

Reading Section 81 on the Within-Time- Ness and the Origin of the Ordinary Concept of Time in Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927): Part One

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Abstract: This article is Part One of a two-article series. This first article introduces a twofold hypothesis regarding the incompleteness of Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time* and the possibility of constructing anew its missing Division Three. The focus will be a close reading of section 81 of Chapter VI of Division Two. The first part of the hypothesis is that a non-linear, non-circular, and non-rectilinear four-dimensional temporalization is buried beneath Heidegger's articulations of the 'equiprimordial, ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic, temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377-380), which derives both the 'endless, infinite time of arising and passing away' of now points in and as ongoing linear time (Heidegger 1962, 379); and that this linear time consists of past (no longer now), present (now), and future (yet to be now), in which the 'ready-to-hand arises and passes away' (Heidegger 1962, 379). The second part of the hypothesis asserts that in order to excavate this four-dimensional temporalization, we must un-do Heidegger's treatment of Plato and Aristotle, particularly in section 81, which is the penultimate chapter before he confronts Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in section 82. We argue that this is necessary in order to frame a comprehensive analysis of how Heidegger treats Hegel at the end of *Being and Time* in order to go beyond *Being and Time* itself.

Keywords: Heidegger, ontology, metaphysics, phenomenology.

Introduction

This first article – Part One – of the two-article series will conduct a close reading of Section 81 'Within-time-ness and the Genesis of the Ordinary Conception of Time' in Chapter VI of Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. It is key for several reasons. It precedes the last two sections of Division Two, which conclude the treatise, but also leaves us in suspense with a previously announced Division Three in the Introduction (Heidegger 1962, 64). The reasons for Division Three's non-appearance are vast and complex (Kisiel 2015 as cited in Braver 2015). Section 82 begins a short critical treatment of Hegel, while referring back to Plato and Aristotle, particularly the latter's *Physics*. Although our ultimate goal is to engage in an exhaustive reading of section 82, particularly on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic*, we feel it necessary to subject section 81 to an extensive critical analysis.

In section 81, we see Heidegger directly engaging texts by Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine. And of course, section 83, the very last section of the whole book, concludes with a question: “Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?” (Heidegger 1962, 488) There is no answer to this question that follows. But we do have the clue of the title of the missing Division Three – ‘time and Being’ – in the Introduction to *Being and Time* as well as announcing Part Two with its ‘three divisions’ that will elucidate Kant’s ‘schematism,’ Descartes’s ‘cogito ergo sum,’ and Aristotle on time (Heidegger 1962, 64).

If we were to imagine our own treatise in response to *Being and Time* and its promised divisions and second part, we might call it *Being as Time, the Being of Time*, or just *Time*. The immediate intuitions and apperceptive possibilities of what these phrases and terms mean foreclose the idea of two separate entities – being and time – and their potential relations or interrelations. A single monistic event that binds the relations of the terms is also foreclosed at this juncture. Our attempt would be irreducible to everything that immediately follows *Being and Time* in Heidegger’s lecture courses – *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927) *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (1927), *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1928), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), *Four Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics- World-Finitude-Solitude* (1929), *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit* (1930), *Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book IX* (1931) and *The Essence of Truth* (1931). This is a big claim.

The only way to verify it is through the work of negation and labor, to go back and revisit the primary passages and moments in Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel; but, we do so in light of another horizon of temporality that Heidegger himself did not articulate or the generations of creative philosophers that came after him in the twentieth-century, for example, Levinas and Derrida. This work falls in the realm of speculative metaphysics, which in different ways could be considered suspicious given the irreversible critiques of the limits of metaphysics, at least since Kant, and then Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and closer to our time, Derrida. It is our responsibility to overcome this epochal hesitation and skepticism towards the metaphysics of presence and the present, which escalated in the 1960s and remains to this day (Thomson 2011).

Our goal is to conduct a careful analysis of how Heidegger interprets key passages in Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine in the original Greek and Latin. We will keep in the background attempts to critique Heidegger’s treatment, such as Derrida’s 1968 essay – ‘Ousia and Grammê: A Note on a Note from *Being and Time*,’ later republished in 1972 in *Margins of Philosophy* (1982). Our assumption is not to reproduce various attempts to critique Heidegger, such as Derrida’s, or broadly speaking, critical evaluations of Heidegger’s treatment of Hegel in section 82, for example Robert Pippin’s recent work on Heidegger and Hegel (2025). Neither of these works offer anything like the missing Division Three as the passage from *Being and Time* to something else that is also not a reproduction or dismissal of everything in Heidegger before and after *Being and Time*. Could we postulate

something like an-other Heidegger? That would be bombastic and superficial. The scholarship on the missing Division Three is not negligible (Kisiel 1996; Braver 2015; Thomson 2011).

We will assume that the bridge between Division Two of *Being and Time* and what could be a 'Division Three' would require a simultaneous expansion of Heidegger's own formulations in Division Two, and Division One, and, moreover, his whole available corpus, early pre-*Being and Time* and later post-*Being and Time* periods. But this time we do so with the explicit aim of continuing where the Dasein'analytic left off – as a presupposition to do fundamental ontology anew – while rejuvenating old seeds buried in ancient ontologies of time and movement, particularly in Plato and Aristotle. In this way, we remain in the indefiniteness of a completed event that reoccupies *Being and Time*, ecstatically within it but also outside it; this is likened to the finite temporalization of *Being and Time* itself as the passage-movement-event to its other Division. It is as if we remain caught in the cocoon of *Being and Time* with no knowledge of what came after. But this is, obviously, not the case since we do know the decades of works that followed from the late 1920s to the 1960s (Thomson 2011; Sheehan 2014; Mitchell 2015). Having said, that, we are not interested in deconstructing the complexity of modern linguistics on verb tenses of 'to be' (Kisiel 2015 as cited in Braver 2015, 150) as a way of deepening Heidegger's initial reflections on the 'ecstatical unity of Dasein.' (Kisiel 2015 as cited in Braver 2015, 152) The so-called unity or whole of Dasein would, ultimately, answer fundamental ontology's question of the meaning of Being itself. However, we move in a different direction.

This will require engaging Plato's *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* and Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* on how the question of time is being presented and the abyssal limits of human understanding that both great founders of Western philosophy attest. It requires a speculative metaphysical will, an anathema to the long epochal stretch that followed after Hegel as an attempt to critique Hegel in the works of the later Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche up to Heidegger himself. Some refer to this period in continental European philosophical thought after Hegel up to thinkers after Heidegger, such as Levinas and Derrida, as the 'philosophers of finitude.' (Winkler 2018) Others point to the 'linguistic turn' (Rorty 1967) with the birth of analytic philosophy in the innovations of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein and within French thought de Saussure to Derrida. Today, the work of analytic and continental philosophy is so specialized and narrow that such an undertaking would seem absurd (Becker and Thomson 2025), as if one's time is out of joint.

