Ecstatic Temporality and Transcendence in Section 65 of Chapter III and Section 69 of Chapter IV in Relation to Ontological Movement in Section 74 of Chapter V in Division Two of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927)

Part I

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**Abstract:** This first article is part of a two-article series labeled Parts I and II. In Part I, we will attempt a close reading of Division Two of Heidegger’s greatest work, *Being and Time* (1927). We will execute a granular analysis of a few lines and phrases in section 65 in Chapter III, section 69 in Chapter IV, and sections 72 and 74 in Chapter V; those sections cover ‘primordial ecstatic, finite, unified, authentic temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the ‘equiprimordiality of the unity of the ecstases’ (Heidegger 1962, 378), ‘the whitherings and horizontal schemas,’ (Heidegger 1962, 416), and the ontological distinction of movement/Bewegtheit and the Western metaphysical tradition on spatialized motion/Bewegung (Heidegger 1962, 427) respectively. Attempting to show the connectedness of these problems in a manner different from *Being and Time*, itself, requires a bracketing of how we renew our engagement with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel even after Heidegger’s attempted ‘destruction’ (Heidegger 1962, 41) of the ontological and metaphysical traditions of the West. We want to set up the possibility of reengaging Heidegger on a cryptic moment in the 1962 English translators’ footnote on the ‘swoon’ and ‘clairvoyance’ (Heidegger 1962, 436) that immediately precedes Heidegger’s great articulation of the ‘moment of vision for its time’ and the possibility of an ‘authentic understanding of fate, which is historicality’ (Heidegger 1962, 437). In Part I, we will resume the possibility of an abstract metaphysical undertaking about a four-dimensional temporality that Heidegger could not and did not articulate in *Being and Time*. This first article constitutes Part I, which then sets up Part II to appear in a second article. In the second article, we will attempt a direct appropriation of Hegel’s *The Science of Logic* (1813-1816), particularly on his enigmatic introduction of the term ‘quadruplicity’ (Hegel 2010, 746), which comes at the very end of his greatest and most complex work.

**Keywords:** fundamental ontology, Hegel, Heidegger, metaphysics, time.

**Introduction**

As our title suggests, we will try to connect seemingly disconnected moments in sections and chapters of Division Two of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* to finish what the work could not conceptualize, particularly on the relation between temporality, movement, and transcendence. Specifically, we will comment on sections 69 and 74 of Chapters IV and V, respectively, in Division Two of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. We do not intend a conflation of the topic of ecstatic temporality and transcendence in Chapter IV with ‘death, the moment of vision, fate, destiny and historicality’ (Heidegger 1962, 436-437) in Chapter V. On the one
hand, for many, there is no obvious connection between these two sections. And for those that do see the connections of how each section foreshadows the next and builds up to the next, they would not want to see a synthesis of both sections. But that is what we will aim to do. Our intention is not to interpret these momentous sections in all of Division Two but to keep an eye open to witness the possibility of passage as a syncretistic gathering: that is the event of a transition from Division Two to the would-be Division Three, which never occurred in *Being and Time*. Hence, we do not aim to contribute to scholarship on Division Two, particularly on the ontological question of temporality (Blattner 1999) or historicality (Barash 1987; Gillisipe 2015). Our aim is to set up the conditions of possibility to think of a set of terms and architectonic-distinctions that could help compose the missing Division Three in Heidegger’s absence.

This work is part of a two-part article series that will appear separately as two individual articles but interconnected in one investigation. In this article, Part I opens with an analysis of section 69 on the ‘horizonal schema’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) of each temporal ‘ecstasis’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) and grapples with the problem of the ‘whithering’ occurrence endemic in each ‘schema.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) This gives us an opportunity to rethink – in non-spatial terms – the ontological problem of movement/Bewegtheit (Heidegger 1962, 427) while revisiting the fundamental descriptions Heidegger gives us of ‘ecstatic temporality’ and the elusive question of the ‘equiprimordial’ (Heidegger 1962, 378) unity of the ecstases even though for each ‘ecstasis’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) the “mode of temporalizing is different.” (Heidegger 1962, 378) To dive deeper into the complexity of these interrelations among the ecstasies while each maintains their own singularity, we argue for a detour through Hegel’s *The Science of Logic* (1813-1816). Particularly, we focus on the passage where the mysterious term – the ‘quadruplicity’ – appears in the last chapter of Volume Two: *The Science of Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Concept*, namely *The Absolute Idea*, of this gargantuan work (Hegel 2010, 735). We realize this goes against Heidegger’s injunctions against Hegel in the penultimate section 82 of Division Two of *Being and Time*; that Hegel is trapped in the metaphysical tradition of equating the ‘now’ with spatialized presence that goes back to Plato and Aristotle (Heidegger 1962, 483), which itself constitutes the ‘ordinary conception of time.’ (Heidegger 1962, 480) And, of course, the monumental achievement of Heidegger, particularly in *Being and Time*, is to derive the most unquestioned assumptions about the nature of time in the history of Western philosophy, beginning with Plato and Aristotle up to Kant, Hegel, and Bergson, from something deeper, more ‘primordial and

1 See the English translators’ discussion of the Greek etymology behind ‘ecstasis’ in footnote 2 in Chapter III of Division Two: “The root-meaning of the word ‘ecstasis’ (Greek ἔκστασις; German, ‘Ekstase’) is ‘standing outside.’ Used generally in Greek for the ‘removal’ or ‘displacement’ of something, it came to be applied to states-of-mind which we would now call ‘ecstatic.’ Heidegger usually keeps the basic root-meaning in mind, but he also is keenly aware of its close connection with the root-meaning of the word ‘existence.’” (Heidegger 1962, 377)
authentic.’ (Heidegger 1962, 486) Hegel’s philosophy happens to be the most ‘radical’ (Heidegger 1962, 480) conceptualization of the ordinary understanding of time in the history of Western thought.

### Part I

#### Opening the ‘Clearedness’ (Heidegger 1962, 401)

Section 69 throws us right into the deep end in elaborating what was begun in section 65 on the obscure complexity of ecstatic temporality:

> The ecstatic unity of temporality—that is, the unity of the ‘outside-of-itself’ in the raptures of the future, of what has been, and of the Present is the condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists as its ‘there.’ The entity which bears the title ‘Being-there’ is one that has been ‘cleared.’xiv The light which constitutes this clearedness [Gelichtetheit] of Dasein, is not something ontically present-at-hand as a power or source for a radiant brightness occurring in the entity on occasion. That by which this entity is essentially cleared—in other words, that which makes it both ‘open’ for itself and ‘bright’ for itself—is what we have defined as ‘care,’ in advance of any ‘temporal’ Interpretation. In care is grounded the full disclosedness of the ‘there.’ Only by this clearedness is any illuminating or illumining, any awareness, ‘seeing,’ or having of something made possible. We understand the light of this clearedness only if we are not seeking some power implanted in us and present-at-hand, but are interrogating the whole constitution of Dasein’s Being-namely, care-and are interrogating it as to the unitary basis for its existential possibility. Ecstical temporality clears the ‘there’ primordially. (Heidegger 1962, 401-402)

Let us make clear that Heidegger is not referring to the ‘there’ as the external space of nature available to a subject who perceives, intuits, or is enveloped space. The hard thing to do for anyone is to decouple the meaning of ‘there’ in the ontological sense from our normal empirical senses that relate it to space or spatiality. It is also not that of an internal mechanism like Kant’s ‘transcendental apperception’ that both constitutes the subject in relation to itself and in relation to an external object that is prior to all data received from intuitions or the senses in experience.2 Rather, this lies prior to any ‘seeing’

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2 To quote directly from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*: "Now this original and transcendental condition is nothing other than the transcendental apperception.24 The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception. That which should necessarily be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought of as such through empirical data. There must be a condition that precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible, which should make such a transcendental presupposition valid. Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apperception." (1998, 232)
anything, whether a perception of the external object or the internal, non-sensory perception within the imagination that can never refer to some outside, sensory object. The ‘there’ is not present-at-hand like the page you are reading now. Therefore, for Heidegger, we cannot assume a preexisting ‘I’ as unchanging through the changes in and of experience. Furthermore, we cannot even presuppose an ‘I’ to begin with when probing the Being of Dasein in terms of the ‘who’ question of Dasein (Heidegger 1962, 150).

