

Ecstatic Temporality and Transcendence in Section 65 of Chapter III and Section 69 of Chapter IV in Relation to Ontological Movement in Section 74 of Chapter V in Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) Part II

Rajesh Sampath

Abstract: This is the second article of a two-article series and is labeled Part II. In this article, we pick up where we left off on a close reading of Division Two of Heidegger's greatest work, *Being and Time* (1927). In the first article labeled Part I, we executed a granular analysis of a few lines and phrases in section 65 in Chapter III, section 69 in Chapter IV, and sections 72 and 74 in Chapter V on 'primordial ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380) and 'equiprimordiality of the unity of the ecstases' (Heidegger 1962, 378), 'the whitherings and horizontal schemas' (Heidegger 1962, 416), and the ontological distinction of movement/*Bewegtheit* and the Western metaphysical tradition on spatialized motion/*Bewegung* (Heidegger 1962, 427) respectively. Attempting to show the connectedness of these problems in a manner different from *Being and Time* itself required a bracketing of how we renew our engagement with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel even after Heidegger's attempted 'destruction' (Heidegger 1962, 41) of the ontological and metaphysical traditions of the West. In Part I, we attempted to resume the possibility of an abstract metaphysical undertaking about a four-dimensional temporality that Heidegger could not and did not articulate in *Being and Time*. In this follow-up article labeled Part II, we will attempt a direct appropriation of Hegel's *The Science of Logic* (1813-1816), particularly on his enigmatic introduction to the term 'quadruplicity' (Hegel 2010, 746) that comes at the very end of his greatest and most complex work. We will try to outline the possibility of articulating the very being of time as an interrelations-movement-event beyond the succession and simultaneity of two things. This conceptualization is non-spatial, never an object of representation, intuition, or the imagination, and not reducible to the predominance of the present as the 'now' point. We see this work as one long preface to our own independent possibility, apart from Heidegger and Hegel, to articulate a heretofore unknown speculative phenomenological theory of four-dimensional time.

Keywords: Heidegger, Hegel, fundamental ontology, metaphysics, time.

Introduction

This work is the second Part of a two-part article series that appears separately as two individual articles but interconnected as one investigation. Part I opened with an analysis of section 69 on the 'horizontal schema' (Heidegger 1962, 416) of each

temporal 'ecstasis' (Heidegger 1962, 377) and grapples with the problem of the 'whithering' occurrence endemic in each 'schema' (Heidegger 1962, 416). This gives us an opportunity to rethink - in non-spatial terms - the ontological problem of movement/*Bewegtheit* (Heidegger 1962, 427) while revisiting the fundamental descriptions Heidegger gives us of 'ecstatic temporality' and the elusive question of the 'equiprimordial' (Heidegger 1962, 378) unity of the ecstases even though for each 'ecstasis' (Heidegger 1962, 377) the 'mode of temporalizing is different' (Heidegger 1962, 378). To dive deeper into the complexity of these interrelations among the ecstases while each maintains their own singularity, we argue for a detour through Hegel's *The Science of Logic* (1813-1816). Specifically, we focus on the passage where the mysterious term - 'quadruplicity' - appears in the last chapter of Volume Two: "The Science of Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Concept," namely "The Absolute Idea," of this gargantuan work (Hegel 2010, 735). We realize this goes against Heidegger's injunctions against Hegel in the penultimate section 82 of Division Two of *Being and Time*; that Hegel is trapped in the metaphysical tradition of equating the 'now' with spatialized presence that goes back to Plato and Aristotle (Heidegger 1962, 483), which itself constitutes the 'ordinary conception of time' (Heidegger 1962, 480).

In Part II, we suspend all of Heidegger's critical assumptions in Division Two of *Being and Time* and his attempted critique of Hegel. We dive right into Hegel's *The Science of Logic*, and try to explore, through various angles, what 'quadruplicity' (Hegel 2010, 746) means. We do this in an intentional contrast with traditional notions of the three-moment dialectic, for example identity, negation, and negation of negation/synthesis. By extension, we suspend all priorities of three in the history of the logocentric metaphysics of the West, be it three aspects of time (past, present, and future) or Christianity, the dominant Western religion, as a Trinitarian notion of the Godhead (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit = One God). We dispense with all spatialized circular conceptions of the ultimate Notion Hegel is seeking to define, and, instead, take seriously the 'quadruplicity' (Hegel 2010, 746) as a placeholder to reconceptualize the ontological question of the meaning of the being of time. We do not argue that Hegel sees this crescendo in *The Science of Logic* as the question of time itself; for the last sentence of his greatest and most abstract work states that "in the science of logic finds the highest concept of itself, the pure concept conceptually comprehending itself" (Hegel 2010, 753). Nor does Hegel name time at this moment of climax in *The Science of Logic* in contrast to the relation between time and Spirit in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) where time is explicitly interpellated. This occurs in paragraphs 800-803 (Hegel 1977, 486-489) and the last and greatest paragraph in the whole work arguably, namely 808 (Hegel 1977, 493) in 'Absolute Knowing' of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The appropriation of these moments in Hegel gives us an opportunity to re-occupy Heidegger's *Being and Time* precisely to deepen Heidegger's own project of fundamental ontology and to go where it could not go, at least in *Being and Time*; namely to articulate a

robust answer to the perplexing question of the meaning of Being by interlocking all the problems that arise in Division Two regarding the interrelations of ecstatic temporality, movement, and transcendence in terms of an 'equiprimordial' unity (Heidegger 1962, 378). Indeed, the 'whole' of Dasein's Being, after introducing Sorge/Care in Chapter VI of Division One and ecstatic temporality in section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two, is what Heidegger confesses as having eluded his entire investigation (Heidegger 1962, 424). This is what we set out to accomplish in this two-part article series, namely the philosophical explication of the being of time itself as this evasive 'whole' (Heidegger 1962, 424) that escapes Heidegger's *Being and Time*. To achieve this, we must first return to Hegel.