Our undertaking is an active creative destruction within Heidegger's *Being and Time* to infiltrate, take-over, and appropriate its project rather than an attempted external critique of Heidegger by retrieving what remains salient in the ancient philosophical foundations of the West. This also means forgoing those who wish to critique and dismiss Heidegger as incoherent or failing to give adequate treatment to what remains in Kant and Hegel; as if what German

Idealism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries began is that with which we must continue to engage for the future of philosophy, for example the Anglo-American work of Pippin (2025) or the continental European work of Zizek (2012). Rather, this is about the self-actualization of passage as movement, which in turn lays down the possibility to re-engage with Heidegger's works, Kant's and Hegel's without subscribing wholesale to either of the three. Four-dimensional time constitutes a complex horizon that cannot be reduced to any moment in the thought of Heidegger, Kant, and Hegel. For us, this marks the threshold of an epoch in which twentieth-century philosophies of time have closed in so far as no new attempt on the scale of Heidegger's *Being and Time* has been made thus far. This includes great French critical appropriations and departures in the writings of twentieth-century figures such as Levinas (1961, 1974) and Derrida (1967, 1972).

Our hypothesis for this analysis is two-fold. 1.) We will see if an unarticulated four-dimensional temporalizing-interrelating-movement-event lurks beneath Heidegger's own under-developed articulations, at least from section 65 of Chapter III onwards, in Division Two on 'equiprimordial, ecstatic, finite, authentic, unified, temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 378-380); the latter in turn derives the 'inauthentic, common, infinite,' spatialized notion of time as a linear flow, 'of the coming to be and passing away of now-points,' (Heidegger 1962, 377-379) particularly when measured by clock and calendar time. And 2.), we will ask whether this flowering of four-dimensional time requires a speculative metaphysical expansion of Plato and Aristotle as a precursor to reevaluate Hegel having passed through Kant. This, in turn, foreshadows what we will eventually find as a long-simmering need to surpass Hegel's ambitiously creative response to Kant's own limits in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. We will argue that this is something Heidegger recognizes throughout his life's work before and after *Being and Time*, for example from lectures or publications in 1930-1931, 1938-1939, 1941-1942, 1950, and 1958 (Pippin 2025).

In Kant's great work, we need to isolate the relative few pages on time in 'First Part: Transcendental aesthetic' within 'I. The Transcendental doctrine of elements'; and time in 'Chapter 1: On the schematism of pure concepts of understanding' in 'Book II. Analytic of principles' in 'Division one. Transcendental analytic' within the 'Second part. Transcendental logic' (Kant 1998, 86-87). To understand Hegel's attempt to surpass Kant's limits, we must re-occupy the depths of the last chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, namely paragraphs 800-808 in 'Absolute Knowing,' and then the greater *Science of Logic*, particularly the last chapter – 'The Absolute Idea' – of 'Section Three: The Idea' of 'Volume Two: The Science of Subjective Logic or The Doctrine of the Concept.' (Hegel 2010, 4) But that will have to be worked out in a separate work.

For now, all we can say is that a 'four'-dimensional, non-spatialized, temporalizing-interrelations-movement-event is not explicitly articulated by Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time*, and cannot be said to have been intuited, conceived, described, or explicated in the thought of the four giants to which

Heidegger is indebted, namely Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. For the moment, we can say that when it comes to four-dimensional time, do not think of two events happening successively or an object moving through space one-directionally and hence traversing two successive locations; and do not think of two events occurring simultaneously, say two lightning bolts striking at same time or a monad coming into existence and disappearing at the same time. It is the relationality of all four events – successive and simultaneous sets of two – but irreducible to them that is in question. Then again, we must be careful in our use of language, such as ‘dimensionality,’ because we do not connote anything like space or geometry, or concepts from either the natural sciences, or at least anything since Kant’s transcendental critique of dogmatic metaphysics. And lastly, we are not considering space in the massive shifts in Western philosophy from Kant’s critical philosophy to Husserl’s phenomenology. Therefore, any spatialization of subjective or objective time is inadmissible in our project.

Instead, we are speaking about the deep philosophical conditions that underpin the common notion of linear-time consisting of three aspects of the ‘present now, the past as no longer now and the future as yet to be now.’ (Heidegger 1962, 374-375) We have to abandon this linear conception by going underneath it or what amounts to the same verbiage as that which lies above it as its horizon, all of which is non-spatial. As Derrida states in ‘Ousia and Grammē’: “nothing other that can be thought by the name of time” (1982, 60) has been handed down to us, and if it were to happen, it would not signify what time has been characterized as in the history of Western philosophy. That includes fascinating figures from Plato to Plotinus to Leibniz to Bergson. Thinking with Heidegger, our understanding of ‘temporality as the meaning of the Being of Dasein’ (1962, 38) has nothing to do with linear time, its paradoxes, and aporias as handed down in the West from Aristotle. This marks Heidegger’s break with the long-standing tradition that precedes him. And so if we have to abandon the use of the word ‘time,’ then we will strongly consider it. It may not even be of Western philosophical origin, but that is saying too much at this point.

Furthermore, as Chapter VI of Division Two of *Being and Time* initiates, we have to question, along with Heidegger, how this whole sense of being ‘within-time’ even came about. This requires going back to Aristotle’s original inquiries on the matter (Aristotle, 2008, 110), but with one caveat. Having read Hegel and then Heidegger’s attempted critique of Hegel, the re-occupation of Aristotle must learn from Heidegger’s oversights that required a reductive reading of Hegel. All the while, we cannot lose sight of Derrida’s 1968 attempt to question Heidegger in returning to Aristotle and Hegel in his ‘Ousia and Gramme: A Note on a Note from *Being and Time*.’ Unlike Derrida’s injunction to refuse naming that which would be other than what the West has known to be ‘time,’ (Derrida 1982, 60) we venture into that realm of what may be Other to the West.

The Anatomy of Section 81:

Let us begin reading each line in section 81 as we expand on each of its impulses and buried assumptions. Section 81 sits within 'Chapter VI: Temporality and Within-Time-Ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time.' (Heidegger 1962, 456) The chapter is vast, complex, and yet under-developed in so many ways. Section 78 announces the 'incompleteness of the foregoing Temporal analysis of Dasein' (Heidegger 1962, 456). Dasein's 'Being is interpreted in terms of temporality,' (Heidegger 1962, 457) but this requires examining the 'behavior' of 'Dasein as temporality temporalizes a relation to time by taking it into its reckoning (Heidegger 1962, 457). This is not based on any kind of subject-object split, for example a subject contemplating what time 'is' external to itself or stating objectively what time 'is' internal to us as human beings in our psychological makeup. Heidegger even states this at the very end of the 1925 lecture course on the *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, which many consider as the outline of what would become *Being and Time* just a year later:

Time is not something which is found outside somewhere as a framework for world events. Time is even less something which whirls away inside in consciousness. (Heidegger 1984, 319)

We can not say what Dasein is, especially as any entity 'readiness-to-hand' (Heidegger 1962, 98) or 'present-at-hand.' (Heidegger 1962, 67) Rather, we must think of an event of self-reckoning of Dasein in relation to its time that does not first begin in a present, which then either moves into the past present or the future present, or the future dawning on the present shoving into the past or the past grasping the present to make room for the future to take its place. It is not even the *presenting* of a future out of the present or itself, out of something not present, or the past from the present or from itself, which is never present. In fairness to Heidegger, this is not a simple reproduction of Aristotle's aporias, and not because of the explicit intention in Heidegger to introduce an 'existential-temporal' (Heidegger 1962, 457) analysis of what lies buried in Aristotle.

