise one second would always be sixty seconds to equal one minute. This is so even if the passing at the sixty-second mark happens at exactly the same time that a minute goes from one spot to the next, say one to two minutes. As the second hand moves forward with every tick creating a new present out of a future and shoving the older present into the past, the minute hand remains still until sixty seconds are up; but that could also mean that although we fail to see the minute hand move until the sixty-second cycle is up, then somehow its present is the second's future before the minute hand moves, which also means the minute is the past of a prior sixty-second cycle that has been completed; and yet minutes are just composed of seconds. There are movements within movements even if something appears to be still. The empirical visualization of whatever time 'is' is bound to fail us if we assume time as counting movement and time consisting of three aspects only, namely past, present, and future.

Phenomenologically speaking, even the stretching-moving in the cycle of the sixty seconds – as it leaves a previous spot and moves to the next – underpins the 'retention and awaiting,' presumably of the 'earlier and later,' which, itself, underpins a delayed movement; that is, delaying an arrival of an 'earlier' and a 'later' waiting to happen until the next-level of movement occurs, namely one minute to another. Inside this event, phenomenologically then, is the moving hand of seconds, which we might follow, until a passing of the seconds reaches sixty, which triggers at the same time the minute hand moving to its next spot. But this simultaneity of two hands is not as simple as it appears. This simple, ontic, linear time of the moving hands (second and minute) of the clock already reveal many possible interrelations of movements of movements of how we can even come to an understanding of how the horizon of the 'earlier and later' even operates. If there are many 'earliers' and 'laters' in layers of movement within a single time flow of a clock, or seconds comprising minutes and minutes comprising hours, then the full notion of this conception eludes the human mind.

For example, just imagine the interrelations of how any 'now' as presence of the moving second hand cuts through the sixty-second mark unleashing the change in the minute hand, a strange simultaneity in which two pasts and two futures are created; or even stranger, two levels of pastness and futurity are created, a before and after in the second transitioning to another second, and a minute to another minute. But this simultaneity is just another 'now,' which itself is an illusion. Hence aspiring to describe the whole totality of movement of movements, presupposing certain relations of change of positions and time as a

counting mechanism, is futile; not because we would not want to attempt to describe that heinous complexity but because we have not inquired deeper into the presuppositions, as Heidegger would have us do, about any spatialized relation between time, change, and movement.

Let us dig further into Heidegger's passage in section 81 as we open Aristotle's incomparable text, the *Physics*. The question of movement is paramount in this section even though it is not made into an explicit ontological question. Rather, the focus is on Dasein's 'calculation of public time,' (Heidegger 1962, 472) even though Dasein is 'reckoning itself,' (Heidegger 1962, 473) which means it is reckoning the "meaning of its Being which is temporality." (Heidegger 1962, 38) But, at this moment the prior discussion in section 65 on ecstatic temporality (Heidegger 1962, 380) with all its labyrinthine features is not brought to bear.

Let us keep in mind the great formulations made in section 65 on ecstatic temporality, particularly the future as "letting-itself-come towards-itself" (Heidegger 1962, 372), past as "I-am-as-having been" or even "I am been" from the translator's footnote (Heidegger 1962, 373), and present as "Present (Gegenwart) as making present" in which "resoluteness as letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it seizes to take action." (Heidegger 1962, 374) For the interrelations of the whole of these ecstases and their complex movements tantalize the imagination but not in any sequence from intuition to perception to understanding.

To lay out some initial assumptions, there is no present entity, which is fixed in space-time in which a future version or position of itself in space-time comes back to the so-called point in space-time that it is. Furthermore, do not think of a rubber band which you can stretch, each pole representing an origin and end, that snaps back to an original position. If you start with something present-at-hand that releases itself from itself so it can come back to itself from itself, you will be drawn in innumerable paradoxes. This is not to mention that the analogy or metaphor of a rubber band as a closed loop is something present-at-hand. As for the past, saying you are a present version of a past moment while being in the present is like saying – you, as an adult, are the exact same being that was born in which you eventually became an adult. Lastly, making present is not taking some unformed matter, an idea as form, performing some cause or action on the matter to align with that idea, and yielding some final product of a thing, like making a table. This is some version of Aristotle's classic four causes (Aristotle 2008, 39). Although not a simple matter for Aristotle or Aristotelian scholarship (Coope 2005; Reece 2018), this is not what Heidegger is discussing here in section 65. Rather, the resolve, to let oneself be encountered by the greatest "possibility to be which is its impossibility," or no-longer being-in-the-world as death (Heidegger 1960, 294), as an authentic stretch of time, is both irreducible to any now-point in linear time but also any simple moment, fortune, accident, occurrence happening in one's lifetime. For example, getting into a terrible, unforeseeable accident and

almost dying, which no one should have to experience. These are just problems that arise when interpreting section 65 (Blatter 2000).