Part II

"The Absolute Idea" in Hegel's *The Science of Logic* (Hegel 2010, 735)

A slow reading of this whole chapter in Hegel's work can fill up volumes, particularly if we keep in mind all the gaps, margins, and blindspots buried in Heidegger's Division Two of *Being and Time* on the interrelations of temporality, movement, and the being of truth and the truth of being. Or to be more specific in fidelity to the actual text as Heidegger says in section 69 of Chapter IV: "Yet a fully adequate existential Interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the *meaning of Being and the 'connection' between Being and truth have been clarified* in terms of the temporality of existence" (Heidegger 1962, 408). At first glance, this would appear to have nothing to do with Hegel's attempt at a self-conception of science in the science of logic, which is neither the history of the natural sciences nor the history of non-natural scientific metaphysics, logic, and ontology leading up to Hegel's time, i.e. after the transcendental philosophical revolution launched by Kant. As Hegel concludes his *The Science of Logic*:

But what is posited by this first resolve of the pure idea to determine itself as external idea is only the mediation out of which the concept, as free concrete existence that from externality has come to itself, raises itself up, completes this self-liberation in the science of spirit, and in the science of logic finds the highest concept of itself, the pure concept conceptually comprehending itself (Hegel 2010, 753).

Unlike Heidegger in *Being and Time*, or any time before or after it in his corpus, we will try to link this 'connection between Being and truth in terms of the temporality of existence' (Heidegger 1962, 408) with Hegel's concluding remarks on the 'pure concept conceptually comprehending itself,' which of course is linked to movement and transcendence, and not any previous traditional alignment of the subject with the object in any notion of 'self-comprehension.' It has nothing to do with subject-predicate correspondence in logic or for that matter the subject/mind vs. object/experience distinctions in the history of metaphysics. We do not want to reduce in Hegel the meaning of the terms of 'free concrete existence, the coming to itself from externality, and the raising up' (Hegel 2010, 753). But it

is not a stretch to re-inhabit these constructions in Hegel while destroying them so we can go further into what we see in sections 65 on the 'ekstatikon' (Heidegger 1962, 377), the 'horizontal schemas and whither' in section 69 (Heidegger 1962, 416), the distinction between 'movement/Bewegtheit and motion/Bewegung' in section 72 (Heidegger 1962, 427), and finally the 'swoon' and 'clairvoyance' (Heidegger 1962, 436) in relation to the 'being in the moment of vision for its time' as 'fate and authentic historicity' (Heidegger 1962, 437) in Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

In other words, a re-occupation of Hegel without arriving at any simple meaning or understanding of Hegel's conclusions in *The Science of Logic* is also a re-inhabitation of Heidegger's *Being and Time* to articulate what it could not articulate. My hypothesis is that Hegel's final definition of 'the pure concept conceptually comprehending itself' (Hegel 2010, 753) is tantamount to Heidegger's disconnected intuitions of the interrelations of ecstatic temporality, movement, 'moment of vision and authentic historicity' (Heidegger 1962, 437) in the full disclosure of the *meaning of the being of time*; the latter is not the being of time as any previous concept or substance that assumes only three axes, namely, past, present, and future. It escapes all and any subject-predicate relations and cannot be derived from the present or presence, which seems to have a stranglehold on every thinking and living subject. This would mark a huge, and unacceptable leap for either Heidegger or Hegel scholars alike, let alone the few that have attempted to work on both, for example Derrida in his early 1964-1965 lecture, *Heidegger: The Question of Being and History* (2019) or his 1968 essay, "Ousia and Gramme: A Note from a Note in *Being and Time*"; the latter was republished in *Margins of Philosophy*, originally published in French (1972) and then translated in English (1982). But we will not retread or revamp those incredibly intricate and labyrinthine reflections by Derrida whose originality cannot be disputed. We defer that to another paper in the future.

We want to articulate four-dimensional time, which conceals a set of moving-interrelations as an event that ascribes an-other to four known nodes in origin, end, non-origin, non-end in which the history of metaphysics on time, movement, and eternity have grappled; that is starting with Plato and Aristotle and extending to Hegel. This is not explicitly seen in anything Heidegger or Derrida have written in their published works. Nor do we intend to resume Platonic dialectics or whatever versions of three-moment dialectics that are ascribed to Hegel.