We would have to venture a self-relation of the reckoning, namely the relation to time as time is reckoned in the relation without assuming that time is anything, for example, unlike money which is gained or lost. What to do with one's time, especially the whole stretch of a life from birth to death, is not what one does in linear time, namely grow, develop, age, take on a vocation, have responsibilities, and eventually die as a biological being. Nor is it the mystery of an 'afterlife' attested in near-death experiences; that too requires human subjects that die clinically, return, and testify as to their out-of-body experiences (Shushan, 2024). This is what makes the sections after section 65 within the whole of Division Two so difficult to understand. Chapter I of Division Two already deconstructed death (Heidegger 1962, 279); now the task is to deconstruct heretofore any previous assumptions about the relation of death and time, or how one may prefigure the understanding of the other and vice-versa, in the history of religion, philosophy,

and science. There is nothing in Heidegger's early work that can be contained in the realm of spirituality and mysticism.

Furthermore, already in this opening section 78 of Chapter VI, Heidegger's purely philosophical ambition does not abate. In addition to the 'incompleteness' of everything considered prior to Chapter VI in Division Two, 'world-time' still needs to be considered. By extension:

World-time, in the rigorous sense of the existential-temporal conception of the world, belongs to temporality itself. We must come to understand how this is possible and why it is necessary. Thus the 'time' which is familiar to us in the ordinary way – the time 'in which' entities occur – will be illuminated, and so will the 'within-time-ness' of these entities. (Heidegger 1962, 457)

By now, Heidegger has told us innumerable times that from Aristotle all the way down to Kant and Hegel, this 'ordinary' conception, not just of linear, flowing time, which seems obvious and everyday, but the very assumption of 'being within-time' has not undergone rigorous questioning and destruction in the history of Western philosophical thought. At least that is Heidegger's claim. The aporetic knot that Heidegger begins the entire Chapter VI with is contained in this formulation:

How and why Dasein comes to develop the ordinary conception of time, must be clarified in terms of its state-of-Being as concerning itself with time- a state of Being with a temporal foundation. The ordinary conception of time owes its origin to a way in which primordial time has been levelled off. By demonstrating that this is the source of the ordinary conception, we shall justify our earlier Interpretation of temporality as *primordial time*. (1962, 457)

To summarise to this point, we see that the 'ordinary conception of time' has an 'origin,' but this 'origin or source' comes about by a 'levelling off' of a more 'primordial time,' which of course constitutes the Being of Dasein as Care, which we find in section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 375). This origin is not an empirical origin in historical time that can be discovered like an ancient Roman artifact. This, for Heidegger, is rather unfortunate. Because now we need to understand not only the 'leveling-off' (Heidegger 1962, 457) and its link to how the ordinary conception of time originates, presumably from Aristotle (and before him in Plato's *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*) down to Kant and Hegel. That is all fine. But the real question is that Heidegger does not devote a substantial amount of pages to what is announced at the outset of Chapter VI since he is nearing the end of Division Two and hence *Being and Time* itself; that is, we are teased into following him in to what his ambition really demands, namely the all-important elaboration of how 'within-time-ness' (Heidegger 1962, 457) even came about. In short, the 'origin of 'within-time-ness' (Heidegger 1962, 457) cannot be *within* something else.

To develop this notion of Dasein's relational 'self-reckoning or concerning itself with 'its time' and the 'state of Being with a temporal foundation' (Heidegger 1962, 457) requires a much deeper probing than we are given. Contrary to

everything that follows in section 79, namely 'datability' (Heidegger 1962, 459), the 'during, lasting, and span,' (Heidegger 1962, 462) and the 'allotment of time to Dasein so it can take time or lose it' through a 'disclosure...grounded in Dasein's own temporality as ecstatically stretched along,' (Heidegger 1962, 463) we turn our attention elsewhere. That means, we also turn away from all that follows in section 80, namely, 'the real making-public of time' in 'Dasein's thrownness,' (Heidegger 1962, 464) which in turn guarantees how 'ready-to-hand and present-at-hand entities within the world' are 'encountered within time.' (Heidegger 1962, 465)

As we know, Heidegger is concerned with the Being of Dasein grounded in the 'ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377) from section 65 in Chapter III and the unresolved issue of Dasein's 'two ends' as 'being-towards-birth and being-towards-death' (Heidegger 1962, 425) in section 72 of Chapter V, whereby the distinction between ontological 'movement/Bewegtheit' and spatialized ontic 'motion' is announced (Heidegger 1962, 427). No synthesis of the great insights on temporality from section 65 in Chapter III to sections 72-75 on 'movement' in Chapter V is achieved in *Being and Time*. According to our twofold hypothesis this requires a re-engagement with Plato, Aristotle and Kant leading up to the encounter with Hegel within *Being and Time*. But to revisit them means absorbing all of Heidegger's critiques of them at the same time. This is not a return to a pre-Heidegger moment in the history of philosophy.

Heidegger reminds us he is not concerned with 'entities that are not Dasein' like the 'ready-to-hand and present-at-hand within the world,' which require that they be situated 'within public time.' (Heidegger 1962, 465) This means no things, objects, entities, even other human beings, are of concern. This would therefore have to include even one's own body or self or some imagined 'I' that resides with them (Heidegger 1962, 150). But he spends the rest of section 80 trying to reckon with this 'public time' and its 'Being.' (Heidegger 1962, 465) As fallen and thrown, Dasein is concerned with itself whose basic state is 'being-in-the-world.' (Heidegger 1962, 465)

We, however, are not concerned with being-in-the-world at all. In terms of the aporias, limits, and power of constructions that we find in the thread that runs through and divides among itself the 'tradition' from Plato to Aristotle to Kant to Hegel, there is a speculative metaphysical will to resurrect. Heidegger, for his part, tries to get at why 'clocks' even gain significance for Dasein; he tries to do so from a more primordial analysis of 'circumspective concern' (Heidegger 1962, 467) of Dasein in the world to make 'existential-ontological meaning' (Heidegger 1962, 467) of its being in its usage of its own time, i.e doing something meaningful or wasting away. It is not about existing in linear time or flowing along with it. That, of course, will become his concern in the lectures right after *Being and Time* for the remainder of the late 1920s, for example in *The Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (1995). Yet, in many respects this is all very ontic, the very opposite of speculative metaphysics, even though the ontic realm,

too, does not devolve into something simply present, along with other empirical or imagined beings in the world.