Furthermore, the other major issues haunt us. Without overwhelming ourselves, we must be cognizant of the problems raised in sections 72, 74, 75 on “ontological movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along as historizing” (Heidegger 1962, 427) and the ‘connectedness’ (Heidegger 1962, 427) that is already inclusive of birth (as no-longer) and death (and not yet) and the ‘in-between’ within the very ‘Being of Dasein.’ (Heidegger 1962, 426) For this ‘Being’ is a deeper ground in which all that can be made present – as the human experiencing of the linear-chronological-calendar time of being born, living out a present, approaching death, ultimately dying and being dead – is sucked into a vortex. The task is monumental. To read Chapters III and V of Division Two, but outside the bounds of *Being and Time*, and seemingly levitate out of the possibilities that were not articulated therein, while re-inscribing those possibilities back into our own interpretation of Aristotle’s Book IV, Chapter 10 in the *Physics* on time seems ethereally complex. But that is where we must go.

We must suspend a simple assumption about the question of time and ordinary understandings of death. For example, those who say Heidegger is talking about human existence and human concern about death, mortality, and finitude, and Aristotle, innocently, expounds an analogue to humans experiencing time naturally through clocks since mechanical clock devices did not exist in his time. Aristotle is concerned with how time is related and not-related to change and motion, and how change and motion are not exactly the same thing either. Whether he calls this ‘physics’ rather than ‘metaphysics,’ or whether we interpret his ancient version of physics (as an earlier version made obsolete by modern physics) as more metaphysical rather than physical is not the issue. Let us dive into his text. The point is to appropriate his work, both his *Physics* and eventually *Metaphysics*, to pick up on an alternative to the incomplete fundamental ontology where Heidegger leaves off.

The Redoubling of Aristotle’s *Physics* by way of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*

We need to make one more recapitulation for Heidegger before moving on to Aristotle. In fairness to Heidegger’s reflection at the start of section 81, he is interested in the “ecstatical unity of a retention that awaits” and that is how any “making present temporalizes itself.” (1962, 473) Furthermore, let us avoid accusing Heidegger of insinuating that this elusive ‘unity’ (1962, 473) is anything ontic as ‘present-at-hand,’ (1962, 67, 79) which is not constitutive of Dasein’s Being. We should not assume that a past is just there as a ‘no longer now,’ even a thereness that is absent or not visible (say an archaeological artifact yet to be discovered); the present always exist because only a present can exist as present even if not seen or lived through by anyone (for example, no human has ever been to the core of the earth); and the future is a ‘yet to be’ now waiting to happen, even as an oracle or prophecy that is never fulfilled (like a biblical apocalypse). Instead,

Heidegger is thinking of something else. We have to be careful here as not to allow any quick spatialization to infiltrate our slowly moving thinking.

Heidegger wants to know within what horizon does a 'retention' and 'awaiting' come about so that a 'no longer now,' (1960, 473) or a simple definition of being past, can come to be as much as a 'yet to be now,' (1960, 473) or a simple definition of a future being future even as a potential, also comes to be. And they do not just come out of nowhere, but they also do not emanate from a present or from positions other than present or presence, for example a former present or a yet to be present. They are neither from nothing nor something else other than nothing. That means how a retention aligned with the no-longer-now and awaiting aligned with a yet-to-be-now gains such relationality, one can say a capability to be related but not between two things; and one does not have to assume how both of these alignments as relationality-forming occur simultaneously or successively. One should not assume that retention means remembering what once occurred, lived through, experienced and now can be recounted (say a photograph of a family) and awaiting is something that has always happened before and by habit – as for Hume – will happen again, like the sun rising tomorrow. (The latter also means that the sun may not rise tomorrow, whether that likelihood is so miniscule, because, for the most part, we expect, with unquestionable commitment, that it will rise tomorrow, just like my next breath of air will come into my nostrils and in fact just did.)

Instead, a different question emerges about how an alignment takes place; that is, an opening *occurs* (and therefore an event-like phenomenon defying presence or absence) that allows for a 'no longer now' to manifest (with or without sensible intuition or perception); and similarly, a 'yet to be now' that one is open towards through awaiting. In principle, I could be waiting – consciously or unconsciously – for a former now to form, either what will have been or a future memory to occur. This is distinct from and underpins a normal sense of time flowing by in one direction with or without clocks. Therefore, one can question how the whole spatialized sequence of now-points coming to be, or the future becoming present, and passing away, or present becoming past, can even be imaginable. What he does not ask here or elsewhere throughout *Being and Time* is whether a four-dimensional temporalizing ground gives rise to the inquiry he is making about how the 'horizon of earlier and later' even opens up, regardless of what intermingling of past, present, and future one can form through interrelations; the latter's possibilities are seemingly infinite.

Furthermore, assuming that past can only be linked with an origin (like one's birth) and future to an end (like one's death) forecloses possibilities that are other to an origin, perhaps something created but not in time, or other to an end, something that dies but not at a specific point like a natural point in time due to natural aging. What Heidegger does say, though, is that "time is what shows itself in such a making-present." (1960, 473) Also, in this moment, we only hear of a "no longer now, yet to be now, retention, awaiting, earlier and later" with respect to

'making-present,' (Heidegger 1962, 473) which, one can say, only connotes three aspects of time, such as past, present, future, not anything more; or even further, no other permutations that could be other to origin, end, non-origin, and non-end and their interrelations are conceivable. We can ask whether a return to the actual text of Aristotle will move us into a better position to not only excavate the possibility of articulating the four-dimensional temporalized ground as an interrelations-movement-event but to experience its conception being formed.