One could say that the very opening of Hegel's last chapter of *The Science of Logic* would be easy fodder for either Heidegger or Derrida to make their critiques of the 'metaphysics of presence' as the only real being, unchanging, eternal, and essential substance, extending from Plato's Forms to Aristotle's Book XII of the

Metaphysics on 'thought thinking itself' and 'God as actuality'.¹ For does not Hegel say: "the absolute idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth" (Hegel 2010, 735). But then to use Heidegger's language as the meaning of the being of truth, its actual living content – beyond the method that comes to conceptualize itself in *The Science of Logic* – is itself concealed or leveled. Heidegger uses phenomenology to deconstruct any simple notion of living as being present or death and dying as negation of body or disappearance of soul as he does in Chapter I of Division Two (Heidegger 1962, 279). There is not much more to say at this point, and if one takes this statement for granted, then one has completely misunderstood the respective tasks of Heidegger and Derrida on destroying and deconstructing, respectively, the history of metaphysics up to their respective epochs; this includes how we hold in suspense what could be other to that tradition, whether the 'other beginning' for the later Heidegger (1936) or 'closure' for Derrida (1967). We would be naive dogmatists trying to resurrect a new metaphysics out of Hegel to try to prove Heidegger and Derrida wrong. That would be as if we learned nothing from Heidegger or Derrida at all, an impossibility for those of us working in twenty-first century continental philosophy. But a renewed Hegelian speculative metaphysics is not the aim of this unfolding task, which began as a close reading of Heidegger's *Being and Time* in trying to connect all the dots from different sections and chapters throughout Division Two. And we have not even arrived at Heidegger's treatment of Hegel in section 82, the penultimate section of Division Two and *Being and Time* as a whole.

We remain fixated on key passage in the entire concluding chapter of "The Absolute Idea," for it is there that Hegel smuggles in without elaborating, further, a mysterious 'quadruplicity':

¹ Here is the full quote from Aristotle in Book XII of the *Metaphysics*: "On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God" (Aristotle n.d., Retrieved January 20th, 2024 from: <https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.12.xii.html>).

In this turning point of the method, the course of cognition returns at the same time back into itself. This negativity is as self-sublating contradiction the restoration of the first immediacy, of simple universality; for the other of the other, the negative of the negative, is immediately the positive, the identical, the universal. In the whole course, if one at all cares to count, this second immediate is third to the first immediate and the mediated. But it is also third to the first or formal negative and to the absolute negativity or second negative; now in so far as that first negative is already the second term, the term counted as third can also be counted as fourth, and instead of a triplicity, the abstract form may also be taken to be a quadruplicity; in this way the negative or the difference is counted as a duality. – The third or the fourth is in general the unity of the first and the second moment, of the immediate and the mediated. – That it is this unity, or that the entire form of the method is a triplicity, is indeed nothing but the merely superficial, external side of cognition; but to have also demonstrated this superficiality, and to have done it in the context of a specific application (for the abstract form of number has been around for a long time, as is well known, but without conceptual comprehension and therefore without any result) is again to be regarded as an infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy (Hegel 2010, 746).²

We have commented on this passage for what seems like an infinite amount of time, but every time we see it, we see something else that has to be said. The whole thing turns on movement, not of three moments, but of four. And this escapes any geometry of a line, circle, plane, or rectilinear schemes of lines and planes. It is the mysterious flipping of a third moment into a fourth. Almost quantum in nature but we are not dealing with spatialized theoretical physics or abstract mathematics here. For we are dealing, fundamentally, with the question of movement, but, as we will argue, not of three ‘ecstases’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) that compose ‘authentic temporality’ for Heidegger (1962, 437) but of four. Yes,

² Here is the original German:

“In diesem Wendepunkt der Methode kehrt der Verlauf des Erkennens zugleich in sich selbst zurück. Diese Negativität ist als der sich aufhebende Widerspruch die *Herstellung der ersten Unmittelbarkeit*, der einfachen Allgemeinheit; denn unmittelbar ist das Andere des Anderen, das Negative des Negativen das *Positive, Identische, Allgemeine*. Diese *zweite Unmittelbare* ist im ganzen Verlaufe, wenn man überhaupt *zählen* will, das *Dritte* zum ersten Unmittelbaren und zum Vermittelten. Es ist aber auch das Dritte zum ersten order formellen Negativen und zur absoluten Negativität oder zweiten Negativen; insofern nun jenes erste Negative schon der zweite Terminus ist, so kann das als *Drittes* gezählte auch als *Viertes* gezählt und statt der *Triplizität* die abstrakte Form als eine *Quadruplizität* genommen werden; das Negative oder der *Unterschied* ist auf diese Weise als eine *Zweiheit* gezählte. – Das Dritte oder das Vierte ist überhaupt die Einheit des ersten und zweiten Moments, des Unmittelbaren und des Vermittelten. – Daß es diese *Einheit* sowie daß die oberflächliche, äußerliche Seite der Weise des Erkennes; aber auch nur diese, und zwar in bestimmter Anwendung aufgezeigt zu haben – denn die abstrakte Zahlform selbst ist bekanntlich schon früh, aber ohne Begriff und daher ohne Folge aufgestellt worden –, [ist] gleichfalls als ein unendliches Verdienst der Kantischen Philosophie anzusehen (Hegel 1969, 564).

the goal is to articulate a four-dimensional temporality inside *Being and Time*, not anything that came after it in Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*. And not to reduce Hegel, we must remind ourselves that he too was obsessed with the mystery of movement when it comes to thought comprehending itself: "The Logic thus exhibits the self-movement of the absolute idea" (Hegel 2010, 736).