We, however, want to go right into the philosophical depths, again, of Plato and Aristotle leading up to Kant before Section 82's full-on encounter with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. A subset of our twofold hypothesis is that we do not presuppose the human being as the beginning or end of the analysis as we consider the other temporal horizon that eluded Heidegger. Then again, we are not turning to theology or religion, whether on the monotheistic God of the West and the Abrahamic faiths globally or the religions of the East, whether they have a creator God in their systems or not. We certainly are not turning to the human-God synthesis of the Incarnation within the Three Persons = One God of dogmatic Christianity, namely Jesus Christ, conceived from the Holy Spirit, as the Son of God the Father.

Instead, the 'Divine Creator' in Plato, the 'Prime Mover' in Aristotle, and the 'Notion' in Hegel are irreducible to the human being, on the one hand, and the God or gods of world religions on the other. How Dasein relates to the question of the meaning of the being of human beings, which cannot be answered by the history of answers in traditional metaphysics, is an open matter to which vast amounts of scholarly work has tried to respond (Wrathall 2013). Fundamental ontology derives all conceptions of the human, whether from the social or natural sciences (Thomson as cited in Braver 2015), especially when situating human beings in linear time with a fixed birth and death; but it also questions the ontic nature of theology, which proclaims transcendence over beings, including human beings, but still assumes that such transcending Being is an entity (Heidegger 1962, 34); or theology presents itself as a 'science of some phenomenon' (Heidegger 1962, 50), even though never a positivistic social or natural science. Heidegger's self-proclaimed breakthrough from the entire history of metaphysics and human sciences before him is this: that all of these assumptions have to be 'destroyed' as he says in section 6 (Heidegger 1962, 41) in order to clear a way for the 'question of the meaning of Being to be posed anew' without assuming the meaning of the question itself (Heidegger 1962, 19). To do so requires the creation of the 'Dasein-analytic,' (Heidegger 1962, 34) which is what *Being and Time*'s first two divisions attempt to do.

But how the Dasein of the first two divisions of *Being and Time* is made distinct from the main subjects in Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel with regard to substance and time is another matter. And a third difference is between the entire possibility of fundamental ontology being suspended in concluding the existential analytic in *Being and Time* and the possibility of writing the missing Division Three about time itself; and that would have to be without repeating Heidegger's attempted separation from Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, and Hegel (and post-Hegelians like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche). In short, the time-question does not end with Heidegger, either in *Being and Time* or thereafter. We will try to articulate four-dimensional time as the substitute for the missing Division Three

because we have never seen the would-be content by Heidegger that would have gone into that all-important division.

And the last moments within Being and Time, where that possibility for transition to occur, reside in section 81 to which we now turn. We have to examine, carefully, the internal architecture within the text so we begin to see certain interrelations, relations of relations, forming between different major figures, namely Plato, Aristotle, Kant (and to lesser extent Augustine). Why and how Heidegger moves in the way he does in this section, having taken up issues of 'world-time and public time' in the previous sections, is noteworthy. It suggests a recommitment to tackling the hardest questions in Western metaphysics that have ever been posed and treated. In some senses, it looks to be too little, too late because Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine get such short treatment with only two quotations from Aristotle and one quotation from Plato and Augustine each. And all these ephemeral encounters with the momentous heritage in its long history and depths, before Heidegger attempts to read Hegel in the penultimate section 82 of Being and Time, gives one to ponder. Why would Heidegger spend six chapters in Division One and five chapters in Division Two, only to spend a few pages in sections 81 and 82 in trying to critique Plato, Aristotle, Kant indirectly, and Hegel on time? This is either naively megalomaniacal or intentionally negligent. The result of the whole work: the 'whole' of Dasein's Being (Heidegger 1962, 424) as 'primordial, finite temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380) is not revealed as 'Present or Now' (Heidegger 1962, 459) since it derives how 'ordinary' flowing time, calendar and clock time and 'world-time' (Heidegger 1962, 457) and 'within-time-ness' (Heidegger 1962, 472) in general are made present and experienced by we human beings. But this 'whole' itself remains concealed in the last question of the work (Heidegger 1962, 488) about time itself.

The Turning-Interrelational-Moving Event Inside Section 81:

We begin our reading of section 81 by introducing Heidegger's opening comments that precede his direct engagement with Aristotle. We will spend this subsection of the article examining that passage leading up to the first quote from Aristotle while opening up 'Chapter 10 Problems about time' in 'Section C. Time' of Book IV of the *Physics* (Aristotle, 2008, 102). If one looks at the whole of 'Section C. Time' and its four chapters, it is clear from the subjects addressed that Heidegger is interested in several aspects of Aristotle's inquiry. Indeed, this was a lifelong endeavor for Heidegger when he was first introduced to Aristotle by way of Brentano's *On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle* (1862) as early as 1907 (Kisiel 1996; Brogan 2005), twenty years before *Being and Time* was published.

According to Heidegger, Aristotle is the first to bring up the following complex aporias in their logical refinements given other great figures, such as the Pre-Socratics, Socrates, and Plato, in ancient Western philosophical thought; a.) not only the issue of ordinary time experienced as flowing and temporalized in

showing itself when ‘counted’ by following the ‘traveling pointer of the clock’ (Heidegger 1962, 473); b.) the general relation between time and change in which time is not exactly change but also not unrelated to change and therefore movement; and furthermore, the logical mysteries of time is neither empirical nor a product of subjective imagination and perhaps other to what Kant surmises two thousand years later in the *Critique of Pure Reason*; c.) what it means to ‘be in time’ (Aristotle 2008, 109) and what is presupposed about the existence of being in time and therefore presupposed about the existence of time itself that makes possible existence *in* time; and d.) the ‘various temporal terms’ (Aristotle 2008, 112) by which time is dilated or contracted, say in various adverbs like ‘suddenly’ or ‘recently’ (Aristotle 2008, 114); and e.) not just whether time can exist if minds did not exist to number, count or measure time in its nebulous relation to change of things in themselves or movement of objects in space (Aristotle 2008, 115).

No doubt, Heidegger is interested in all these matters, starting within Division Two of *Being and Time*, for example, Chapter IV on ‘Temporality and Everydayness’ (Heidegger 1962, 383) and what followed in the immediate years after *Being and Time*, particularly *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927), *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1929), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), and *Four Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics- World-Finitude-Solitude* (1929). The missing Division Three never appeared. But that does not mean Heidegger did not go down twisting and turning paths as he continued to explore time directly before ceasing to do so, at least in an explicit lecture-format (Kisiel as cited in Braver 2015).

For the immediate purpose, we can only focus on the opening paragraph of section 81 leading to the first quote from Aristotle (Heidegger 1962, 473) while situating it within the larger inquiry at work in ‘Section C. Time.’ (Aristotle 2008, 102) Here is the full quote from Heidegger:

This time is that which is counted and which shows itself when one follows the travelling pointer, counting and making present in such a way that this making-present temporalizes itself in an ecstatic unity with the retaining and awaiting which are horizonally open according to the ‘earlier’ and ‘later.’ This, however, is nothing else than an existential ontological interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of ‘time’: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμός κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. “For this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and the later.” (1962, 473)

The first objective is to read everything leading up to this passage in the beginning of section 82. Here, Heidegger is concerned with the ‘making present’ of the traditional, ordinary, one-directional, flowing time by following the ‘pointer’ (Heidegger 1962, 473) moving through the twenty-four hour numbers of the typical, circular clock, and the sixty seconds buried within each minute, and the sixty minutes of each hour. This ordinary time is one motion, of which the traversal of the twenty-four hour period of the day carries the traversal of seconds within a minute and minutes within an hour, and hours within a single day. An

ontic consideration – which is still phenomenological – could delve into these spatialized complexities of motions within motion, how the passage of time by making it ‘show’ (Heidegger 1962, 473) up opens up a certain dissonance between a perceiving subject in their anxiety of losing time in trying to meet a deadline or, inversely, wishing it would pass faster if we are stuck in a boring situation.