We would be naive to think we are the first to question Heidegger's critique of Aristotle leading up to Hegel on the question of time that is performed within the text of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, and therefore bring into serious reconsideration, whether Heidegger's analysis and claims are as legitimate as they may seem. Indeed, recent work raises this profound problem at the heart of Heidegger's thought (Weigelt 2017). Our focus, however, will be on a much earlier attempt whose seismic qualities are immense.

Derrida's famous essay from 1968 – "Ousia and Grammē: A Note on a Note in *Being and Time*" – is particularly telling. It delivers an astoundingly meticulous reading of the actual text of Aristotle's *Physics's* Book IV on time and then Hegel's appropriation of Aristotle in his own works, particularly the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic*. Not to reduce Derrida's long essay, which requires a separate analysis in its own right, he concludes with his own notions of 'différance' (undecided deferral/differentiation), 'trace of the trace,' 'trace of the erasure of trace' of an 'early difference' (Derrida 1982, 66) between Being and beings, or Heidegger's ontological difference, which was forgotten. If Being was lost, when the distinction between Being and beings collapsed, then there is no way we can go back to an 'earlier time' and define that difference or re-articulate it anew; nor just introduce a new metaphysical conception of Being as if that crucial moment, not a moment in recorded historical time, of the collapsed difference never occurred. That would be naive. But, in the positivity of Derrida's conclusions, that does not mean we can orient ourselves in different ways to the meaning of difference, even if the difference was erased. As he says, the "erasure of the trace (of the difference) must have been traced." (Derrida 1982, 66) This is so even though "difference (is) itself other than absence and presence, and since difference (is) (itself) trace, the trace of the trace disappeared." (Derrida 1982, 65-66)

Derrida, however, does not examine the temporalization of his own innovative critical constructions, for example how "difference disappeared." (1968, 66) He also does not really explore, in depth, Hegel's treatment of time at the end of *The Science of Logic* or 'Absolute Knowing' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. All we get in footnote 32 of "Ousia and Grammē: A Note on a Note in *Being and Time*" are these scant remarks:

Perhaps this is why there is no other possible answer to the question of the meaning of Being of time than the one given at the end of the *Phenomenology of the Mind*: time is that which erases time. (Derrida 1982, 53)

Derrida does, however, make this momentous point, which he does not explore further:

Nothing other has ever been thought by the name of time. (1982, 60)

Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if something – which bears a relation to time, but is not time – is to be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, it cannot be a question of something that still could be called *time*. (1982, 60)

Regardless of what that ‘other thought’ about time could be or that other “that bears a relation to time which cannot still be called time,” (Derrida 1982, 60) the fact remains in its haunting quality. Irrespective of the creative work by Derrida, unavoidable in its own right, we will, if not naively, resume the project of speculative metaphysics by trying to see time in a different way from Heidegger’s critiques of Aristotle, and even eventually his attempted critiques of Plato and Hegel, by returning to their works. We will start with Aristotle. That means being cognizant of Derrida’s work, which in part is a critique of Heidegger’s main claims, without repeating Derrida’s moves. Our work is definitely post-Derridean, which means it is not pre-Heideggerean or post-Heideggerean either (Thomson 2025).

We have to excavate a four-dimensional temporalization that can only appear if we remain attuned to the inner-motivations propelling Heidegger’s analysis in *Being and Time*, even if it falls short in achieving its goal of developing, further, its breakthrough views on temporality (section 65) and movement (section 72) and their interrelations. Derrida’s essay attests to so many limits in Heidegger’s work. Thus, to keep in mind Derrida, Heidegger, Aristotle, Hegel (and therefore Kant too) on time is daunting to say the least. Leaving that suspended for a moment, however, this return to Aristotle alone does not come without great trepidation and foreboding.

The Opening in and of Aristotle’s Book IV of the *Physics*:

A slow reading of Aristotle’s Book IV risks an infinite task, which we can never complete in one lifetime. But we must take that risk. We begin with one long quote from the very beginning of Chapter 10 of Book IV where the historic inquiry on the mystery of time commences. We are going to bypass the opening question itself that asks us to inquire into “whether or not time is a real entity” and “second what its nature is.” (Aristotle 2008, 102) Let us also forgo the first aporia that in an ‘infinite time’ some parts exist and others do not (Aristotle 2008, 102), for presumably the present exists and past and future do not exist (at least not as a present like the existing present). Present is not just an aspect of time, it is the alleged opposite of what is absent. Hence, the being of time consists of being and non-being, which raises all kinds of dialectical problems for the ancients, particularly Aristotle’s great predecessors. But then the whole of this infinite stretch of time into the past and future cannot be a fully existent thing if some of its parts did not exist (Aristotle 2008, 102) in themselves or other things. Time

begins to strangle itself once you try to conceptualize it. By analogy, I cannot say the whole of the body I was born with in which no limbs were missing exists if I no longer have one of my hands. This is simple enough, and not the point where things get very interesting and very complex in Aristotle's analysis.