So how do we deal with this transition from three to four in Hegel so we can prepare ourselves to return to Heidegger becomes the question. For us, this is the most important question that no one seems to recognize. For whether it is Heidegger on the 'unity' of ecstatic temporality as a 'horizon' in which different 'horizontal schemas' as 'whitherings' move as the 'horizon' in different ways (Heidegger 1962, 416) or Hegel's passage on the 'unity as the entire form of method' (Hegel 2010, 746), we must reckon with the question of four. For Heidegger, the unarticulated 'equiprimordiality' (Heidegger 1962, 378) as the 'process' of the 'ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377) can be brought into dialogue with this question of the transition-passage from 'three to four' in Hegel. In Hegel, overcoming the 'superficiality' of three, means overcoming any simplistic ideas of a three-moment dialectic, say thesis, antithesis, synthesis, or the Christian Trinity of Father/Eternal, Son/Incarnation as Temporal and Eternal, Spirit as Eternal (and of course the Trinitarian nature of the One God as Eternal), and even time as three- past, present, future. It means not seeing the unity of the identity of identity (sameness) and non-identity (difference) as back to some non-conceptualizable One. That identity ($A=A$) and difference (A does not equal B), and all possible relations between them, conceal a deeper ground as the later Heidegger (1969) explored in his *Identity and Difference*, originally published in 1957.

For Hegel, we cannot simply resign ourselves to counting moments. We need to get at the "conceptual comprehension" (Hegel 2010, 746). We are interested in this part of the passage specifically:

this second immediate is third to the first immediate and the mediated. But it is also third to the first or formal negative and to the absolute negativity or second negative; now in so far as that first negative is already the second term, the term counted as third can also be counted as fourth, and instead of a triplicity, the abstract form may also be taken to be a quadruplicity; in this way the negative or the difference is counted as a duality (Hegel 2010, 746).

We have two 'immediates,' a 'first and a second' (Hegel 2010, 746). We have two negatives. The 'first negative is the 'second term' (Hegel 2010, 746) after the first immediate, and this negative is 'formal' as in simple opposition to any original, uncomprehended, innocent first immediate, as is any presence or present. (Think of, for example, the predominance of the present as a now-point in which the past is a no-longer present now and future as a yet to be present now.) But since the 'second immediate is third to the first immediate and thus mediated' (Hegel 2010, 746), then it is also 'third to the absolute, second negative' (Hegel 2010, 746), the other to the other (that is other to the first negative as a second term to the first

immediate). If it is third (not as in the number 3 that comes after 2), but literally two spots over from that second negative (the 'other of the other'), then it is actually a fourth spot. The fourth spot is not a simple dissolution of the other of the other back to a simple, uncomprehended identity or presence; instead, we must consider the complexity of the 'self-movement' of the method of thought comprehending itself. This is what Hegel means. We are interested in the turning-movement of the 'quadruplicity' (Hegel 2010, 746), which is not circular, linear, or rectilinear. Just read the text repeatedly. The event of the self-conceptualization of movement beyond any three-moment dialectics of being and becoming, rest and motion, identity and difference is transcendent. Furthermore, we are not assuming a simultaneity or succession in this moving-play of the 'quadruplicity' despite what Hegel says, ambiguously, about 'difference being counted as a duality' (Hegel 2010, 746). But we do not want to go any further here, at least at this particular moment. There will be time for it later.

We just want to bracket this mysterious vanishing, clearing, happening, opening that converts the third into fourth with respect to our traditional understanding of three moments, be it thesis, antithesis, synthesis³, or any

³ Jean Hyppolite has to be one of the twentieth century's most critically rigorous and creative readers of Hegel's texts, particularly the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *The Science of Logic*. But even he comes back to a 'cycle' and does not venture a fourth moment when commenting on *The Science of Logic*. See this quote from his 1953 magisterial work, *Logic and Existence*:

The first term is always the universal as immediate, but then it is determined, and this determination is the negation which it has in itself. This is why the first term passes into the second which is the negative; it is its other. Being is not itself; it is nothingness. This second term is the pivot of the dialectical movement; it is doubly negative. It is at first the other, the negation of the first; but, taken by itself, it re-establishes the first. Nothingness is always the nothingness of being; as other, it constantly re-establishes the other of which it is the other. In itself, it is the other of the other; this is why the dialectical point gets sharpened in it. It is infinite negation, the second negative, the negation of the negation or negativity. Then the first positivity reappears as the third term, as the emergence of the whole movement. But this positivity is one that has become, and, as such, it is a second positivity which is given as a new immediacy. The justification of the beginning is its new advancement, because a new immediacy and the beginning of a new cycle is there. Thus the conflict of being and nothingness exhausts itself in the instability of becoming, but what has become, the being there (*l'être-là*), is a new immediateness. Somehow, the process gets congealed. In the total movement, essence is the instability of the second dialectical moment. In essence, being is negated-no longer in the immediate form of being, as nothingness-but in itself. Being appears; it is being and non-being, as essence and appearance. It appears in itself and is only this reflection. This negation of immediate being, however, negates itself. The concept which completes itself with the absolute Idea re-establishes the immediate being of the beginning (Hyppolite 1997, 169).