Now we can start reading critically from the first line of section 69 to unpack the density of every phrase in every sentence. We are concerned with this initial connection between ecstatic temporality and the ‘clearedness [Gelichtekeit].’ (Heidegger 1962, 401) There is something strange about the ‘unity’ inherent in ecstatic temporality. Do not think of it as the sum of two numbers or how a work of art achieves its unity in some final truth, or in the mind of the art critic of how a work ‘hangs together’ and accomplishes something. Unity is not that of the perfect democratic polis where all conflict and dissent have been overcome, as if such a thing can exist. Unity is not that of the solidarity of all those engaged in a social movement or a coalition of social movements to challenge some status quo. It is neither that of the nation-state, globe, nor the human species. These are all ontic registers of the term ‘unity’ of which there are numerous other semantic possibilities. Let us also avoid the temptation of Plato’s founding moments in Western philosophy, for example on the ‘one and the many’ in his great Parmenides, and how Aristotle in his corpus tries to resolve those great dialectical paradoxes, for example in his towering Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics. We will return to these Western foundations; but phenomenologically, we need to suspend and bracket what this epoch – the entire span of historical time from Plato to Aristotle to Kant to Hegel – means to us. We care about what Heidegger’s text is telling us, that is his novel introduction of ecstatic temporality, which is not articulated – in the way that Heidegger does in Being and Time – at any time prior in the history of Western philosophy and Christianity. At least according to Heidegger, the entire Western tradition of ontology (unities of the Forms, of Being, of the Transcendental Apperception, of Spirit’s Notion) is being destroyed (1962, 41). This does not mean Heidegger’s thought does not have roots in pretty much the entire Western tradition, which a quickglance of the translators’ footnotes and Heidegger’s endnotes illustrate. That is not the point. We must creatively try to expand on Heidegger’s initial ideas and give new meaning to them that is not available in his text.

The ‘unity’ (Heidegger 1962, 401) in this opening moment of section 69 is split apart, a non-original caesura that does not offer itself as a present-at-hand difference, say a line drawn in the middle of a page dividing it into halves. That means its interrelation gives rise to the possibility of sensing what lies beyond the horizon of simple identity and difference, and hence any simple dialectical synthesis. (For example, the unity of A, which does not equal B, with the negation and raising to a higher level the difference between A and B in C is one
characterization of the dialectic and its movement.) Rather, the “primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself” (Heidegger 1962, 377) in section 65 as the ‘ekstatikon’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) acquires some added features so to speak in the opening of section 69.

The ‘outside itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 378) is the transcendental horizon. Such a horizon stretches out any possibility of an ‘in and for itself,’ which is not some atomistic point called the subject, which then intuits space and time internally and externally without reducing them to an object of experience to return to Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. Rather, we have a strange non-identity in the juxtaposing relation-in-difference of the ‘outside-of-itself’ (forever other to oneself as if standing over oneself as the horizon of the possibility to be) while questioning the original position of oneself as an ‘in and for itself,’ the latter of which is never ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. It is likened to a movement of ecstases of temporality as we will see, which is never lined up one after another as Heidegger says in section 65 (1962, 377). Temporality is not ‘prior’ to itself and therefore does not ‘emerge from itself’ as Heidegger says (1962, 377), but, instead, refers to a ‘process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases.’ (1962, 377)

Having said that, demonstrating an understanding of how Heidegger critiques the ordinary understanding of linear time as flowing now-points (calendar, chronological, scientific spatialized time) is not enough. Furthermore, understanding how linear time is derived from the deeper ‘primordial temporalizing of temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 278, 378) is also not sufficient.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) In his early article, *Martin Heidegger and Ontology*, Levinas demonstrates this understanding to a degree that no other did so close to the original publication of *Being and Time*. But as we shall see, he did not go far enough. Levinas states: “Later on we will see the authentic understanding (or existence) of Dasein revealing itself as authentic and finite time itself. Consequently, the fall into everyday life, to which is linked, according to Heidegger, the appearance of calculable time, of the infinite time of the sciences, and later, of timeless-ness itself, appears as a temporal event of authentic time. To exit toward the timeless and eternal is not to be detached from time, for, by virtue of the inner possibility of existence, this exit is a mode of time. The progress toward the eternal, which Western consciousness believes to have accomplished with the supertemporal point of view of the sciences, is not a victory achieved by spirit over concrete and temporal existence, but a moment of the very drama of this existence. This leap toward the eternal does not transcend this drama that it may give a new birth to persons; it does not transfigure the eternal by an act of grace come from beyond. But, by virtue of the integrating element of existence, this leap is completely dominated by the leitmotiv of this drama. We wanted to emphasize Heidegger’s reduction to time, and to the most concrete time as he at least so thinks-of all that one might be tempted to call supertemporal, the reduction to existence of all that one would wish to call relation. This is his fundamental ontologism, which we must bring into relief in this work.” (1996, 25-26) This is not to reduce the complexity of Levinas’s rich understanding, particularly with regard to the ‘supertemporal.’ (1996, 26) And this great early article of the early 1930s predates of course the mature Levinas’s attempt to critique Heidegger directly on the project of fundamental ontology and the centering of the ethical in a renewed attempt at philosophy in general in his *Totality and Infinity* (1962) and *Otherwise than Being and Beyond Essence* (1974).
We must go deeper than those twentieth-century interpretations of Heidegger by linking questions of ecstatic temporality with the problem of ‘movement/Bewegtheit,’ which appears in Chapter V starting with section 72 (Heidegger 1962, 427). If Heidegger’s many stupendous achievements in Being and Time, and quite frankly several earlier works prior, such as the The Concept of Time (1924) and the 1925 lecture course, The History of the Concept of Time, is to deconstruct the linear sense of time as flowing now-points and introduce in Being and Time a more elaborate articulation of the ‘finite, ecstatic, unified, primordial, authentic temporalizing of temporality,’ (Heidegger 1962, 380) then the same cannot be said on the distinction between the ontological mystery of ‘movement/Bewegtheit’ and the ontic-physical-experiential idea of ‘motion/Bewegung’ (Heidegger 1927, 427) as a change of location over a distance measured by clock time. It turns out ‘movement as an enigma’ (Heidegger 1962, 444) may be harder to treat than ecstatic temporality; and that is what causes, ironically, Being and Time to come to an abrupt halt, long before the concluding encounter with Hegel even occurs.

This means we have to see how Heidegger commences a direct confrontation with Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel and the entire history of metaphysics to open an other horizon of thought altogether. But that also means we cannot reduce the complexity of Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. We agree with Heidegger’s overall project in Being and Time: namely, that the history of Western metaphysics has not inquired deeply enough into how ‘within-time-ness’ (Chapter VI) and ordinary, inauthentic, infinitely flowing linear time ‘levels off primordial temporalizing of temporality.’ (Heidegger 1962, 278, 457) However, we also have to affirm what he does, which is that he did not go far enough on his reflections on primordial temporality (Heidegger 1962, 457) and got completely stuck on the ‘enigma of motion,’ (Heidegger 1962, 444) let alone how the two are connected. Therefore, Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel cannot just simply disappear; they must be carefully deconstructed and appropriated post-Heidegger to re-occupy Heidegger’s Being and Time itself. Furthermore, we must draw creative inspiration from Heidegger’s critical assessment of them to make a critique of Heidegger himself and open a space of reflections that were not articulated in Being and Time, or thereafter in his later works. This, we hope, speaks to the inspiration behind our gathering in this venue.

Let us return to the opening passage of section 69. Now, Heidegger talks about the ‘raptures’ (Entrückungen) within which the ‘ecstatical unity of temporality’ occurs (1962, 401). We speak of an event as opposed to something residing in something else, for example reducing time to space and saying that time takes place in space. This complex event is the ‘condition of possibility’ for anything to be ‘there’ (Heidegger 1962, 401) and therefore derives any ontic ready-to-hand or present-at-hand person, thing, object, etc. But that also means space and time itself, and, therefore, not the Kantian pure a priori intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason, which is irreducible to any empirical sense of space and
time as external things that are simply out there, beyond the intuition or imagining subject.