However, if we read this beginning of section 81, carefully, while situating it within Chapter VI within Division Two, something stranger starts to make itself felt; the issue is how this ordinary experience of clocks, regardless of the complex metaphysics of perception, movement, change, and continuous, infinite linear time ‘showing itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 473) therein, is ‘derived’ from ‘primordial, finite, authentic temporality.’ (Heidegger 1962, 379) The derivation is not one of deduction or induction. One simple turn away from Heidegger is that the complex-phenomenological apperception of the moving hand of the clock does not have to connote that a human subject is anticipating a ‘coming future while also being one’s having been to make present’ (Heidegger 1962, 402) anything. The phenomenological description of time, movement, and change and in their interrelations can be derived from a fourfold event-process, but we are getting ahead of ourselves. We cannot ignore others in the analytic philosophical tradition either. They have tried to show that Heidegger’s attempted derivation of the ‘ordinary, inauthentic time from primordial finite temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 379) is fraught with difficulties regarding time being dependent on the existence of human beings (Blattner 2005).

Heidegger’s ambition is to bring those previous sections of Division Two to bear in the encounter with Aristotle’s *Physics* on metaphysical problems of time. Heidegger says this ‘ancient ontology has its limits but can be appropriated in a positive way.’ (1962, 473) This way, we can renew fundamental ontology not to produce a new metaphysical conception of time or being or their relation as such and such Concept: but to understand that a new relation to the fundamental breakthrough of ancient Greek metaphysics opens the possibility of an-other relation to ourselves as human beings given all that followed in Western philosophical and religious history, particularly Catholic and Protestant theology. Asking how the ordinary experience and understanding of linear, passing time of clocks and calendars arises from a concealment of a deeper primordially throws open the question, but not the question of what or who human beings are. But, rather, ‘who time is’ (Heidegger 1991, 22E) as Heidegger asks in his 1924 lecture on *The Concept of Time*. And to that great question, no one has given a definitive answer that is concrete, intuitable, and perceivable by any human being, including Aristotle, Hegel, and Heidegger. The ‘who’ of time is neither a human nor a god, and, let us dare to say, not even Dasein in *Being and Time*.

However, to give that profound question its full treatment, we must un-do some of Heidegger’s assumptions in section 81 before moving to Hegel in section 82. We need to re-open Aristotle’s *Physics* itself and attempt a slow reading while questioning some of Heidegger’s assumptions in his engagement with Aristotle in

distancing ourselves from Heidegger's whole philosophical undertaking: namely the existential analytic of Dasein – "being-in-the-world, thrownness and fallenness, Care, death, resolve, primordial finite temporality, everyday registers of time, fate and historicity, origin of within-time-ness" (Heidegger 1962, 7-12) – as the precursor to fundamental ontology.

The goal is to see what is buried deeply in Aristotle that marks the passage from Heidegger in Division Two and his encounters with Plato and Hegel, specifically, while imagining how the horizon of the missing Division Three starts to take shape. It is obvious to see that it is no simple task of disentangling time, change, and movement as philosophical problems in Aristotle's works while trying to reintegrate the problem of 'ontological movement' (Heidegger 1962, 427) in sections 72, 74, and 75 as the 'equiprimordiality of the ecstases of temporality' in section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 378). This would be tantamount to a synthesis of sections 65, 72, 74, and 75 in a new section before even engaging section 81 as the preface to Heidegger's all-out confrontation with Hegel in section 82. For now, that seems like an utter impossibility if we merely repeat all the gestures, inclinations, and proclivities that run through Division Two; hence, the need to reimagine the missing Division Three.

Let us keep in mind whether time in general or the way it is discussed in the entirety of *Being and Time*, that saying 'time is' is inadequate (Heidegger 1962, 377), or whether time is or is not is not the question. Time is not an entity, being, or something ever present. Neither is ontology, 'the central problematic' of which is Being, which, itself, is 'rooted' in temporality (Heidegger 1962, 40). This is unlike Aristotle's opening questions of Book IV on whether time even exists like other beings, and if so what its nature is (Aristotle 2008, 102). Rather, it 'is temporalized,' but the verb 'to be' and the predicate 'temporalized' cannot be assumed in any ordinary relation between being and time, time comes to have being, emerges into being or takes the place of being itself if we were to reverse things and say – 'being is temporalized as time' for example. Time is not in being and being is not in time; both are derived from something deeper. But the deep is neither nothing nor a no-where despite its resistance to come into presence.

Rather, for Heidegger, at this moment at the very end of the Dasein-analytic, "time shows itself for everyday circumspect concern." (Heidegger 1962, 472) This means, already in the fallen state with others, the reckoning of time indicates it is some 'thing' that 'shows itself' or comes to be related to in such and such way. It inserts itself for reasons no human has been able to explain. This is not about secrets or private imagination, but a shared experience or something that is 'public' (Heidegger 1962, 472) and, therefore, of significance for society. There is no language of one, even for those who are deemed mad; for example, if one were to proclaim a whole other theory of time that has nothing to do with human beings, for all of recorded history, that have some version of the three aspects and their relations, namely past, present, and future. Most societies, for example, have to regulate themselves according to some kind of time, namely seasons, harvests,

clocks and calendars. We will say most, because, perhaps, there remains one or few completely isolated societies unencountered by the rest of the world, whereby time is not reckoned at all, which is hard to imagine, or in ways that we cannot understand. As far as our humanity knows, there is no hidden society somewhere, yet to be discovered, consisting of immortal beings.