We, however, cannot end with an 'immediate being of the beginning' (Hyppolite 1997, 169), and even moreso, a 'process that gets congealed' (Hyppolite 1997, 169). Hyppolite is an incredibly

relation and interrelations of past, present, and future. But conversion is not transmutation, transfiguration, or repentance, as in a turning. Let us, finally, take Hegel seriously that to be a third term as a second immediate for a first term as the first immediate that has a second term as its negative or other, and a third term as the negative of the negative (the other of the other) in relation to the first term as immediate, then any third term to a second (which now looks like a first term immediate) must occupy a fourth moment. It is about cutting the simultaneity of being in two places at once. The third term as the 'negative of the negative, other of the other' (Hegel 2010, 746), itself, splits itself apart. Difference – as the origin of itself as difference – is not spatialized difference between two things; therefore, the origin is neither originally split in itself nor non-split, self-same presence, even in the concept or intuition of what difference 'is.' The splitting apart, the opening of difference is where there is neither a prior undifferentiated unity nor an in-between margin or gap that appears in the creation of two different things. Only retrospectively from the event of the splitting apart can you see a gap between two different things, for example only after cutting a piece of wood can you see two halves. We will eventually have to bring this back to Heidegger's *ekstatikon* or the "primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself" (Heidegger 1962, 377) and the 'clearedness [Glichtkeit]' (Heidegger 1962, 401) since neither can be spatialized empirically or in the imagination. The movement of three to four is not linear, circular, or rectilinear; neither will the disclosure of 'movement/Bewegtheit' (Heidegger 1962, 427) based on any geometric spatialization of presence be or become accessible.

There is another way to look at this Hegel passage to see how the third term in a non-visible instant becomes also a fourth term. Or rather, it is not a question of becoming from one thing to another or going from one location to another; nor is it a matter of the simultaneity or succession of being a third and fourth moment. Let us line up the original three terms and reexamine everything from the start.

- 'First Immediate' (Hegel 2010, 746)
- 'Second Term'- Other as 'Formal negative' (Hegel 2010, 746)
- Third Term- 'Other of Other as Absolute negative of negative' (Hegel 2010, 746)

The 'other of other' (Hegel 2010, 746) is how the first immediate becomes the second immediate while the third term as 'other of other, negative of negative' (Hegel 2010, 746) remains and therefore resists any simultaneity of the first and second 'immediates,' since the first immediate has to become the second immediate while the third term seems to stand in the place of or behind the second immediate. Do not spatialize any becoming like a point traveling on a line, or a metamorphosis of a single being, like a caterpillar becoming a butterfly.

prodigious reader of Hegel who deserves his own separate interpretation; but that is a different project from the one underway.

To accomplish this feat, the third term – ‘other of the other, negative of negative’ (Hegel 2010, 746), and one can say death of death (without yielding the Christian resurrection or Eastern reincarnation) splits itself apart, distancing an internal relation before the origin or non-origin of differentiation occurs. And that ‘is’ the fourth moment. But the being of this ‘is’ is not disclosed. The ‘other of the other’ (Hegel 2010, 746) is not a simple doubling or repetition; it takes the infinity of alterity between first and second terms and, paradoxically, links it to a distended finitude so that a crossing out of the first term takes place.

You can say the fourth moment is the distancing from and hidden differentiation that both keeps the third term – ‘other of other, negative of negative’ (Hegel 2010, 746) – in place in relation to the first; but since the first term as immediate becomes the second immediate, the third cannot remain third to the first but then becomes third to the second, which is impossible. Rather, it is now in a fourth position in relation to the second, just as the third was to the first. To avoid the succession and simultaneity of first becoming second immediate and third term remaining just third to the first since it is also now third to a second, which means fourth, then the fourth is beyond the succession or simultaneity of terms – first, second, and third.⁴

⁴ This is not the place to get into a comparison of Hegel’s concluding moment in *The Science of Logic*, let alone the last two chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, namely “Revealed Religion” and “Absolute Knowing” (Hegel, 1977), with dogmatic and systematic theology. But one could compare with the speculative metaphysical complexity of the Christian Trinity: the Father as Eternal and Pre-existent Logos, the Son as Christological Substance of Two Natures- Eternal and Temporal – in the Incarnation, and the Holy Spirit as Eternal Procession from the Father (for Orthodox) and Father and Son (for Roman Catholic), all of which has a complex relationship with the Parousia/2nd Coming at the ‘end of time’ (Paul’s Letters to the the Thessalonians and John’s Revelations). As Hegel warns in “Revealed Religion” in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, one does not want to start counting all these moments and see how they add up to some higher conception beyond the Trinity (Hegel 1977, 469). But not because it would be heretical to Christian faith, but, rather, it would not be a genuine self-expression of speculative philosophy, which would have to cross a line that faith cannot; faith must remain with an intuition and hope that only God can actualize at the end of time, not the human being. Whereas speculative philosophy is a more perfect and complete shape of Spirit that religion and art cannot accomplish on their own. Hegel says this even in the concluding moments to *The Science of Logic*:

It is the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains all determinateness within it, and its essence consists in returning through its self-determination and particularization back to itself, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to recognize it in these. Nature and spirit are in general different modes of exhibiting its existence, art and religion its different modes of apprehending itself and giving itself appropriate existence. Philosophy has the same content and the same purpose as art and religion, but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute idea, because its mode, that of the concept, is the highest. Hence it seizes those shapes of real and ideal finitude, as well of infinity and holiness, and comprehends them and itself. The derivation and cognition of