We must read Heidegger more carefully. He speaks of that which allows a 'there' as an "entity which exists as its 'there.'" (Heidegger 1962, 401) There is a doubling of the word 'there' that we must keep in mind. To say 'I am there' does not mean I am a being in a certain location of the world, i.e. in the U.S.A. Contrast that with, for example, all religious and theological registers in the *New Testament*, for example in John 17:16 – “I am not of the world” – on the eve of Jesus’s arrest, death, and resurrection in his Passion. To be in the world and not of it is the mystery of Jesus’s own Christological transcendental subjectivity, His one substance with two natures, divine and human, eternal and temporal. Rather, and in contrast, if Dasein as 'being-there' is grounded in this 'process of temporali\zation in the unity of the ecstases,' (Heidegger 1962, 377) and if this 'ecstical unity of temporality' occurs in the 'raptures of the future, of what has been, and of the Present,' (Heidegger 1962, 401) then somehow the doubling of any simple 'there' (presumably intuited as a space or a time) is converted into an “entity that exists as it’s there.” (Heidegger 1962, 401) And this ‘Being-there’ as an entity is “one that has been 'cleared' (gelichtet).” (Heidegger 1962, 401)

Before we venture into all the semantic possibilities of the clearing, being-cleared, clearedness, etc., we have to keep in mind the following: that the enigmatic *movement* as the ecstatic unity of ecstases is a rapturous one, or rather a non-rapturous one, in which no simple sequence of past to present to future or future to present to past (or any sequence of the three terms for that matter) can be available prior to some intuiting subject experiencing itself from birth to death or epochs in historical time. (This is not the Christian rapture of actual living human beings taken up to meet Jesus in the clouds as in Paul’s 1 Thessalonians 4:17.) For an entity to exist as its 'there,' (Heidegger 1962, 401) that means it does not exist as something in space and time; this is how the ontological difference is maintained. The meaning of the 'there' as the totality of Dasein’s Being grounded Care, which is grounded in ecstatic temporality, is not fully revealed in *Being and Time*. That is, at least regarding the problem of movement, 'being-towards-birth,' and the already articulated Chapter I of Division Two on 'being-towards-death,' which is re-adumbrated in Chapter V.

To repeat, incessantly, for sure in section 65, and thereafter in Division Two, the future is not ahead of the present now as a 'yet-to-be now' and the past is not behind the present now as a 'no longer now.' (Heidegger 1962, 375) We are not saying today is Sunday, yesterday was Saturday, and tomorrow is Monday on the chronological line to which most of us, unfortunately, are tethered beyond our will. Rather, the non-rapturous whither as the movement of the "future in the process of having been in making present, the making present as coming back to what has

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4 Retrieved January 18th, 2024 from https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/1-Thessalonians-Chapter-4/
already been as past, the future as letting itself come towards itself” all from section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 372-374) points to a non-circular, non-linear, and non-rectilinear movement whose complexity defies Euclidean space. We will argue that it transcends the three moments of time in general, which most people think of, namely past, present, and future. Yet it involves a ‘temporalizing of temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 278) as an Event. Clocks and the most complex temporal phenomena, like wormholes, in the physical cosmos will not help us. Despite the English etymology of ‘whither,’ currently defined in reference to ‘state or place,’ commonly understood as ‘to what or to which,’ (Oxford English Dictionary n.d.)⁵ we must resist any spatialization of a subject, or space and spatiality in general. There is no subject-object relation, and nothing outside it either. We do not speak of any kind of destination to which we can arrive. Rather, this critical exegesis of Being and Time argues that the ‘whither’ does not refer to a state of being that human beings find themselves in or a location in space. Rather, we are concerned with non-spatialized, non-linear ecstatic temporality in relation to movement (which is not the motion of a thing in space or space itself). There is no ‘present-at-hand’ or ‘ready-to-hand’ understanding of things, time, movement, and all their possible interrelationships.

Furthermore, each of these ecstases relates to the other two in their own unique ways, going back to the ‘equiprimordiality’ (Heidegger 1962, 378) that Heidegger states in section 65: for the ‘modes of temporalizing are different,’ or each ‘ecstasy’ (1962, 377) in its ‘equiprimordiality’ with the others (1962, 378) is different. The nature of this difference remains indiscernible. And difference is not spatialized as a binary cut or any kind of mathematical non-identity or inequality. Heidegger does not articulate a super-synthesis of how each ‘ecstasy’ (1962, 377) in relation to the other (therefore six sets of relations of three terms of past, present, future) comes about in some higher concept or Notion if we think that is what Hegel was trying to achieve. We will, as always, come back to Hegel at some point. ‘Coming towards’ our ‘having been’ (Heidegger 1962, 373) is not like a time machine that goes back to a past moment we lived to relive it as a new present, which then is followed by another future rather than a future that already occurred, i.e. the future of 2021 was 2022 and 2023 the future of 2022, and now 2025 is the future of our now, which is 2024.

Now, although Heidegger does not develop the unique structure of ecstatic relational ‘equiprimordiality’ proper to each of the three temporal axes in relation to the other two as one big ‘unity,’ (1962, 401) he does give us a clue with the ‘clearedness’ (Gelichteheit) of the ‘Being-there.’ (1962, 401) Heidegger says that the “light which constitutes the clearedness” is not some “ontically present-at-hand as a power or source for a radiant brightness occurring in the entity on occasion.” (1962, 401) Do not think of an internal illumination of mind in

⁵ Retrieved January 18th, 2024 from https://www.oed.com/dictionary/whither_adv?tab=meaning_and_use#14388944
conceiving an ingeniously new idea like Einstein’s relativity: then again, do not think of external light from photons, the hydrogen of the Sun, of fire, or the electricity of the light bulb. But on the other side of science is theology. Therefore, we certainly want to avoid conflating it with the theological metaphysics of the Prologue to the Gospel of John on the Preexistent Logos of Jesus with the Father as an example:

4 In him was life; and the life was the light of men.
5 And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.
6 There was a man sent from God, whose name was John.
7 The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe.
8 He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light.
9 That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.
10 He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not (King James online n.d.)

As tantalizing as it is to compare what Heidegger says about Dasein with what John the Evangelist is referring to as the ‘Light’ that came into the world (and in fact made the world) but the world’s darkness could not envelop it, we will refrain from such an undertaking. A work that contrasts philosophy with theology is important but has to be deferred. Going back to Heidegger, an entity – Dasein – that has been ‘cleared’ is ‘open for itself.’ (1962, 401) For us, everything lies in the dynamic motility of the ‘equiprimordiality’ (Heidegger 1962, 378) of the ecstases of the ‘temporalizing of temporality,’ (Heidegger 1962, 278) which transcend any interrelations of the relations of past, present, and future. We will attempt to probe this ‘opening’ while returning to the attendant mysteries left unprobed, and therefore ideas that remain undeveloped in Being and Time’s Second Division: namely that which remains a question regarding the ontological mystery of ‘movement’ (Heidegger 1962, 427) and the ‘equiprimordiality’ (Heidegger 1962, 378) of the ecstases of temporality in their unique interrelations. But now we must consider the ‘clearedness’ (Gelichteheit) and ‘open’ (offen), which culminates the first paragraph of section 69 in this simple formula: “Ecstatic temporality clears the ‘there’ primordially.” (Heidegger 1962, 402) The opening of any possibility (not just to be but for time and space to be also) of a ‘Being-there’ (Heidegger 1962, 401) is lodged in a deeper temporalization that is primordial in a kind of ontological (not ontic) nature. This, for sure, is Heidegger’s great achievement in
the history of Western philosophy. This statement is preceded by what many see as the central insight to all of *Being and Time*, namely the ‘whole constitution of Dasein’s Being -namely, care’ in its ‘unitary basis’ (Heidegger 1962, 402) is grounded in what Heidegger introduces in the extremely bizarre contorted movement that is a non-rapturous⁶ ecstatic ‘temporalizing of temporality,’ (1962, 377) each of the three in relation to the two as singular. Singular but interrelated somehow. There is no succession or simultaneity of two or three entities here. All other ‘existential structures’ (Heidegger 1962, 402) of Dasein have their possibilities ‘regulated’ by this enigmatic ‘unity.’ (Heidegger 1962, 402) But the ‘unity’ eludes the whole of *Being and Time*.