It will turn out for Heidegger, at least in his modern Western context (two decades into the twentieth century), the way time presents itself occurs in a specific way. We will quote the full long passage:

in so far as Dasein calculates time in reckoning with itself, then the kind of behaviour in which 'one' explicitly regulates oneself according to time, lies in the use of clocks. The existential-temporal meaning of this turns out to be a making-present of the travelling pointer. By following the positions of the pointer in a way which makes present, one counts them. This making-present temporalizes itself in the ecstatic unity of a retention which awaits. To retain the 'on that former occasion' and to retain it by making it present, signifies that in saying 'now' one is open for the horizon of the earlier – that is, of the 'now-no-longer.' To await the 'then' by making it present, means that in saying 'now' one is open for the horizon of the later – that is, of the 'now-not-yet.' Time is what shows itself in such a making-present. How then, are we to define the time which is manifest within the horizon of the circumspective concerned clock-using in which one takes one's time? This time is that which is **counted** and which shows itself when one follows the travelling pointer, counting and making present in such a way that this making-present temporalizes itself in an ecstatic unity with the retaining and awaiting which are horizonally open according to the 'earlier' and 'later.' This, however, is nothing else than an existential ontological interpretation of Aristotle's definition of 'time.' (Heidegger 1962, 473)

What immediately follows this long passage is the original Greek formulation in Book IV of Aristotle's *Physics*. But we cannot just yet jump into Aristotle's original text without really attempting a deconstruction of what is happening in this long and consequential passage in Heidegger. Whether we think of a human subject, at least a normal one with all of their senses operating, standing in front of a clock or not is not the issue. In other words, dismissing this possibility as an illusion of the Cogito as Descartes doubted all reality, including his own existence when awake, is not the issue. Rather, there all kinds of buried assumptions about the interrelations of time, movement, and change in this very passage, which we can contrast from what is happening in section 65 on the 'primordial, finite, ecstatic, unified, authentic, temporalizing of temporality.' (Heidegger 1962, 380) Just one example of section 65 gives us numerous aporias to unpack:

Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of 'having been' arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which 'has been' (or better, which 'is in the process of having been') releases from itself the Present. 2. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as 'temporality.' 3 (Heidegger 1962, 374)

We have to reckon section 65 throughout our lifelong investigations. There are innumerable ways to develop many more confounding, paradoxical formulations just out of this passage alone as we shall see; but one should never imagine a spatialize geometry of lines or circles or even non-Euclidean multidimensional spaces to capture the complexity of the interrelations of these 'ecstases of temporality.' (Heidegger 1962, 377) But, for now, let us return to section 81. We have to see what we have in the section 81 passage while keeping section 65 in the background.

Dasein 'calculates time' by reckoning with 'itself.' (Heidegger 1962, 473) Already, we have so many potential ways to go with this to show how this 'reckoning with itself' is not merely a human being looking at a clock and saying – "It will turn 3pm in five minutes, and I need to go pick up my child from my neighbor's house." One can say that there is a certain vertigo, back and forth enchantment and bewilderment, simultaneously; a.) one is pausing to look at what time it is, not because they have to go do something or they are coming up against an incessant deadline (like a few minutes left before an exam ends and one still has a few more questions to answer); or b.) one looks at the clock by accident with no desire to know the time but is pleasantly surprised to know that it is not the time they would have assumed if asked what time it could be. For example, they would have more time if they need to complete a task, or inversely, they are glad so much time has passed because they will be getting off work soon.

Rather, one is constantly checking to see how much time has passed, or even how time is passing while one watches the passing, to either suppress the anxiety of even trying to relate why one is looking at time and what it means for understanding all time prior to that moment and all time to come thereafter; as if one is really, in an uncanny sense, not wanting to be in time because one is becoming along with it (getting older and losing what time one has left on earth) or one is embracing the accumulation of time passing to enjoy the process of expiration as if one is competing a task; but, in this case, the task is simply living and breathing a whole stretch of a lifetime, and not doing anything in particular.

One transcends the ontic being they were, are, or will be. In other words, beyond negation of time passage or full embrace, something else is happening in, for, as Dasein in 'its self-reckoning.' (Heidegger 1962, 473) The full resolve to transcend in finiteness is not a tranquilized ascetic nothingness bereft of any desire or embodiment at all; then again, it is not the fulfillment of any ontic entity, or the empirical view that most, if not all, human beings strive to become something recognized or withdraws ascetically into a mystical realm that most cannot understand or emulate. One does not begin with a subjective or objective 'I' that is experiencing anything. For 'philosophy and its object' is 'universal phenomenological ontology.' (Heidegger 1962, 62) But this object is not any entity, which means neither the presence nor absence of an entity. And the Dasein-analytic as 'an analytic of existence' is the 'guiding line for all philosophical inquiry' from which it 'arises and returns.' (Heidegger 1962, 62)

Let us look further at Heidegger's text. For Heidegger, in order to 'make present' (Heidegger 1962, 472) time itself, and not simply accept the present now as one of the three aspects of time with the past no longer now and future yet to be now as the other two, the event of 'making present' (Heidegger 1962, 473) itself relates to a complex occurrence: that which we call a temporalization-interrelations-movement event. Let us say the awareness of time through the use of the clock, being and becoming of time, being and becoming as time itself, and this whole fidelity to something called the 'present,' as I am presently alive right now, writing this text, is derived from something else. All of this has to come from somewhere, that is not quite itself, for example, if no human beings or clocks existed. (Example – how would algae, a type of animal-plant that feeds, and so technically a living organism, relate to time by trying to reckon with it?) We cannot take for granted what present means, how present is prioritized as being, or whether it exists at all! There goes all metaphysics and its history prior to Heidegger.

As we continue to follow what Heidegger says in this passage, we have to assume that something makes possible this very possibility itself, of Dasein reckoning itself, by calculating the time generated spatially by the clock; again, not because it has some impending task to do ('picking up the kids from school') but because it is in the business of making time 'show itself.' (Heidegger 1962, 472) But this compulsion – 'showing time' (Heidegger 1962, 473) – comes from somewhere but not from within time; because that would mean that time comes from time, a circular fallacy. Even Aristotle knew that (Aristotle 2008, 104).

What will be interesting is not so much the ecstatic 'unity' that is "time showing itself in the counting that makes present," (Heidegger 1962, 473) but what we want to show in this movement as 'ontological movement' that perplexed Heidegger in Chapter V. And we do so, not by repeating what Heidegger has to say, or, rather, so little to say about the 'enigma of motion' (Heidegger 1962, 444) in Chapter V, particularly sections 72, 74, and 75. But, instead, we must open up this question of 'movement' right in the heart of this 'making-present' matter that we see in the opening of section 81 prior to Heidegger's direct engagement with Aristotle. This will then allow us to reenter Aristotle's text and try to do and see things that Heidegger himself was unable to do, for sure in this section 81. In Aristotle, the mysteries of time, change, and movement are interrelated even though each of the three terms are uniquely different in relation to the other two (Aristotle 2008). They are both irreducible to one another, all three irreducible to the others in their own unique ways and in the singular relation of one with the other two in their own singular ways. Furthermore, there would be no Aristotle if he did not have something to respond to, namely Plato's greatest and most complex investigations of movement, particularly in the *Parmenides* on the one and the many.

Because then, without giving Plato and Aristotle their proper due, Heidegger completely loses the chance to engage movement in section 82 where

he attempts to critically evaluate Hegel but ends up reducing him to the 'ordinary understanding of time.' (Heidegger 1962, 480) Whereas, even the most novice readers of Hegel cannot help encounter the profound mystery of 'movement' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Hegel 1977, 487), but also *The Science of Logic*, perhaps foundational for all of Hegel's philosophy and its method of self-presentation. For Hegel, movement is not the movement of something nor movement as something itself, namely substance as the foundation of being, since both substance and subject are overcoming themselves, and all their previous relational shapes in 'Absolute Knowing' (Hegel 1977, 488) of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

However, we are not even remotely ready to produce anew a speculative metaphysics of time, movement, Spirit, its Notion, and their interrelations in 'Absolute Knowing' of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* by way of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, an anathema to what Heidegger himself asks but does not answer in the last section 83 of *Being and Time*: namely, the still unanswered question of "How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted?" (Heidegger 1962, 488) We are preparing the steps towards actualizing that possibility.