There is a leap-movement-event-passage, or ‘the other of the other’ (Hegel 2010, 745) as resistant against simultaneity or remaining while the first immediate becomes the second immediate. Yet, we must keep striving in trying to conceptualize as if it were possible – beyond Hegel’s text – and that requires a whole new architecture of concepts and terms. There is no way to visualize or spatialize the ‘flip’ or ‘conversion’ (those are our terms) of third to fourth without invoking pre-Heideggerean presence. The event of passage cannot be reduced to succession or simultaneity and is not Kant’s unchanging ‘permanence as substance’ as ‘time’ itself in which all events have relations of succession or simultaneity within time (Kant 1998, 299-300). Everything before Heidegger assumed that time is of three aspects- past, present, future, and for the most part constitutes a linear flow, at least since the modern age began. [Just think of modern physics grounded in thermodynamics and entropy, or the one-directional flow of time.] However, by reconceiving time in its four-dimensionality, we are not enslaved to the same paradoxes and aporias in the history of metaphysics from Plato to Kant regarding linear, circular, or rectilinear schemes. We are cutting simultaneity without resorting to succession, and bringing both in an interrelation that defies both at the same time. This doubling of simultaneity to deny simultaneity sounds contradictory and puzzling. However, a four-dimensional temporalization-interrelation-movement-event underlies this unheard-of act in the history of Western metaphysics and religions, Christianity and all its traditions (Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical) in particular.

The critique of simultaneity, which would invoke ready-to-hand and presence-at-hand, requires an ontological critique as does the spatialization of becoming. The asymmetry in the heart of Hegel’s greater *Logic* seems to defy conventional thinking on how Hegel’s thought nicely sums itself up as the culmination of the history of metaphysics in one Notion or ‘Absolute Idea’ (Hegel 2010, 735). It is hard to deny this when Hege, himself, says: “the absolute idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth” (Hegel 2010, 735). But this must come under Heideggerean ‘destruction’ since it is part of the ‘history of ontology’ (Heidegger 1962, 43); this is when tradition does not question the meaning of the being of ‘is’ and being of the meaning of the question to go back to Heidegger’s Introduction (Heidegger 1962, 19). Heidegger’s fundamental ontology raises ‘anew’ the question of the meaning of Being (Heidegger 1962, 18), and not just tries to answer the traditional ontological question of what Being ‘is’ as did Plato, Aristotle, and Kant. But against Heidegger’s delimiting proclamation, we speak of an appropriation and *transformation* of Hegel to execute a *turning* within Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. This massive event remains unaccomplished within that great work and thereafter.

these particular modes are now the further business of the particular philosophical sciences (Hegel 2010, 735-736).

We must now try to conceptualize, within the constraints of fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*, a specific moment. This is when Heidegger could go no further on the 'process' (Heidegger 1962, 377) and 'equiprimordially' (Heidegger 1962, 378) inside the interrelating movements of the 'horizontal schemas' of the 'whithers' (Heidegger 1962, 416) of each 'ecstasis' (Heidegger 1962, 377) of the 'temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 278, 377-378). Let us bracket this notion of becoming one term to another; the resistance to simultaneity of those terms; and the perplexing role of the third moment remaining third to the first immediate but also resisting the role of being third to the second immediate (that the first immediate has become) and thus having to appear as a fourth moment, in order to *now* be that that third term to another immediate. In short, like Heidegger, we cannot begin and end with only three moments that ensnares us in linear time, namely past, present, and future. The contortion of moving-events will comprise a four-dimensional time that will allow us to go deeper into Heidegger's ecstatic temporalizing of temporality in Division Two of *Being and Time*.

Back to Heidegger's *Being and Time*

Now we go back to Heidegger. With this 'fourth' side opening, we can reread his sections 69 and 74. What we need from Hegel is the splitting apart of the 'third term,' the 'negative of the negative as the other of the other' (Hegel 2010, 746) that does not return to some simple identity as pure presence or immediacy to the empirical senses, Kant's transcendental categories, or any experience or concept of the imagination. There is no circle that returns back to an origin after completing its end despite what dogmatic Hegelian interpretations try to tell us about circles. Similarly, for Heidegger, we cannot use any metaphysical or scientific conceptions of motion in relation to spatialized geometric shapes like lines or circles to plumb the depths of a more primordial temporalizing that lie beneath the apparent linear flow of now points 'coming to be and passing away' (Heidegger 1962, 382). The linear flow presupposes 'within-time-ness' (Heidegger 1962, 382), but both are derived from another source. Indeed, Heidegger sets out to ask the audacious question from where does 'within-time-ness' come about, and from where is the linear time associated with it derived (Heidegger 1962, 456-457). Most people would not even bother to question both the natural sense of linear time and the idea of being within-time or being within-history in this calendar year, decade, century, or epoch. Today is today no question. That kind of inauthentic time is continuous, relentless, and ubiquitous. But Heidegger deduces that it comes from an 'essential kind of temporalizing of primordial temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 382). Yet that ecstatic temporality is not elaborated further, other than the brief sections where it receives the most attention, namely section 65 in Chapter III (Heidegger 1962, 370) and section 69 in Chapter IV (Heidegger 1962, 401).