We are not even remotely close to getting to the problem of ‘death, moment of vision, and historicality’ (Heidegger 1962, 437) in section 74 of Chapter V. We still have to tackle a more massive passage in section 69 before moving to 74 and then reading 69 and 74 together in a new ‘unity’ so to speak. For us, everything begins and ends with the problem of movement/Bewegtheit and ecstatic temporality, and how to think about their inter-relation so we do not attach one as the predicate to the subject that is the other and vice-versa. We will not say, for example, ‘ecstatic temporalizing of temporality’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) moves like this or that. You cannot start with the point, which turns into a line, which becomes a plane as Derrida (1972) discusses in his long 1968 article, *Ousia and Grammê: Note on a Note from Being and Time*, if one tries to speak of the origin of space, and therefore the spatialization of time. Or that movement is temporalized in relation to a distance traveled through space. The ontological nature of movement defies anything present-at-hand moving in space or as and of space itself, i.e. like physical theories of the expanding universe, black holes, or the nature of gravity. Since we cannot begin with a human subject experiencing or observing anything, we must start elsewhere, not even with an entity, like Dasein in *Being and Time*, the meaning of whose totality or wholeness has not been revealed, i.e. the missing Division Three.

**The ‘Whither’ and ‘Horizontal Schemas’ (Heidegger 1962, 416)**

Let us continue with section 69 and try to interpret the passage that would take lifetimes to truly penetrate if we have a chance of even going slightly beyond where Heidegger could not go. In a seeming summary of the whole of *Being and Time*, Heidegger states:

> We have defined Dasein’s Being as ‘care.’ The ontological meaning of ‘care’ is temporality. We have shown that temporality constitutes the disclosedness of

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⁶ The traditional English dictionary definition of ‘rapture’ is this: “As a mass noun: transport of mind, mental exaltation or absorption, ecstasy; (now esp.) ecstatic delight or joy”; and also “transitive. Christian Church. In Millenarian theology: to cause (believers) to ascend into heaven as part of the rapture of the Church (cf. rapture...)” Retrieved January 18th, 2024 from: https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?scope=Entries&q=rapture.
the ‘there,’ and we – have shown how it does so. In the disclosedness of the ‘there’
the world is disclosed along with it. The unity of significance—that is, the
ontological constitution of the world must then likewise be grounded in
temporality. The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world
lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a
horizon. Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away.
Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a ‘whither’ to which one is carried away.1
This ‘whither’ of the ecstasis we call the ‘horizontal schema.’ In each of the three
ecstases the ecstatical horizon is different. The schema in which Dasein comes
towards itself futurally, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the ‘for-the-
sake-of-itself.’ The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in a state-of-
mind as thrown, is to be taken as that in the face of which it has been thrown
and that to which it has been abandoned. This characterizes the horizonal
schema of what has been. In existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself
as something that has been thrown, Dasein, as Being-alongside, is at the same
time making present. The horizonal schema for the Present is defined by the ‘in-
order-to.’
The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, Present, and having been, is
grounded in the ecstatical unity of temporality. (1962, 416)

In this enormously rich and complex passage, we need to isolate a few terms
and phrases before we begin our creative expansion.

“Horizon

Whither and distinct from rapture

Horizontal schema

Futurally – for-the-sake-of-itself

What has been – in the face of which

Present – in-order-to” (Heidegger 1962, 416)

Let us suspend any semantic possibilities that normally come to mind when
we think of these words, whether in English or the original German.7 We do not

7 Here is the original German: ‘Das Sein des Daseins bestimmten wir als Sorge, Deren
ontologischer Sinn ist die Zeitlichkeit. Daß und wie diese die Erschlossenheit des Da
konstituiert, wurde gezeigt. In der Erschlossenheit des Da ist Welt miteinschlossen. Die Einheit
der Bedeutsamkeit, das heißt die ontologische Verfassung der Welt, muß dann gleichfalls in der
Zeitlichkeit gründen. Die existenzial-zeitliche Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Welt liegt darin,
daß die Zeitlichkeit als ekstatische Einheit so etwas wie einen Horizont hat. Die Ekstasen sind
nicht einfach Entrückungen zu... Vielmehr gehört zur Ekstase ein »Wohin« der Entrückung.
Dieses Wohin der Ekstase nennen wir das horizontale Schema. Der ekstatische Horizont ist in
ejeder der drei Ekstasen verschieden. Das Schema, in dem das Dasein zukünftig, ob eigentlich
oder uneigentlich, auf sich zukommt, ist das Umwillen seiner. Das Schema, in dem das Dasein
ihm selbst als geworfenes in der Befindlichkeit erschlossen ist, fassen wir als das Wovor der
Geworfenheit bzw. als Woran der Überlassenheit. Es kennzeichnet die horizontale Struktur der
Gewesenheit. Umwillen seiner existierend in der Überlassenheit an es selbst als geworfenes, ist
das Dasein als Sein bei... zugleich gegenwärtigend. Das horizontale Schema der Gegenwart wird
begin with a human subject experiencing itself through the flow of time, carrying their birth (by re-memorializing an alleged birthdate, which they do not remember as an infant) with them as they move towards death as an end that they cannot anticipate, even as they try to evade it, and certainly cannot accomplish own their own, and return to tell about it. The accumulation of ontic or psychological time in the malaise or nausea of aging, forever recollecting past trauma or glory, forever sinking into the eternal agony or joy of a present that does not seem to end, and constant anticipation of what can be (without ever knowing what tomorrow will bring) is constantly invaded by calendar, chronological, linear time; the latter, of course, is that which Division Two of *Being and Time* utterly questions and in fact destroys. The destruction takes place through an attempted derivation of linear time from a deeper ‘ground’ (Heidegger 1962, 318) that turns out to be the finite, authentic, unified, primordial, ecstatic temporalizing of temporality (Heidegger 1962, 379-380). To transcend this flow of linear time while being a living human being (and perhaps the dead too), ironically, sinks us into a ‘ground.’ (Heidegger 1962, 318)

It is to this ‘ground’ (Heidegger 1962, 316) that we shall try to go, submerging deep within it. But the movement is not motion in space or from one dimension to another; it is not like trying to dig a hole deeper, or even more bizarrely a hole within a hole, i.e. bizarre mathematical forms of modern geometry. Idealized intuitions of pure space and time beyond the senses will not help the ontological analysis. Rather, the ground ‘is’ movement in opening the question of the meaning of (not Being and hence Heidegger’s *Being and Time*), but the Being of Time. As tempting as it is to spatialize a conceptual notion that is time self-comprehended as a whole stretch in which past, present, and future move together within and among themselves and as life in which it unfolds, we must resist this type of metaphysical search for a ‘ground.’ This is not simply an issue of our insufferable physical morality; that is of not being able to transcend our finite moment in the present (and the finite stretch of time from birth and death allotted to us) in order to see the whole stretch of time from birth to death from a transcendental viewpoint; that would mean being above a death yet to occur and having the power to see the actual moment of our birth happen (something no human being can recall in their visual-sensory memory).

Our hypothesis is the following: the moving set of interrelations of the ecstases – that the passage above tries to describe in terms of the ‘horizontal schemas’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) – by which the ‘unity of ecstatic temporality’ as a ‘horizon’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) is structured differently but for different reasons; therefore, there are at least three possible sets of interrelations of the three ecstases of the ‘futurally, the what has been, and the Present.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) It would seem like we are speaking about triangles of triangles of possible

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relations between past, present, and future; but we will bracket this off as an impossibility since this is not a work of geometry or pre-Heideggerean speculative metaphysics.