In the very next moment, Aristotle ends up admitting that even something as commonplace as a 'now' is not a part of time. (2008, 103) And if any whole consists of parts, then the whole of "time so to speak cannot consist of nows." (Aristotle 2008, 103) If time is whole, then it is not like any other kind of whole when that is taken up in metaphysical conceptualization. *Meta-physics* cannot get us any closer to understanding this 'now' especially if we rely on any subject-object relation or quite frankly any immanentist explanation that collapses that distinction into some deeper existential-materialist ground. Although Aristotle does not name it here, metaphysics will not inquire into the nature of spatialized things that exist or any object of the human senses. This is a good early injunction in Aristotle's thought to get it on a proper footing to really probe the complexity inherent in the question of asking about time, and if, whether, and how it partakes of any kind of being or not.

For his part, Heidegger thinks he is departing from the entire tradition of Western metaphysics, which he says the West presupposes as the "succession of now-points coming to be and passing away" (1962, 377, 379) and how it even came to be that we think entities are in time or 'within-time-ness' (1962, 457) in general. In contrast to the whole tradition, he will articulate – so it appears for the *first time* – the "ecstatic unity of how temporality temporalizes itself as a process." (Heidegger 1962, 377) Yet, section 65 is brief, and so many questions regarding the 'equiprimordiality' of different 'modes of temporalizing' (Heidegger 1962, 378) for three different ecstases remain. So does this mysterious 'process' of how temporality "temporalizes itself rather than emerging from itself." (Heidegger 1962, 377) The interrelations-movements-event of the ecstases in their differences could open up the primordial ground of temporalization, which then helps us think even more deeply about the aporias of linear time that Aristotle, according to Heidegger, takes to a new level given Aristotle's predecessors from the Pre-Socratics to Plato.

We want to take up those reflections in section 65, which includes the missing elements and propositions within it, and go inside Aristotle's text. Imagine swimming to a sunken ship with new tools to fix it since the original tools of the ship are missing. We begin with a long quote in Aristotle's text. Before we take the plunge, let us respect Aristotle's distinctions and modern scholarship that can validate the claims about those distinctions. For example, "time is not change," (Aristotle 2008, 104), but the question of time can be brought into relation with the question of change even if that relation remains undefined. The question is whether it is rational to assume there is a relation between time and change (Coope 2005, 31). Aristotle states:

Moreover, the now appears to divide past from future, but it is not easy to see whether it always stays the same or whether it is always different. Suppose, first, that it is always different. If none of the parts of time, which are successively different, are simultaneous (except that one might contain another, as a longer stretch of time contains a shorter stretch), and if a now which does not exist, but which existed earlier, must have ceased to exist at some time, then, first, nows will not be simultaneous with one another either, and, second, earlier nows must have ceased to exist. An earlier now cannot have ceased to exist during itself, because that is when it exists; but it is also impossible for the earlier now to have ceased to exist during some other now, given that it is impossible for nows to be consecutive as it is for points. So since there is no next now during which the earlier now ceased to exist, but it ceased to exist during some now other than itself, then it must have existed during all the infinitely many nows between itself and that other now. This is impossible, however. But it is also impossible for it to stay perpetually the same, because nothing that is divisible and finite has only one limit, whether it is continuous in one or in more than one dimension. But now is a limit, and a finite time can be grasped. Secondly, assuming that to be temporally simultaneous, rather than being and earlier or later, is to be in one and the same now, if both earlier and later events are within this present now, then things which happened ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous with today's events, and nothing would be either earlier or later than anything else. (2008, 103)

As we move deeper into Aristotle's texts while keeping in mind the key sections of Division Two of *Being and Time* to which we have been referring, namely section 65 on 'ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377) and section 72 on the ontological distinction between 'movement/Bewegtheit' and 'motion/Bewegung' (Heidegger 1962, 427), we take precautions as not to risk groundless assertions about a horizontal four-dimensional temporalization-interrelations-movements-event. We have asserted this possibility throughout our analysis and have stated several times, before, that something absolutely uncanny lies buried in Aristotle's text. And this hidden realm is not one that Heidegger could fully exploit in Division Two of *Being and Time*.