Thus, *our* four-dimensionality will allow us to open and clear the the space of rethinking the 'equiprimordiality' (Heidegger 1962, 378) and 'process' (Heidegger 1962, 377) of the ecstatic-temporalizing of time so that we do not line up the ecstases in one, unified picture or diagram:

- 'futural/letting itself come towards itself/for the sake of itself' in sections 65 (Heidegger, 1962, p. 372) and 69 (Heidegger 1962, 416)
- 'I am my having been-ness/having been in thrown and abandoned in the face of which' in sections 65 (Heidegger 1962, 373) and 69 (Heidegger 1962, 416)
- 'Making present as futural in process of having been is released'/'moment of vision for its time' as 'authentic historicity' in section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 374), section 69 (Heidegger 1962, 416), and section 74 (Heidegger 1962, 437)

Since all three 'horizontal schemas' (Heidegger 1962, 416) have a different 'unity' (Heidegger 1962, 416) in them, then, like Hegel, we cannot have a becoming of the schemas from one to the other or a simultaneity of one with an-other or the other two. There is no way to take the three sets of triangles [each 'ecstasis' (Heidegger 1962, 377) pointing to the other two] and somehow link up all their points so they show us a picture of their connectedness; nor can we remain with one triangle with three different arrows pointing away from each of the three points of the triangle and then the reverse of those arrows in the opposite direction; finally, finally there is no intersecting lines within the triangle that we can multiply in attempting to connect one side with the other two in a cross-crossing movement. Why? Because we do not begin with only three moments or three sides.

There is a splitting apart from the three in their unity that reveals a fourth at play. What this means in Heidegger is that we have to resist making present one of the 'schemas' (Heidegger 1962, 416), say the 'futural/for-sake-of-itself' (Heidegger 1962, 416) in relation to the other two – 'having been' and 'making present' (Heidegger 1962, 416) – by way of some intuition, whether sensorial, empirical, imaginative, apperceptive, and likewise each of the other 'schemas' (Heidegger 1962, 416) in relation to other two. Furthermore, the 'inauthentic, linear, derivative concept of time' (Heidegger 1962, 377) with its 'past, present, and future' – whether 'subjective or objective' – constantly threatens to invade our inquiry as Heidegger says (Heidegger 1962, 374). Furthermore, we must resist the obvious spatialization when relating ourselves to time in reckoning its mystery when having recourse to the constant 'arising and passing away' of now-points (Heidegger 1962, 379), ie. seconds, minutes, hours, days, years, decades, etc. Obviously, Heidegger is trying to derive linear time from some deeper primordiality and is taking up again the projects launched by Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel; but Heidegger's innovation is to destroy any reliance on immediacy or presence as the starting point to reflect on the question of the meaning of being in

relation to the question of the meaning of time. Any hermeneutical circle between subject and object is usurped in favor of another enterprise. This is how the Introduction to *Being and Time* opens (Heidegger 1962, 21).

However, this is what we take from Hegel to re-submerge back into Heidegger. What we want to keep in mind is our attempt to develop a critique of simultaneity that does not lead back to succession; and therefore, we speak of an othering of any origin or non-origin in the creation of differences between them, and a non-spatialized becoming in the interplay of the three ecstases that can only be understood in terms of a four-dimensionality beyond succession and simultaneity. The passing through of interrelating movements without center – of origin/other than origin and end/other than end, non-origin/other non-origin and non-end/other than non-end and all interrelations therein between these four relations – all of this is our construction (Sampath 1999), not Heidegger's or Hegel's.

The problem is showing why appropriating insights from Hegel's 'quadruplicity' (Hegel 2010, 745) can deepen the ground by which 'ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377), 'horizontal schemas as whithers' (Heidegger 1962, 416), ontological 'movement' vs. ontic-physical 'motion' (Heidegger 1962, 427), and 'moment of vision for its time... as authentic historicity' (Heidegger 1962, 437) come to be understood in their ontological togetherness. The 'unity' as Event, Heidegger so desperately wants to articulate in its 'equiprimordiality' (Heidegger 1962, 378) and its ecstatic temporalizing as 'process' (Heidegger 1962, 377), finds its ground in a deeper four-dimensionality. And the path to four-dimensionality is by way of a counter-intuitive appropriation of Hegel's 'quadruplicity' (Hegel 2010, 746) as a type of remaining/whiling, and splitting apart of simultaneity in which the traditional three moment Hegelian dialectic is actually lodged in a play opened by the fourth side; for that matter any attempt to synthesize binary oppositions into One notion, any tradition of three trying to be understood as One (thesis, antithesis, synthesis; Father, Son, Holy Spirit; past, present, future) is derived from this deeper four-dimensionality. This has never been articulated in its full speculative metaphysical conceptualization in the history of Western gentile philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger).

This is an intriguing gesture – namely to appropriate Hegel to complete Heidegger. Most Heidegger scholars would not subscribe to this move. In Hegel, we encountered the non-spatialized becoming of the 'first immediacy' to the 'second immediacy' (Hegel 2010, 746) and the non-simultaneity (literally cutting of simultaneity an act of which is neither simultaneous nor successive) between the 'third term as abstract negative of negative, other of other' (Hegel 2010, 746) to the 'first immediacy' (Hegel 2010, 746) and the new, 'self-sublating contradiction and restoration of the 'first immediacy' (Hegel 2010, 746) as the 'second immediacy' (Hegel 2010, 746). However, since the 'second immediacy' is already the 'third term as negative of negative, other of other to the first

immediacy,' then it is also the 'third term' to the 'second term of first negativity' (Hegel 2010, 746). But to be 'third to a second' (Hegel 2010, 746) when it is already 'third to a first term' (Hegel 2010, 746), then the 'third can be counted as a fourth term' (Hegel 2010, 746). We know this is repetitive, but it is necessary to try to make our point stick.