Furthermore, the 'horizontal schema' refers to a 'whither'/‘Wohin,’ (1962, 416) which Heidegger contrasts with the more religiously-loaded term ‘raptures’/‘Entrückungen.’ (1962, 416) In a preliminary stance, we can say the ‘rapture’ is ontic with reference to religious and metaphysical understandings of human beings' emotions and either spiritual, bodily, or both in acts of transportation to some transcendent sphere (see footnote 3's dictionary definition of 'rapture'). That is all part of ‘picture-thinking’ as Hegel would say in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977, 463) or what philosophical theologians might probe as the mystical, particularly in Catholic and Orthodox traditions. Christian traditions are obsessed with the mystery of the rapture, as in Paul’s First Letter to the Thessalonians to which we alluded before. The early Heidegger was, too, but from a phenomenological-historical encounter with ‘primordial Christian religiosity as lived temporality’ and not defense of Christian faith (Heidegger 2004, 55); or rather, he tried to reoccupy primordial Christian experience in St. Paul’s first-century CE time-context from the vantage-point of the parousia, and not what would follow later in the canonization of the New Testament and the doctrinal Councils, which would found Christianity as we know it today. But religion meets its limit here, and neither we nor Heidegger will go further on the matter.

With the ontological difference, however, ‘whither’ will turn out to be something else entirely different as we continue to probe the perplexity of the horizontal ‘unity,’ which is different for each of the 'horizontal schemas' or each temporal ‘ecstasis’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) in relation to the other two. Let us say that the ‘whither,’ appropriate to each ‘horizontal schema,’ is not an actual place or referent to which or what a subject can refer, i.e the biblical apocalypse or parousia/2nd Coming as an anticipated, actual event. Using Sausurrian terminology, there is no ‘signified’ beneath a ‘signifier’ that unites them in a ‘sign.’ Rather, Dasein grounded in ecstatic temporality ‘is’ a movement of the equiprimordial soup of ecstatic-temporal interrelations, each of which are distinct, and therefore has to be fleshed out. Beyond succession and simultaneity, which the mind cannot intuit or perceive (since it is only capable of perceiving spatially two or more events as simultaneous or successive), the interrelations move within and through each other but without a centered presence to view the whole. We will attempt to articulate those distinctions next and draw out the consequences of their meaning for philosophy alone, not religion.

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8 Here is another English definition of ‘rapture,’ which has several senses: “1.) an expression or manifestation of ecstasy or passion; 2.) a) a state or experience of being carried away by overwhelming emotion; b.) a mystical experience in which the spirit is exalted to a knowledge of divine things; 3.) the final assumption of Christians into heaven during the end-time according to Christian theology” (Merriam-Webster n.d., Retrieved January 20th, 2024 from: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rapture)
So, we have three different horizontal ‘unities’ for which each ‘horizontal schema’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) describes the ‘whithering’ of each ‘ecstasis’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) in relation to the other two in their own unique way. Each ‘schema’ does so differently in its apprehension of the ‘ecstatic unity’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) of the whole of the ‘temporalizing of temporality.’ (Heidegger 1962, 278) [We can and should compare and contrast with Husserl’s lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness that the young Heidegger edited.] We have to imagine all possible interrelations and differences within each ‘horizontal schema’ and between them: A.) ‘futurally/for-the-sake of itself’ in relation to ‘having been’ and making ‘Present;’ B.) ‘Having been’ as ‘thrownness’ or rather in the ‘face of which it has been thrown’ in relation to ‘futurally’ and making ‘Present;’ and C.) ‘Present’ as the ‘in-order-to’ in relation to ‘futurally’ and ‘having been.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) That means there are interrelations and differences within each ‘horizontal schema,’ let alone the massive undertaking of describing the interrelations and differences between all three ‘horizontal schemas.’ To take seriously the ontological possibility of describing how the three sets of three relations of what is normally described as past, present, and future can in fact result in six sets of three, we must indulge the following multiplication:

- Past, Present, Future
- Past, Future, Present
- Present, Past, Future
- Present, Future, Past
- Future, Present, Past
- Future, Past, Present

This enumeration of six relations takes us beyond the actual text of Being and Time. There is nothing in Division Two that evokes six within the ‘equiprimordiality’ of section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 378) or the ‘ecstatic unity as horizon’ of section 69 (Heidegger 1962, 416). Hence it is our responsibility to show what is buried beneath Heidegger’s formulations on the three sets of ecstatic schemas (consisting of ‘futurally, having been, Present’) as necessary possibilities. These possibilities help us articulate a four-dimensional temporality that would constitute the super-synthesis of how all three ecstatic horizontal schemas (each with their own relations of the ecstases) relate to one another in a larger whole. But this is not to be confused or conflated with Heidegger’s last statement of philosophical career on ‘four-dimensionality’ in On Time and Being (1962).9 This

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9 Heidegger states the cryptic message in the 1962 lecture without developing the basic intuition any further in that lecture or anywhere else thereafter before his death in 1976: “But from what source is the unity of the three dimensions of true time determined, the unity, that is, of its three interplaying ways of giving, each in virtue of its own presencing? We already heard: In the approaching of what is no longer present and even in the present itself, there always plays a kind of approach and bringing about, that is, a kind of presencing. We cannot attribute the presencing to be thus thought to one of the three dimensions of time, to the present, which would seem obvious. Rather, the unity of time’s three dimensions consists in the
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way we can elaborate, further, what Heidegger means by the 'unity' proper to ecstatic temporalizing of temporality as a 'horizon.' (1962, 416) This will help us to ground ontologically what will later appear as statements on the 'swoon/Ohmacht' and 'clairvoyance/Hellsichtigkeit' in the English translators' footnote in section 74 of Chapter V (Heidegger 1962, 436). There, the great discussion about the ‘moment of vision’/‘Augenblick’ takes place regarding ‘historicality/Geschichtlichkeit.’ (Heidegger 1962, 437) And all of this is prior to the penultimate encounter with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in section 82 on the threshold that eventually concludes Being and Time with a question – “Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?” (Heidegger 1962, 488)

Of course, all of this has to do with being at ‘its time,’ (Heidegger 1962, 437) not to be confused with the New Testament theological and religious idea of the kairos or fulfillment of time when God sent His Son (Galatians 4:4);\(^{10}\) for the latter the sending is inclusive of the Christological unity of the Preexistent Logos, the virginal conception to a human mother, a life lived with miraculous events (like walking on water) and encounters with other human beings, a real death, a real resurrection, and ascension back to the Father, a sending of the Holy Spirit during earthly time of the Church in an anticipation of an apocalyptic end in the Parousia, i.e. the Second Coming. We shall see how our expansion of Heidegger’s ideas will be diametrically opposed to the New Testament dogmatic conceptions that underpin all mainstream Christian traditions (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox).

The ontological meaning of this intentional attack on the doctrines has to be fleshed out and has nothing to do with debates about theism vs. atheism. All Christian theologies grounded in philosophical explanations still require the historical belief in an actual person (Jesus) and a metaphysical conception that is Christological (one substance in two natures-human and divine) as one Person with two Others in the Father and the Holy Spirit, which comprise a Trinity. Of interplay of each toward each. This interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very heart of time, the fourth dimension, so to speak—not only so to speak, but in the nature of the manner.

True time is four-dimensional.