Now the time has come to try to show that is the case. Before we do, however, let us offer the full passage from section 72 where Heidegger makes that key ontological distinction between 'movement' and 'motion.' (1962, 427) Here is the passage within which the distinction sits:

Accordingly it is within the horizon of Dasein's temporal constitution that we must approach the ontological clarification of the 'connectedness of life' – that is to say, the stretching-along, the movement, and the persistence which are specific for Dasein. The movement [Bewegtheit] of existence is not the motion [Bewegung] of something present-at-hand. It is definable in terms of the way Dasein stretches along. The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its 'historizing.' (Heidegger 1962, 427)

At least, here, we have a clear linkage between a.) the 'temporal constitution of Dasein' (Heidegger 1962, 427) within its horizon and b.) that of the 'ontological clarification of the 'connectedness of life' (Heidegger 1962, 427), which is

inclusive of both its ends, namely birth, which is not just a no-longer-now-past, and death, which is not just a yet-to-be-now future, (Heidegger 1962, 426), or any 'point in time' (Heidegger 1962, 426) like a chronologically-dated birth certificate or a dated eulogy in a newspaper. Rather, "the between which relates birth to death already lies in the Being of Dasein," (Heidegger 1962, 426) and when "Dasein factually exists, both the 'ends' and the 'between' are." (Heidegger 1962, 426) This speaks to a whole movement-event, which remains undeveloped in Chapter V of Division Two.

However, these precipitive reflections still emit a spatial connotation of some kind like a living human being with a past birth and yet to be physical death. That is the case, even if those ontic registers are used by way of contrast. This is why Heidegger moves in deeper in raising the more fundamental issue of the "stretching along, the movement, the persistence" (1962, 427) of Dasein. Dasein is not just an entity floating along in linear time and transformed by the passage of time. This itself is rooted in a larger distinction between the 'movement of existence' and the "motion of something present-at-hand." (Heidegger 1962, 427) And hence the ultimate definition of this 'movement' of Dasein as a "stretched along and stretches itself along" (Heidegger 1962, 427) called 'historizing/Geschehen' (Heidegger 1962, 427) emerges. And, to repeat, this has nothing to do with anything in time that is moving, like a train, or an internal decay within a being aging in time, say cellular death of an organism.

Our longstanding hypothesis is that the way to link the problem of the 'equiprimordiality' of the different 'modes of temporalizing' (Heidegger 1962, 378) of the ecstases, each different in relation to the other two, and this problem of 'movement' (Heidegger 1962, 427) is through the possible disclosure of one massive Event buried in Aristotle's passage. Our hypothesis is that the Event is quadruplicitous. To that passage previously quoted we now turn by offering its different parts.

In Aristotle's text, we have to be careful about the problem of a "simultaneity, limit, ceasing-to-be" (2008, 103) in which he is already deconstructing the common assumption that time is a sequence of 'nows.' (2008, 103) These terms do not need to mean what they normally mean: a) simultaneity has many things happening at the same time (two lightning bolts hitting the ground at the same time); b) limit as, for example, water filling up a container right to the edge before it spills over; and c) ceasing-to-be as going from existence into nothing, i.e. a flame going completely out. Hence, relations between new meanings of them can start to appear.

Before Aristotle even distinguishes time from change (say internal metamorphosis of a thing) and both from movement (say change of location of an object), he is already probing the aporetic depths of how a 'now' (presumably anything that is present and existing, whether an empirical object or an imaginative idea) is both the 'same and different' (2008, 103) from itself. No doubt, all the mysterious depths and complexity of Plato's *Parmenides* lurks in the

background. In a way, like Plato's *Parmenides*, genuine thinking can go the furthest, not so much in posing and answering a metaphysical question of being, time, the one, many, etc. Rather, by raising question after another, questions about assumptions to answers to questions and the questions themselves, the mind can dig deeper and deeper in ways that clear out how the most difficult question the mind can pose, namely time itself, can take shape.

In Aristotle, time is a problem. Furthermore, the problem is not just "whether it exists and if it does, what its nature is," (Aristotle 2008, 102) but why thinking confronts limits in encountering the question of time itself; that itself is more difficult than trying to conceptualize time in and of itself if you assume time is something that exists. Time is a self-generating limit for thinking to transcend because of an inner-compulsion to distance itself from any metaphysical concept. This is a point, one can say, first recognized by Heidegger in trying to respond to everything before him, particularly the legacy of German Idealism with Kant and Hegel at the forefront.

Returning to Aristotle's passage, we can take partitioned sections while moving around between them within the larger text of the long paragraph and its place within Chapters 10-14 of Book IV. The first section is the opening of the paragraph:

Moreover, the now appears to divide past from future, but it is not easy to see whether it always stays the same or whether it is always different. (Aristotle 2008, 103)

If the now has a purpose, which seems to illustrate the passage of something akin to the movement of something or the movement of something in something else, it would 'appear' to distinguish a 'past' from a 'future.' (Aristotle 2008, 103) That seems simple enough because today is not yesterday or tomorrow for example. But in terms of its Being the matter is not simple; if the function is to divide parts (which if something is divisible, then it is potentially infinitely divisible as Aristotle said), then within the now, an infinite number of slices can be created to create an infinity of pasts in one direction and an infinity of futures in another direction. Those non-existent parts can only make sense in reference to the part that exists, namely, the present, and hence any relation of past-present-future. Yet, somehow, in this internal differentiation of one now, there is also movement and passage. Even this simple statement is not watching a fixed line that does not move and then following a point that moves along on it in either directions or both simultaneously; for example a present moving into a future, leaving its former spot to become a past while taking the place of that future as a new present, which in turn makes another future appear after that new present, and so on. If the now were to hang over this whole process, and remain itself, namely the 'same,' while its dividing itself, and hence differentiating itself by breaking off parts of itself named as non-existent, then we have one metaphysical limit in trying to understand what this elusive 'sameness' even means. The now, nevertheless, has a dividing function, and therefore is related to a 'limit.' In a prior