The question before us at this moment is peculiar: it should be what is the 'mode' of movement as the interrelations of ecstases in section 65 – 'coming-towards, having been-ness, making present' – (Heidegger 1962, 374) and their 'schemas' (Heidegger 1962, 416) in section 69, where each has a different relation with the other two. Quite frankly, section 69, which tries to build on the introduction to 'primordial ecstatic temporality' in section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 380), is key for postulating various possibilities of what was at stake in the abandoned, or missing, Division Three (Kisiel 2015 as cited in Braver 2015, 152). The hideously complex event of ontological movement in/as primordial temporality requires a new set of distinctions and terms that cannot be captured within *Being and Time*. (For example – if each ecstasy has a different relation with the other two, then there are at least three sets of interrelations and at least nine movements among the three sets.) Heidegger does not state anywhere in *Being and Time* anything like four-dimensional time as a horizon to derive all these possible interrelations, relations within each ecstasy in relation to the other two; neither do his interpreters (Blattner 2005; Braver 2015; Pippin 2025).

Where Heidegger does not answer at the end of *Being and Time*, we seek to answer by retracing the problem of the relation between time and movement in section 81; we must begin, again, with Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle, before he gets to Plato and Augustine, as the penultimate moment before taking on Hegel. And before, Hegel, we pass through Kant's 'schematism' (Kant 1998, 273) and the 'first analogy of experience within the third principle of understanding.' (Kant 1998, 299)

Let us return to Heidegger's passage that leads up to the first quotation of Aristotle's *Physics*. To give a preview of the complex aporia to come: in Hegel, we must probe the relation between 'Spirit knowing itself in revealing its depths as

the Notion and its time' (Hegel 1977, 492-493); the aporetic limits that hide beneath Aristotle's triplicit separation of time from change and change from movement from how all three relate to one another asymmetrically (one in relation to the two) [chapters 10-14 of Book IV of the *Physics*]; all while courting the Platonic dream of conceptualizing time, not as past, or what was, and future as what will be, but as as a 'moving image of eternity' (Plato 1888, 119) in a new deconstructed formulation. We must accomplish this unheard movement of thought as we temporalize the crossing out of an origin and end, but also non-origin and non-end, or a temporal-less eternal Now that is being erased. We need to theorize what is *other* to all four, origin, end, non-origin, and non-end, and all interrelations therein. And, as mentioned before in relation to Aristotle, let us not forget Plato's *Parmenides*, which Heidegger does not even attempt to touch in these last sections of *Being and Time*.

The 'Existential-Temporal' (Heidegger 1963, 473) Nuclei of Heidegger's Passage in Section 81:

We return to the passage one last time. This will be the final, recursive attempt in this article to see inside Heidegger's short text of section 81 potential relations within and among past sections (65, 69, 72, 74, 75). The goal is to imagine a different engagement with Hegel from what Heidegger undertakes in section 82. Simply put, spending more time with the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic* becomes a necessity, rather than the philosophy of time in the *Philosophy of Nature* (Heidegger 1962, 481) with which Heidegger opens section 82.

In order to articulate the conditions anew to engage Hegel's most complex and difficult works, we will penetrate the most elemental aspects of Heidegger's consequential passage by partitioning different propositions and phrases in these early moments in section 81. Here is the focus for the remainder of our investigation. Heidegger states:

This making-present temporalizes itself in the ecstatic unity of a retention which awaits. To retain the 'on that former occasion' and to retain it by making it present, signifies that in saying 'now' one is open for the horizon of the earlier—that is, of the 'now-no-longer.' To await the 'then' by making it present, means that in saying 'now' one is open for the horizon of the later—that is, of the 'now-not-yet.' Time is what shows itself in such a making-present. How then, are we to define the time which is manifest within the horizon of the circumspective concerned clock-using in which one takes one's time? This time is that which is **counted** and which shows itself when one follows the travelling pointer, counting and making present in such a way that this making-present temporalizes itself in an ecstatic unity with the retaining and awaiting which are horizontally open according to the 'earlier' and 'later.' (1962, 473)

For the first sentence, let us not assume that 'making present' (Heidegger 1962, 473) is something already present, but not seen, or something that is not present that will become present, say a future non-actuality or non-possibility becoming present, especially something unexpected. For example, a new

invention for which there was no precedent or predecessor. 'Temporalizing' (Heidegger 1962, 473) is not an act of something that relates to change or movement or fixing and allotting a determinate set of boundaries, particularly time-bound determinations, i.e. guessing someone's age or putting an expiration date on a canned food product. And finally 'unity' (Heidegger 1962, 473) may, for many of us, recollect great problems of ancient Greek metaphysics, say Plato's Parmenides or Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; but we must bracket this, particularly Heidegger's concern with ancient ontology in *Being and Time*. But at this juncture, we know it is not a monad, like a simple indivisible with no parts to go back to Leibniz (1898, 217-218), a bounded homogenous plane composed of all the same elements, simple addition where 2 is the unity of 1+1, or a patriotic nation with absolutely no dissent or divergence of opinion. There is no unity of any 'thing' or its parts, say the organs of the human body.

Instead, we must consider non-present interrelated possibilities that defy either successive or simultaneous relations between them. For Kant, the human mind cannot connote, intuit, imagine, or experience anything beyond successive and simultaneous events, and therefore time as 'permanent substance' is a priori and irreducible to any experience within which representable relations of successive and simultaneous events occur (Kant 1998, 300). We do not agree with Kant on the 'unchanging' nature of time, even if time can never be derived from experience. And we do not begin or end with the human subject, and therefore the human mind.

Rather, our real question about the being of time itself is likened to the problem of 'movement/ Bewegungtheit' and 'connectedness' (Heidegger 1962, 427) whereby both 'ends' of birth and death 'are.' (Heidegger 1962, 426) These are existential-ontological matters, not metaphysical or physical problems of the phenomenon of moving objects or movement itself. Following Heidegger, this constitutes a whole known as 'historizing' (Heidegger 1962, 427) from section 74. Yet, this remains completely undefined beyond sections 74 and 75, and the word itself appears only four times in section 6 (Heidegger 1962, 41). And, lastly, the big problem of defining 'ecstatic' within the formulation of 'ecstatical unity of a retention that awaits' (Heidegger 1962, 473) confronts us. What Heidegger says in section 65 is only the very beginning of a formulation: "Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself." (Heidegger 1962, 377) The comparison with Hegel, particularly in *The Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, is tempting, but we will get to that.