But the dimension which we call the fourth in our count is, in the nature of the matter, the first, that is, the giving that determines all. In future, in past, in the present, that giving brings about to each its own presencing, holds them apart thus opened and so holds them toward one another in the nearness by which the three dimensions remain near one another.” (1972, 15)

Not only will we not resume Heidegger’s assumptions about the ‘remaining near one another’ (1972, 15) regarding the three ecstases, we will not try to revert the ‘four’ back to an ‘original, incipient one.’ (1972, 15) We, of course, must be mindful of the profound simplicity and elegance of expression in the last lecture of 1962 but we do not have to be beholden to it or in its debt. Although he mentions ‘interplay,’ (Heidegger 1962, 15) there is no explicit mention of ‘movement’ and the destruction of the history of metaphysics, which would require another reckoning of Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. In short, there is no super-synthesis of Being and Time (1927) and On Time and Being (1962).\(^{10}\)

Retrieved January 18th, 2024 from https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/Galatians-Chapter-4/
course, this is all grounded in faith, which quite frankly is not the matter at hand. The fact of the matter is this: all theologies are ‘ontic’ in so far as they try to be a ‘positive science’ (Heidegger 1962, 30-31) and therefore have some residue of present-at-hand or ready-at-hand even in belief or intuition, if not pictographic icons and images. Furthermore, there is not a single, extant world religion that does not exist by and for human beings. Therefore, atheism too, can only come from human beings. [For example, since there are no known extraterrestrial beings on earth, there is no extraterrestrial religion by and for them.] Heidegger feels justified in lumping radically different fields such as mathematics, physics, biology, and theology together in the category of ‘positive sciences.’ (1962, 30)

We, however, are not interested in either the history of metaphysics, which tries to construe Being as One, and time as only of three axises only (past, present, future), or the history of conceptualizations of their interrelations, however profound that occurs in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. And this tradition, of course, is not simple; it too questions the linear, flowing, clock, chronological, calendar of now-points, present as now, past as no longer now, and future as yet to be now. But as Heidegger desperately tries to stave off having to conclude Division Two of Being and Time, he asks if and whether time has any ‘Being;’ (1962, 458) and beyond that whether we can even construe time ‘as being.’ (1962, 464) But we cannot think of being in time, as their relation, or time as substance, or that which does not change for empirical change to take place within it since time is nothing but pure a priori intuition and never an object of experience (Kant 1998, 300). One cannot come up with the concept or notion of Time as any kind of spatialized or intuited metaphysical substance as if time were composed of things. And of course, we are not engaging in any ‘positive science.’ Like Heidegger, the task is to complete the work of ‘fundamental ontology.’ (1962, 31) The ultimate motivation is ‘destruction,’ (Heidegger 1962, 41) which is not ‘aimed at the past but the present.’ (Heidegger 1962, 44) Furthermore, not only must we consider the early Heidegger’s historical present of the 1920s; we must consider our historical present of the 2020s.

‘Horizontal Schemas’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) and ‘Equiprimordiality’ (Heidegger 1962, 378)

So not the Being of time as some kind of substance or concept or being at its time as if the ‘its time’ were a point or location on a chronological line, we must wander elsewhere in search of answers to what remains unanswered in Division Two of Being and Time. Let us come back to the all-important passage we quoted from section 69 and isolate the main definitions of each ‘ecstatic horizontal schema’ (Heidegger 1962, 416):

A.) ‘futurally/for-the-sake of itself’ in relation to ‘having been’ and making ‘Present;’
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B.) ‘Having been’ as ‘thrownness’ or rather in the ‘face of which it has been thrown’ in relation to ‘futurally’ and making ‘Present;’

C.) ‘Present’ as the ‘in-order-to’ in relation to ‘futurally’ and ‘having been.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416)

To live ‘futurally’ is to distend away from an intuition of the anticipated future now-point, for example what will be tomorrow from today’s standpoint on the calendar. It is a movement as the ‘whither’ in which coming towards itself, it actually transcends the future point by coming back to another realm, that is also not the past now point on the calendar, i.e. yesterday. It is also irreducible to the fallen submersion of the inauthentic present (being and doing things with oneself alone or others), which is a slave to the linear time flow where the future always encroaches pushing the present into the past or the reverse the past forms out of pushing the future into the present and converting that present into a past. Either way, this linear-time frame has to be abolished in our thinking. The ‘futural’ seems like an ‘outside of itself,’ which speaks to the original definition Heidegger offers in section 65 on the ekstatikon – ‘the primordial ‘outside-of-itself in and for itself.’ (1962, 377) This ‘futural’ does not have an origin that is ever present even if the ‘futural’ is what is impending. What is fascinating is that we think of primordial as ground or some deep foundation from which everything else is derived; but, with Heidegger, it is linked with exteriority as alterity, a limit that is there but somehow can be crossed, an inverted skeleton so to speak to use that metaphor, where it seems to lie outside the physical body (not internal to its architecture that holds it together). The futural englobes the non-center or nonpoint, and hence is irreducible to any presence of a present. But then it must have some relation to the ‘having been’ and the ‘making Present,’ which are the other two ecstases.

To be ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) is not simply to live out authentically what one determines from the beginning of their life on what they ought to be, and not what others, including family, thinks one should be. That is all ontic and what most human beings have to struggle with. Rather, the futural carries as the whither of its having-been, already sent on its way to consider the extreme responsibility for the meaning of life, not the life unfolding in and through and as time. It looks like a ‘radical individuation of transcendence’ that Heidegger speaks of in the Introduction (1962, 62); but even in that initial moment for Heidegger, that does not mean an infinite singularity in which nothing else can possibly relate to the simplest monadological substance, which is internally sufficient and necessary on to itself alone. We are not talking of either the monad, which cannot be divided into any further parts, or the black hole singularity, which is infinitely dense, or a substantial mass shrunk down to a zero point in space-time. It is certainly not the number One, or any kind of undifferentiated, intangible unity that nothing can touch. Rather, it is an obsession with difference, the self-differentiating difference that does not begin with the presence of an original unity or preexistent difference between two things, say a cisgender man and cisgender woman who are not related to each other.
In the phrase ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 416), the ‘itself’ is not the physical birth of the human being in the chronological past nor the future death for all those who are living. It would appear to be the incessant accumulation of past moments (even if one forgets them or does not forget but also does not want to activate through memory) that keep agglutinating in preparing the material that accomplish one of two things: it will either shape a future course of events or flit out of those future events that spontaneously release a memory of some past joy or trauma. As past, present, and future move together, one never knows in what present a future that was dreamed before is realized or what past will be recalled for what reasons; one can never predict a future moment in which a past will be activated; the past that is recalled (say an event from childhood) just seems to happen out of nowhere. But these are all ontic considerations for human beings, not the singularity of Dasein and its role in the existential-analytic that prepares fundamental ontology. We can also contrast with the Jesusiological temporalization split into two between a regular human being heading towards a painful, gruesome, humiliating death and hence end; but also, a prefigured approach to a non-end in the Resurrection and eventual return to the Father before the Resurrection actually takes place after the physical death on the cross. But these are all pictures of faith whose adherents count to nearly two billion people on the planet, not the ‘radical individuation’ of Dasein’s Being (Heidegger 1962, 62).

Rather, let us stick to the fine material of Heidegger’s text. The ‘letting-itself-come-towards-itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 372) in relation to the ‘comes towards itself futurally’ as the ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) is to not only jump ahead of the present but any future present as an emanation of that present. To what one ‘whithers’ is in fact is not the physical past that was experienced as something real, say a birthday. Rather, in the ‘futural for-the-sake-of-itself,’ the ‘itself’ (not a self, subject, ego that is present) links up with the other ‘horizonal schema’ of being ‘thrown’ into the world with others, therefore “in the face of which it has been thrown and that to which it has been abandoned.” (Heidegger 1962, 416) This is quite amazingly eccentric if one thinks about it.

One is coming towards an abandonment that seems to have taken place in the past but is emanating out of the future. One can ask about being abandoned out of the future or from the future or both, none of which are certain. And the future is not the anticipated event of a physical death impending, as it would be for someone who is in the act of committing suicide and ends up doing so successfully. The ‘face’ of which is not just being-in-the-world in this life (with this birthdate and eventual demise), doing the things one does, the family one is born into, the friends, new family and kids, or career one makes. Rather, the ‘face’ is the having been abandoned and thrown into the open possibility of seizing the future that is one’s true birth or origination with the courage to rewrite it, not accept that one’s present is derived from a past one could not create or control. Certainly, it
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has nothing to do within being-present in the world marked by clock, chronological, calendar linear time of flowing now-points.