moment, Aristotle would say anything that divides its living self or being into parts that do not exist means those parts could not share in anything that exists; and hence for something to exist in itself without undergoing change, it cannot divide itself into non-existent, parts, for example Leibniz's idea of simple substance in a monad (Leibniz [1714] 1948, 217).

Yet, even this very simple moment of the event of differentiation, of splitting apart, which cannot exist in a self-same substance that does not change, that event, itself, cannot take place in a now in order for a now to serve its function to divide. This may be akin to Derrida's 'différance'; or the event of differentiation but also delaying or postponing, either as the arrival of something to the present or delaying an action that should take place in the present but postponed to the future (Derrida 1982, 8). Or to be more precise, we can briefly detour through Derrida's own elaboration of this "neither word nor concept" (1982, 7) as the protean sense of 'différance':

We know that the verb differer (Latin verb differre) has two meanings which seem quite distinct; for example in Littre they are the object of two separate articles. In this sense the Latin differre is not simply a translation of the Greek diapherein, and this will not be without consequences for us, linking our discourse to a particular language, and to a language that passes as less philosophical, less originally philosophical than the other. For the distribution of meaning in the Greek diapherein does not comport one of the two motifs of the Latin differre, to wit, the action of putting off until later, of taking into account, of taking account of time and of the forces of an operation that implies an economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation-concepts that I would summarize here in a word I have never used but that could be inscribed in this chain: temporization. Differer in this sense is to temporize, to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of 'desire' or 'will,' and equally effects this suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers its own effect. And we will see, later, how this temporization is also temporalization and spacing, the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time, the 'originary constitution' of time and space, as metaphysics or transcendental phenomenology would say, to use the language that here is criticized and displaced.

The other sense of differer is the more common and identifiable one: to be not identical, to be other, discernible, etc. When dealing with differen(ts)(ds), a word that can be written with a final ts or a final ds, as you will, whether it is a question of dissimilar otherness or of allergic and polemical otherness, an interval, a distance, spacing, must be produced between the elements other, and be produced with a certain perseverance in repetition.

Now the word difference (with an e) can never refer either to differer as temporization or to differends as polemics. (1982, 7-8)

This dense passage requires a separate investigation in its own right. It seems the written or spoken 'difference,' which can only mean to separate, divide, or make unlike between two things (A does not equal B), can never take on the

two simultaneous or non-simultaneous possibilities of 'différance' as 'temporization or polemos' (Derrida 1982, 8). When one speaks, we cannot see the written version of the two distinct words on the paper, but only when one reads or writes them. But curiously enough, we can ask Derrida: then what is the *difference/différance* when one hears the word and can imagine both possibilities vs. reading one of them and only seeing one word or both at the same time? He might say that is precisely the point, the ambiguity in speech does not lead to any certitude of signification; and the play within writing opens up possibilities that are distinct from any original intent of a speaker or sender. Hence, it is not about inverting the long-standing hierarchy of writing over speech when speech has dominated the history of everything, of metaphysics, of knowledge, etc; but to show the asymmetries of how both have operated in relation to one another in order to reveal hidden possibilities for thought that remain unexcavated. Either way, this "becoming-time of space and becoming-space of time, 'the originary constitution' of time and space, as metaphysics and transcendental phenomenology" belongs to the "language that here is criticized and displaced." (Derrida 1982, 8) Let us keep in mind Derrida's reflections on the *difference* between difference and 'différance' as we try to differentiate our thinking on time in Aristotle as to return to what is missing in Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Indeed, there is another horizon that Derrida did not see, and therefore his own interesting critiques of the history of the metaphysics of conceptualizing of time could not capture within its finely-constructed traps.

We go back to Aristotle, but we have to keep in mind that even this start will be highly preliminary, therefore setting up the need to continue our analysis in a future effort. What we can do is lay out some problems in attempting a critical appropriation of Aristotle's text to see what we can begin to outline in Division Two of *Being and Time* with regard to the relation between 'ecstatic temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380) and "movement as an event of historizing." (Heidegger 1962, 427) Here is the remainder of Aristotle's text:

Suppose, first, that it is always different. If none of the parts of time, which are successively different, are simultaneous (except that one might contain another, as a longer stretch of time contains a shorter stretch), and if a now which does not exist, but which existed earlier, must have ceased to exist at some time, then, first, nows will not be simultaneous with one another either, and, second, earlier nows must have ceased to exist. An earlier now cannot have ceased to exist during itself, because that is when it exists; but it is also impossible for the earlier now to have ceased to exist during some other now, given that it is impossible for nows to be consecutive as it is for points. So since there is no next now during which the earlier now ceased to exist, but it ceased to exist during some now other than itself, then it must have existed during all the infinitely many nows between itself and that other now. This is impossible, however. But it is also impossible for it to stay perpetually the same, because nothing that is divisible and finite has only one limit, whether it is continuous in one or in more than one dimension. But now is a limit, and a finite time can be grasped. Secondly, assuming that to be temporally simultaneous, rather than being and earlier or

later, is to be in one and the same now, if both earlier and later events are within this present now, then things which happened ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous with today's events, and nothing would be either earlier or later than anything else. (Aristotle 2008, 103)

The 'now' is not a bounded entity like an object that is completely distinct from something else. Or we can say that the now – ontologically – is not like a bounded entity or does not exist as such. If it is not bounded, it is not boundless either. This is not about magnitude in and of space. Even if it is not that ontically, whatever its Being is, it can be neither same with itself nor different from itself. Aristotle's greatness is to show, logically, how going down the path of self-sameness or self-differentiation falls into various contradictions and errors. But our point is not to retread his argument and just reaffirm what he has already stated. And we have yet to get to the physical definition that humans, particularly scientists, still use: namely measuring time by counting the movement of ticks on a numbered clock. Rather, we want to ask what is not articulated in Aristotle's seminal text through the following guiding questions:

- Why does the entry point into the question of time become the aporia of why we cannot even rely on the now-point to inhabit what that question means for us?
- Could a phenomenological reduction of all immediate intuitions of why this question appears the way it does to us, with everything at stake in it, still gives us the ambition, perhaps a false one, of resuming Aristotle's questioning without his necessary blind spots?
- How can interrelations in the 'difference' part of the aporia point to other paradoxes of the being vs becoming distinction when we partition time into a present now, past as no longer now, and future as yet to be now?
- How the simultaneity of an 'earlier' and 'later' in a 'now' collapses past and future into the existing present, which leads to absurdity, as much as keeping them apart gives them existence even though they are not supposed to be?
- Could a non-now point, non-presence, and non-absence be revealed as a swirling vortex of possibilities that then re-orient ourselves to another side of Aristotle's aporia, which has never been revealed, for example in Heidegger's 'destruction' (1962, 41) and Derrida's deconstruction as 'différance?' (1982, 67)

With these and there are more, we can deconstruct Heidegger's will to 'unity' (1962, 427) in his passage that links 'the temporal constitution of Dasein' (1962, 427) with the peculiar, singular, uncanny 'movement as a stretching-along and stretching itself' (1962, 427) event, which fails to develop fully in the sections after 72 in Chapter V before being completely abandoned in Chapter VI; the latter of course, is where Heidegger ends his grandiose work, *Being and Time*, by coming up to and against the giants in Aristotle, Plato, Augustine (briefly), and then Hegel.

We can try to put forward the following propositions, which themselves contain questions that can be pursued in a future investigation. It is possible to

intuit the possibility of imagining – without any empirical content to invoke a Kantian limit – of a third horizon, which does not partake of the ‘sensible’ and ‘intelligible,’ and hence not a revocation of Kant’s ‘schematism.’ (1998, 272) Rather, we speak of a third horizon beyond the simultaneity or succession of anything while questioning, like Heidegger, why and how ‘within-time-ness’ (1962, 456) even becomes a question for us. This way we do not think of time being simultaneous or successive with itself and within itself, or a pure repetition of Aristotle’s reasoning. The two sides of Aristotle’s aporia of being neither the same with itself nor different from itself with respect to how a ‘now’ divides itself into non-existent beings, namely past as now longer now and future as yet to be now, is itself not within the presence of another now (Aristotle 2008, 103). This much we can give to Aristotle.

But then the question of how a ‘stretching’ (Aristotle 2008, 103) takes place, to be compared and contrasted with Heidegger’s definition of “ontological movement as stretched and stretching itself,” (1962, 427) means we do not have to assume, in terms of spatialized thinking, the following observation: how the now ceases to exist in itself to become the no longer now, which itself is aligned with an ‘earlier,’ just as much as another now comes into being, which is thought of as ‘later’ with regard to a previous now that once existed and has disappeared. One disappears to become, and the other appears from non-being. We have to cross out all intuitions or objects of empirical sense that descend on us when the words – ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ – even manifest; for it could turn out that they conceal possibilities that are with us when we think through common sense that they are always outside of us. (For example a being living now whose birth is not happening now and neither is its death; and definitely not like birth and death happening together in a religious event of resurrection or reincarnation.)

Rather, let us imagine the possibility of articulating something other to origin and other to end, just as we imagine an origin and end (i.e. the beginning of the year 2025 and its end), and how any alignment with an ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ can happen by way of a crossed-out ‘now.’ There ‘is’ something other to ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ in relation to what is other to origin and end. For example, there is something other than the origin of 2025 and its end, which is not just 2024 before the origin and 2026 after the end; those are just numbers on a calendar, and not the ground from which such numbering can arise. We will have to ask about the relations of these four: origin, end, other than origin, and other than end, whereby what is other is not just a negation of origin and end, or some version of timelessness like eternity.