Trying to dive deep into this internal movement of a complexity (which cannot be circular, linear, rectilinear, or triangular) in Hegel while considering Heidegger's formula of 'transcendence with an ecstatico-horizonal foundation' as temporality (Heidegger 1962, 418), 'or temporality that temporalizes' (Heidegger 1962, 377) is the daunting task. Because Heidegger, himself, does not link this moment of 'transcendence-ecstatico-horizonal foundation' (Heidegger 1962, 418) in Division Two of *Being and Time*, namely Chapter IV, with the ontological problem of 'movement/Bewegtheit' in Chapter V (Heidegger 1962, 427). Hegel, for his part, does not explicitly name time at all in describing the movement of the 'quadruplicity' as the 'Absolute Idea,' which is the unveiling of the 'method' (Hegel 2010, 746) as the "pure concept conceptually comprehending itself" (Hegel 2010, 753). If Heidegger wants to make his ontological critique of Hegel on movement (which is irreducible to a dogmatic three-moment dialectic), by contrasting his 'ecstatic temporality' and 'movement/Bewegtheit' as an occurrence and not ontic, spatialized 'motion/Bewegung' (Heidegger 1962, 427), then so be it. But then Heidegger does not take it any further in revealing the whole of Dasein heading to both its 'ends,' namely 'being-towards-the-end' and being towards the 'beginning, or birth' (Heidegger 1962, 425). He is seeking the 'whole' which would be the 'between birth and death' (Heidegger 1962, 425). But this search for the 'whole' (Heidegger 1962, 425) takes us right into the question of 'movement as historizing' (Heidegger 1962, 427), whereby an ontological understanding of that would yield and understanding of 'historicality' (Heidegger 1962, 427). Let us quote Heidegger directly:

The movement [Bewegtheit] of existence is not the motion [Bewegung] of something present-at-hand. It is definable in terms of the way Dasein stretches along. The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its "historizing".¹ The question of Dasein's 'connectedness' is the ontological problem of Dasein's historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing, and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has achieved an ontological understanding of historicality. ² (Heidegger 1962, 427).

This is where we take our departure from most, if not all, Heidegger scholarship (Braver 2016), which is busy with discussions of 'fate and destiny' or 'Schicksal' and 'Geshick' (Heidegger 1962, 436). At that moment, the English translators, Macquerrie and Robinson, note the difficulties in trying to interpret Heidegger's intentions in the original German, which does not intend to conflate the ordinary understandings of 'Schicksal' as fate and 'Geschick' as common

destiny.⁵ Instead, we will turn our attention elsewhere and attempt the unthinkable. We want to expand on the speculative metaphysical impulses raised to a new level of self-comprehension in Hegel's discussion of the 'quadruplicity' while *returning and appropriating* seeds buried in Division Two, particularly chapters III, IV, and V on the 'primordial, finite, authentic, unified, ecstatic, temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 380), the 'ecstatico-horizontal foundation' (Heidegger 1962, 418), and 'movement/Bewegtheit' (Heidegger 1962, 427) as the 'between of the two ends of death and birth' (Heidegger 1962, 425). At the crux of all this is a more fleshed out version of the "movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along" (Heidegger 1962, 427)... as "historizing" (Heidegger 1962, 427). Unlike Heidegger, we will hypothesize a four-dimensional movement as the whole of ecstatic 'temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 278, 377-378) as the 'process' (Heidegger 1962, 377) of the interrelations of the 'unity of the three ecstases as future, having been, Present' (Heidegger 1962, 377).

Conclusion

Four-dimensionality, beyond succession or simultaneity of two things, say birth and death, origin and end, and its opposites in non-origin and non-end, must be elaborated to reveal the 'whole' (Heidegger 1962, 425) that Heidegger was seeking in Division Two of *Being and Time* but could not find. This comes down to revealing time as interrelations-movement-event as four-dimensional, utilizing phrases from Heidegger but the speculative-metaphysical force that Hegel's descriptions of 'terms' at work in and beyond the 'quadruplicity' (Hegel 2010, 746). This is just the beginning for us because, so far, we have only tried to develop a hypothesis. But we have yet to demonstrate anything, let alone convince anyone of the validity of our hypothesis. Following what Heidegger says in the very last section of Division Two of *Being and Time* that his whole undertaking is just 'one way' (Heidegger 1962, 487) that philosophy could take. By inference, there must be other ways to take. Our undertaking is such an attempt that radically departs from Heidegger, and therefore all those he influenced in twentieth-century continental philosophy such as Marcuse, Levinas, and Derrida to name the main

⁵ See footnote 1 in the 1962 translation: "This statement may well puzzle the English-speaking reader, who would perhaps be less troubled if he were to read that the irresolute man can have no 'destiny'. As we shall see in the next paragraph, Heidegger has chosen to differentiate sharply between the words 'Schicksal' and 'Geschick', which are ordinarily synonyms. Thus 'Schicksal' (our 'fate') might be described as the 'destiny' of the resolute individual; 'Geschick' (our 'destiny') is rather the 'destiny' of a larger group, or of Dasein as a member of such a group. This usage of 'Geschick' is probably to be distinguished from that which we have met on H. 16, 19, and perhaps even 379, where we have preferred to translate it by 'vicissitude'. The suggestion of an etymological connection between 'Schicksal' and 'Geschick' on the one hand and 'Geschichte' (our 'history') and 'Geschehen' (our 'historizing') on the other, which is exploited in the next paragraph, is of course lost in translation" (Heidegger 1962, 436).

protagonists who were serious readers of *Being and Time*. The transition from twentieth-century continental philosophy to an alternative future is not a mere shift from one century to the next. It requires a re-occupation of the 'old' but for the purpose of announcing what is potentially 'new.'

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