Again, let us make a sharp contrast of Heidegger's non-theism with the split Jesusiological temporalization of the Passion narrative in the Garden (Matthew 26:36-46; Mark 14:32-42; Luke 22: 39-46; John Chapters 13-17), when Jesus is anticipating a future, painful, publicly visible death, and the actual forsakenness (Matthew 27:46; Mark 15:34) announced on the Cross when Jesus is dying physically as a human being. In this situation, Jesus is heading to death to the point of being abandoned by the One who sent him, namely the Father, but willingly accepts the death sentence that occurs before the actual act of vindication in the resurrection occurs. It is a consciousness of extreme duty without knowledge of the result, but also a self-conscious retroactive relief that the willpower driving one into this abandonment will have not been in vain even if it seems so in the moment. This is not about utter powerlessness becoming powerful in itself. Neither point, the splitting of the death-event into abandonment and eventual salvation and redemption, is evident in the cry of abandonment and the pre-resurrection death that occurs. We just want to bracket this and separate it off, as another example of a complex temporalization that no other human being, allegedly, in history has experienced. The Gospel is strange indeed.

Coming back to Heidegger, we can now take as the formulation, an interrelation between the 'for-the-sake-of-itself' and the 'in the face of which' of 'thrownness and abandonment.' (1962, 416) If one wants to avoid all ontic content, all actual events, people, animals, things that one can recall from their past on the one hand and all fears, evasions, anxieties, forgetting, or irresponsible surrender in an anything goes type of life that will culminate in physical death as demise on the other, then we need to be given the creative license to keep expanding on Heidegger's formulations. This is before we get to the third and final 'horizontal schema' of 'making present' in 'Being-alongside.' (Heidegger 1962, 416) Even here, do not think about a human subject living in the present making something like a table. It is not even the manifestation of a unique phenomenon, say the aura of feelings emitted when one is engaged in or witnessing a great performance at the opera or theater. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Furthermore, we have only begun by starting with the 'futurally for-the-sake-of-itself' (Heidegger 1960, 416) to examine the relations with the 'having been' as 'thrownness and abandonment.' (Heidegger 1962, 416) Things will be different if we start with the 'having been or the Present.' (Heidegger 1962, 416)

We must re-invoke some critical distinctions between the 'whither' as a happening and the idea of 'rapture' as either physical or spiritual teleport to another realm. The totality of Dasein's Being grounded in Care/Sorge, which is grounded in the ecstatic 'temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 278) relates to movement of the 'outside-of-itself in and for itself.' (Heidegger 1962, 377) But the problem is that this 'movement/Bewegtheit,' which Heidegger distinguishes from 'motion/Bewegung' in sections 72-75, remains 'obscure.'
Therefore, ‘movement’ (not motion as change of location or distance traveled through space and measured by clock time) relates to an event or occurrence. We will come back to this because Heidegger’s great contribution to the destiny of Western philosophy is his attempt to ‘destroy’ the history of metaphysics, starting with the Pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle up to Kant and Hegel, to critique every philosophical attempt to deal with the mysteries of time and movement when the metaphysics of Being goes unquestioned, namely being as that which simply ‘is.’ Science and social science must assume that something ‘is’ in order to study it; both are not in the business of indulging in fantasies or myths of what does not exist, say a flying horse. But fundamental ontology in distinction with science on the one hand and the history of metaphysics on the other is concerned with: “Yet a fully adequate existential interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the meaning of Being and the ‘connection’ between Being and truth have been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence.”

We are a long way off from trying to reckon with this great statement by Heidegger on the ‘meaning of Being and connection of Being and truth with respect to temporality;’ but that would seem to be the ultimate horizon to try to reach.

To get at the problem of ‘movement/Bewegtheit’ anew without recourse to simplistic notions of origin, end, non-origin, and no-end manifested in simple geometric shapes, be it a line, circle, or rectilinear formation, we need to think of alterities to those dialectical antinomies of origin, end, non-origin, non-end. We must articulate what could be other to each of the four, and hence four alterities that do not have names. Our hypothesis is that we can achieve this conceptual development by moving through the interrelations of the three ecstatics each within their own ‘horizonal schema’ of how the unity of the three occurs for them. So far, we began with the futurally in the for-sake-of-itself in relation to the ‘having been as in the face of which it has been thrown and abandoned.’ But then we must empty out all the human-ontic registers of what these quoted phrases could possibly mean, and perhaps multiple different possibilities of meaning while also being attentive to resist the lure of religious interpretation. The horizon of the New Testament kairos and parousia constantly threatens to engulf our inquiry, which, following Heidegger’s lead, is purely phenomenological and hence must be extra vigilant against religious-dogmatic impulses.

Ecstatic Temporality and ‘Movement’

Let us return to the ecstatics. With the ‘futural in relation to the having been and making present,’ we must begin, yet again. But if we start with either of the other two ecstatics each in relation to the other two, different senses will appear. The horizon becomes blurry, and we don’t know where one interrelation of the three begins and ends. The question is how does this all hang together if one meta-‘unity’ of the ecstatic ‘temporalizing of temporality’
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(Heidegger 1962, 278) has to admit how such a nebulous 'unity' of each of the ecstasies in relation to the other two occurs differently. Perhaps, we must make a distinction between the ontological description of the substance of unity and the phenomenological bracketing of its occurrence as 'three' different manifestations. We do not derive three from one, but rather one from three, which seems unthinkable. We are back to problems that descend from Plato, particularly in his greatest work, the _Parmenides._

So far we have:

'Futural' – 'for-sake-of-itself.' (Heidegger 1962, 416)

'Having been' – in 'thrownness and abandonment.' (Heidegger 1962, 416)

'Making present' – 'in-order-to.' (Heidegger 1962, 416)

The interrelations between them indicate an erasure of simple notions of origin and end and everything in between that could be called the stretch of life, i.e. a person is born, lives in a succession of presents, and dies at some point. Rather, they intermingle in a complex soup of 'equiprimordiality' (Heidegger 1962, 378); the latter which never comes to presence as a present now point, a past no longer present now point, or a future yet to be present now point. To ask whether each 'ecstasis' (Heidegger 1962, 377) shows how the overall 'horizon' that is the 'unity' of the ecstatic 'temporalizing of the temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 278, 377) as the three ecstases intermingle (Heidegger 1962, 416) appears differently is one thing. It is another, however, to try to trace the movement of interrelations between the ecstases period. We speak of movement, long before we get to the actual ontological question of movement/Betwegtheit in Chapter V of Division Two because in section 65 in Chapter III where 'ecstatic, primordial, finite, unified, authentic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380) is introduced, Heidegger states:

> Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases” (1962, 377).

Temporality is not some a priori intuition prior to all experience, which can then self-generate. Rather, it 'is' not (1962, 377) as in some simple relation between being and time and time and being as subject-predicate relations. Rather, it 'is' as an event as movement or rather 'process,' (1962, 377) rather than being an 'entity' at all. (1962, 377)

So, we must unpack this 'movement' whose 'enigma' (1962, 444) Heidegger fails to unravel in Chapter V. We can think of the 'coming-towards-itself' by replacing the 'itself' with the 'thrownness and abandonment,' (Heidegger 1962, 416) which is not just having been a previous present now point; which would then yield something like the event of movement of having to come towards having been 'thrown and abandoned' as the 'in face of which.' (Heidegger 1962, 415) But 'in the face of which' is not an ontic entity – as in I have been thrown into a family, community, society, profession to which I cannot relate and perhaps detest. Then again, against these ontic registers, we resist the religious-theological
motivation as much as we sincerely would like to re-occupy the inner-messianic consciousness of the kairolological temporalization of Jesus: so many times, when he had to resist his family, disciples, Satan, the larger community to avoid establishing a political kingdom on earth even though he had divine powers as God incarnate. Besides the dogmatic conceptions of a virginal birth and real death over which he ultimately triumphed, as One Person (with two natures – divine and human, eternal and temporal) within a Trinity, he also has a Pre-Existent status; that is from the Prologue to the \textit{Gospel of John} and an anticipated 2nd Coming – from Paul’s very early \textit{Letters to the Thessalonians} – while somehow being trans-eternal. But again, imagining an antithesis to all these religious-theological constructions while transcending the a-theistic limits of \textit{Being and Time}, we come back to the problem of ‘movement’ of the temporal ecstases, and now with the further complications of the ‘horizontal schemas’ and ‘whithering’ announced in section 69 of Chapter IV. And to repeat, this has nothing to with a decision for or against theism or atheism akin to what Heidegger forewarns in endnote ii of Chapter III of Division Two (1962, 496) on the question of sin. We bracket this for now.