Hence, a four-dimensionality, beyond the succession or simultaneity of four possibilities (origin, end, what are others to both), can reveal interrelations between what is same and different, without being either one, of time itself, in a deeper sense, with respect to the problem of movement. These interrelations as possibilities are not present beings in existence. This is so, especially, if we do not start with an origin to arrive at an end, say the end of the present to become past

and the origin of the future to create a new present when the former present becomes past. We are also not accumulating more time, adding one second to another in the uni-directional flow of history. What is other to origin and end is precisely the hidden dimension in Aristotle's inquiry of the *aporia* – how an impossibility arises when thinking time in relation to movement as either a simultaneous phenomenon or a successive phenomenon.

The simplest way to restate the consequences of Aristotle's *aporia* is this: the *nows* cannot be successive with one another because they cannot just stay the same without dividing one now into a no longer now and yet to be now, and then be lined up with each other as if nothing changed; that would be like time as a whole entity (present dividing into past and future along one line) multiplying or cloning versions of itself in which we would have an infinite regression of sets of past, present, future juxtaposed with one another. They would just be lines next to lines, whether continuous or discontinuous. That would be absurd as Aristotle notes since "*nows* cannot be consecutive like points." (2008, 103)

Then again, if there is no change, then events of the past (i.e. the asteroid that killed the dinosaurs 60 million years ago) will be simultaneous with today's clock moving through its seconds, minutes, and hours in one direction. That was Aristotle's last point in the passage. (Let us leave aside the speculative consequences of today's scientific physics on parallel universes, time travel, speed of light, and multiple dimensions more fundamental than Einstein's unified space-time itself in which some other alien species can be viewing our past or future on earth.) Hence, we need to deconstruct, not so much the metaphysical conceptions of change and movement handed down to us in the Western philosophical tradition, but how the question of time even came about as a problem linked with change and motion, which themselves became problems. Problems entangled with problems have arisen, but no one knows why. However, we must do such rigorous questioning without reliance on human perception and experience unlike all sciences today, the social sciences, and quite frankly any kind of philosophy that needs to begin and end with human language and subjectivity. There has never been a human being in history who has successfully written down a theory of non-spatialized, non-physical, and non-existential four-dimensional time, which has then passed down to us humans for us to understand. Such a theory would literally be quite alien from a human's standpoint.

We have yet to scratch the surface of interpreting – with a new lens – Aristotle's passage while reinhabiting all the problems presented in Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. For *now*, all we can do is offer a summary of points in our conclusion. We can only close by saying that continuing the analysis of Aristotle before moving to Plato, and back to Aristotle and Augustine, in section 81 of Division Two is the necessary step before reopening all the problems presented in Hegel. Once we get to Hegel, we will have to start with 'Absolute Knowing' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which is where Heidegger's *Being and Time* ends in a cataclysmic clash; not quite an ending to Heidegger's momentous

work but a suspension regarding the very meaning of the question of time. This is where our own investigation began.

Conclusion

This article is Part II of a two-article series. Both articles attempted to present a hypothesis regarding a four-dimensional ground. We are exploring a way that could link Heidegger's novel articulations of a "primordial, ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic temporalizing of temporality" (Heidegger 1962, 380), the 'equiprimordiality' of 'differing modes of temporalizing' (Heidegger 1962, 378), for each of the three ectases – "the future in the process of having been in making present" (Heidegger 1962, 374) –, with the ontological distinction between "movement as stretched and self-stretching" event and 'motion' (Heidegger 1962, 427) as a change of location in place or change of thing in itself. Time and movement in relations with one another constitute one massive Event that can then derive the paradoxes and aporias of why and how all Western thought on the relations and differences between past, present, and future come to be possible and what that means for human thought in general. Furthermore, following Heidegger, the whole question of why and how we think of things 'in time' needs further development.

'Coming to be' is not a question about historical origins though. The way to achieve this, which remains unaccomplished in Heidegger's *Being and Time* and before and after it in Heidegger's thought for that matter, is to return to the actual texts of Aristotle; but we must do so first with a view to moving on to Plato to set up another encounter with Hegel, who himself is responding to Kant. The ultimate encounter with Hegel on 'time, movement, the Notion, nature, and history' in 'Absolute Knowing' of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1977, 492) can be resituated within *Being and Time* to pass beyond its Division Two into a new Division Three. By then, we will be back into the problem of time becoming a question in an authentic way with respect to the Western philosophical tradition, both the question of the meaning of time's being and the meaning of the question. This would mark a whole new start in contrast to Heidegger's opening question about the meaning of Being (1962, 19) by way of his 'Dasein-analytic' (1962, 65) as a preparatory step to conduct fundamental ontology. We, however, are not after an answer to the question of the meaning of Being. We want to answer Heidegger's last question in *Being and Time* (1962, 488) and show what the revelation of time 'is' or the very being of time as four-dimensional.

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