We might think 'retain' is to keep something from an earlier moment or preserve something, like a retaining of an event in memory. Or, it could mean to keep something rather than throwing it away like an old pair of socks. But this remembering, or refamiliarizing, is also a waiting for something, not of something coming to memory. It is a re-relating, paradoxically, to something that has yet to happen, a filling of a void within the traditional conception of the past, which is something that was present and has now elapsed but preserved somewhere. One

can say it is even other to the past and any conception it evokes. Then again, it is not the future of the memory, as in I have a memory and then wait for a new interpretation of it. To get at a 'retention' that 'awaits,' the status of waiting, the stretch of time between two non-possibilities, not a past recollected or a future that is arriving, we return back to section 65. Let us ward off any ontic impulses that force us back into the realm of human beings and ordinary life experiences, or even extraordinary ones like perceived miracles or prophecies. Heidegger, too, was weary throughout section 65 about how the ordinary understanding of time as flowing with an 'earlier' and a 'later' keeps 'thrusting itself upon us.' (Heidegger 1962, 374)

There, in section 65, once again to which we never cease to return, we have all the problems and complications, where *Being and Time* seems to reach a climax of radical philosophical novelty; but, then, only to dissipate and submerge in subsequent sections that end up trying to dialogue with past thinkers, Dilthey on history, and then again, Plato, Aristotle, and even Augustine; particularly Plato on time and eternity (Heidegger 1962, 475) and Aristotle and Augustine on time and the soul (Heidegger 1962, 479-480) before the confrontation with Hegel (Heidegger 1962, 480). Kant rears himself time and again, and right before section 82 where Heidegger draws a consequential contrast with Kant and Hegel (Heidegger 1962, 480). But then, cryptically, in endnote xvi, Heidegger states that Kant will come back, for him, to reveal 'a more radical understanding than Hegel' in Division Three, which, of course, did not appear (Heidegger 1962, 499).

We can ask what in section 65 helps us understand the formulations Heidegger is making while trying to deconstruct but also reinterpret Aristotle in a novel way how 'time shows up' as the 'counted' in 'following the traveling pointer' of the clock (Heidegger 1962, 473). Even at this moment, the phenomenological complexity of time's relation to movement goes unaddressed in Heidegger, but not so in Aristotle. We have to bracket section 81's approach, which is thoroughly Heidegger's own construction; namely, "by reckoning time Dasein reckons itself in a kind of behavior" (Heidegger 1962, 473) as 'world disclosedness' and 'concernful equipment-using dealings' for which 'time shows itself.' (Heidegger 1962, 472) And then on the other end of the matter, we must bracket Heidegger's interpretive summary of Aristotle's formulations in Book IV of the *Physics* as this: "For this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later." (Heidegger 1962, 473) We are concerned what is between these two poles so to speak, namely Heidegger's 'world-disclosedness' and 'concernful equipment-using dealings,' (Heidegger 1962, 472) and the Aristotle direct quote (Heidegger 1962, 473). The direct quote in Aristotle within Book IV of the *Physics* absolutely dwarfs anything Heidegger has to say about it in the opening paragraphs of section 81.

The resumption of articulating the complexity of these interrelations between the ecstases in section 65 will allow us to approach the passage in section 81 and give it greater fullness than what Heidegger states. And this way we can

bracket what Heidegger ends up saying about Aristotle's quote on 'counting or numbering' in so far as time counts or numbers movement so that an 'earlier' and 'later' can even be encountered (Heidegger 1962, 473). Given the initial harshness of our critique, however, we need to give Heidegger his due and not accuse him what a non-philosophical majority would see as obvious: namely the ordinary perception of time at any given moment is whatever the clock says it is – for example 3:57pm, that 3:56 was the present but is no longer, and 3:58 is approaching and will be the present now. Any child would understand this. By filling up the ecstases from 65 in the formulations in section 81, we get a greater sense of what the 'existential-temporal' meaning that Heidegger so desperately seeks can really look like.

Conclusion

We can draw some preliminary conclusions for this first article – Part One – in the two-article series. We have seen fourfold distinctions between a.) 'ordinary, infinite, endless, linear, one-directional, flowing time...as a sequence of now points' (Heidegger 1962, 377-379) and b.) 'primordial, finite, authentic, unified, ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380) in relation to the distinction between c.) 'Dasein's self-reckoning as reckoning with its time' (Heidegger 1962, 381-382) and d.) the 'temporal-existential' interpretation of 'time as counted and self-showing by following the traveling pointer' in the 'ecstatic unity of retaining which awaits.' (Heidegger 1962, 473) But, instead of accepting Heidegger's interpretation of time as 'making present,' (Heidegger 1962, 473) we will now take the plunge, perhaps 'fall' (Heidegger 1962, 376) to use Heidegger's famous term in *Being and Time*, into Aristotle's *Physics*, particularly chapters 10-14 in Book IV (Aristotle 2008,103-117).

Our aim is to deconstruct the assumptions about 'making-present' and 'falling.' (Heidegger 1962, 376) This means we have to suspend the project Heidegger undertakes in Chapter VI of Division Two about 'Dasein's self-reckoning with itself by reckoning with its time' (Heidegger 1962, 457) and 'concernful equipment using dealings' (Heidegger 1962, 472). That is for human beings, and for interpreters of Division One (Dreyfus 1990). Our hypothesis is that we will be dealing with an entity that is not human and has nothing to do with the meaning of being human, even if decided by the Dasein-analytic of *Being and Time*. This is not theology or religion either, which assumes in differentiated ways, at least in two monotheistic religions, a transcendental, wholly other, unnameable, unknowable, in human representation and cognition, entity commonly known as 'God.' Neither human nor God raises the question of 'who' is four-dimensional time. This is not the work of Christian theology either.

In the second article titled Part Two, we will indulge in a speculative metaphysical expansion of germs in Plato's *Timaeus*, particularly 'time as the moving image of eternity,' (Plato 1888, 119) Aristotle's Book IV of the *Physics*, Kant's 'schematism'

(Kant 1998, 273) in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as an intentional framing structure that will allow us to open up 'Absolute Knowing' on the 'unity of Thought and Time' (Hegel 1977, 489) and 'the Notion's time' (Hegel 1977, 493) in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Let us be clear, we will be deconstructing and moving in different directions with Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, not trying to interpret them or get them 'right.' As for Hegel, we are not claiming that he himself articulates four-dimensional time in the last paragraphs of the last chapter, 'Absolute Knowing,' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There is not even a trace of this in Hegel's thought. This is entirely our construction. If we succeed in trying to make the case clearly, then we are distinguishing our project from Heidegger's *Being and Time* completely. We say this even though we will be reinhabiting *Being and Time*, but from the standpoint of its missing Division Three. That which is other to *Being and Time* cannot be contained within it in so far it is the passage from within *Being and Time* to a new speculative metaphysical realm that exceeds it. By analogy, imagine traveling into a black hole, going through a wormhole, and out of a white hole. Our aim and intention is to do something Heidegger did not do, which includes what decades of interpreters have said about *Being and Time* (Wrathall 2013; Braver 2015) and all of Heidegger's thought in general (Sheehan 2014; Thomson 2011).

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