Let us be careful to read the text, specifically, for what it states grammatically rather than intentionally misinterpreting it to fish out different possibilities in an arbitrary manner. Heidegger states: “In each of the three ecstases the ecstatic horizon is different” (1962, 416) and to recall the ‘horizon’ is ‘temporality, as an ecstatic unity.’ (1962, 416) So, one could flesh each ‘ecstasis’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) with regard to its singularity and difference either in itself or with respect to the ‘ecstatic unity,’ which would therefore include the other two ecstases. Or one could say both in itself and with the other ecstases. If it is the latter – namely both – then we do have the ontological responsibility to articulate the irreducible singularity, uniqueness, and differences of how each ‘ecstasis’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) in relation to the other two makes occur one could say (as to opposed to appear as something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand) the ‘unity.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) But then this would indicate three different unities, which Heidegger, himself, does not develop. And to take it further, could the three different unities synthesize themselves into a fourth that encompasses the other three is not a question that anyone seems to venture. This includes Heidegger, at least at this juncture in \textit{Being and Time}.

Could we imagine a larger Event in which each ‘ecstasis’ (Heidegger 1962, 377) pointing to the other two opens and therefore ‘clears’ (Heidegger 1962, 401) a possibility for the ‘for-sake-of-itself,’ ‘in the face of which,’ and the ‘in-order-to’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) and how the interrelations of the three ‘whithering horizontal schemas’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) maps to a fourfold complexity becomes a question. And this is not posed in \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{11} Such a fourfold

\textsuperscript{11} For now, we must bracket the enormously complex set of debates involved in the Kehre/turning from the immediate works after \textit{Being and Time} in the period from 1927 to 1931 including lectures on Kant, Leibniz, Aristotle, and Hegel to the later, more mysterious works in
would be other to origin, end, non-origin, and non-end, whereby the traditional linear conception of passing now-points (present as now, past as no longer now, and future as yet to be now) gives way to a higher complexity. Maybe this raises the specter of the Hegelian Aufhebung, an aspect of which involves raising/lifting to a higher complexity. But we will not go there just yet. This, therefore, also cannot succumb to the metaphysical complexities of the interrelations of time and eternity in the kairos and parousia of Christology and the Trinity in Christianity. So, it would be other to both the human-ontic registers, which can only construe time as a one-directional linear succession of three (past, present, future) or the religious-transcendental realm of the unity of time and eternity in the kairos overcoming itself in a 2nd Coming/parousia, which has yet to occur and that no one (save Jesus Himself) can envision.

Following Heidegger, the ‘futural’ is in the ‘process of having been’ (1962, 374) in section 65 of Chapter III, but in section 69 of Chapter IV, we have this formulation: “In existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself as something that has been thrown,” (1962, 416) but this is emptied of an immediate sensuous or empirical content. We must look at this, carefully, before we consider the ‘Present.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) In section 65, “the having been arising from the future and the future in the process of having been releases from itself the Present.” (Heidegger 1962, 374). But in section 69, the “existing for the sake of itself in abandonment as something that has been thrown” (Heidegger 1962, 416) makes Dasein as ‘Being-alongside,’ which is ‘at the same time making present.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) Right now, we do not want to get into all the difficulties of drawing out the consequences when Heidegger decides to capitalize – Present – in contrast to the lower-case present, or more specifically in the German, when Gegenwart (1967, 365) is capitalized as ‘Present’ and the lower case gegenwärtigend (1967, 365) becomes ‘making present.’

Rather, we want to deconstruct the simultaneity inherent in the constructions we find in both sections 65 and 69 on how the primordial interaction of the ‘futural’ and 'having been' simultaneously is a 'making present.' (Heidegger 1962, 416) For one, we want to avoid smuggling in some notion or concept that would make present-at-hand the ‘unity’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) of the ecstases. But, more so, we want to replace any metaphysical or scientific ideas of time (past, present, future) by taking seriously Heidegger’s semantic complexities when he invokes the ‘for sake of itself’ in ‘futorally coming towards itself,’ the ‘having been thrown and abandoned and as abandoned as thrown’ and the simultaneous ‘making present’ marked as the ‘in-order-to.’ (1962, 416) Each of the ‘horizonal schemas’ apperceive the ‘unity’ of all three ecstases as different (Heidegger 1962, 416). Yet there is no perceived destination of any of the

the 30s up to his last writings prior to his death. That constitutes the later Heidegger on the History and Truth of Being, the Sendings of Being, and the Ereignis-Event/Appropriation. See Thomson (2011) who draws out the complexity of these debates and makes us rethink what we mean by modernity and postmodernity.
‘whithering’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) ecstases that can be anticipated. Indeed, this apperception does not emanate from a human subject’s experience or imagination. We want to articulate, for the first time, as far as we can tell, all the innumerable differences buried in each ‘horizontal schema’ as they relate to the other two. And we want to do so beyond the Kantian limit in the *First Analogy of Experience* on time as transcendental substance/permanence in which all relations of succession and simultaneity occur (Kant 1998, 300). We are in a realm beyond succession and simultaneity. This is where the human mind cannot go, something which cannot be experienced.

Let us stay focused on the ‘futural/for-sake-of-itself’ and the ‘having been’ while suspending for a moment any ‘at the same time making present.’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) The ‘at the same time’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) is bracketed. Furthermore, we need to be more precise. We quote Heidegger more fully: “Dasein is disclosed to itself in a state-of-mind as thrown, is to be taken as that *in the face of which* it has been thrown and that to which it has been abandoned.” (1962, 416) Dasein is ‘disclosed to itself...as thrown’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) but there is the added ‘in the face of which’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) Dasein has been thrown, which means this ‘face’ is not revealed. Dasein has not come up to anything as a thing or event, including its own death or God in some kind of theophany. It is also not Jesus’s forsakenness on the Cross before ultimate redemption in the non-witnessed, sealed-tomb event of resurrection. So Dasein is thrown, the ‘face’ is not revealed, and Dasein has also been ‘abandoned’ to that (Heidegger 1962, 416). In ‘futurally’ letting itself come towards itself as this ‘thrownness’ and ‘abandonment’ to the undisclosed ‘face of which’ those are happening, namely ‘thrownness’ and ‘abandonment,’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) we have a complex, multidimensional construction. Furthermore, the movement is not linear, circular, or rectilinear. We must understand the ‘horizontal schemas’ of ‘futural’ and ‘having been’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) in their interrelations. All of this transcends and derives the spatialized linear time flow of now-points. As Heidegger says, whatever he is groping for, he can say at least this much: ‘a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizontal foundation.’ (1962, 418)

There is so much to flesh out here now, ‘the ecstatico-horizontal unity of temporality’ is linked with ‘transcendence’ that has a ‘foundation.’ (Heidegger 1962, 418) However, the singular hypothesis is this: there is no way to describe either the ontological constitution of this ‘transcendence’ or the ‘foundation’ that is also a ‘horizon’ (Heidegger 1962, 418) without re-incorporating the problem of the ‘equiprimordiality’ of the ecstases (Heidegger 1962, 378) with the ‘horizontal schemas’ of the ‘whitherings,’ (Heidegger 1962, 416) and both with the ‘enigma’ (Heidegger 1962, 444) of ‘movement/Bewegtheit’ in contrast to spatialized ‘motion/Bewegung’ (Heidegger 1962, 427) This is all prior to any discussion we may want to have on ‘fate/Schicksal,’ ‘destiny/Geshick,’ ‘historizing/Geschehen’ and ‘historicality/Geshichtlichkeit.’ (Heidegger 1962, 436-437) And this subtends the problem of the ‘Ohnmacht/swoon’ and ‘Hellsichtigkeit/clairvoyance,’
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(Heidegger 1962, 436) which will constitute the other horizon, so to speak, of how we approach the question of the ’being in the moment of vision for its time.’ (Heidegger 1962, 437) This is non-kairiological and non-parousiological and will require an all-out confrontation and destruction of New Testament Christianity.

We care about the completion of fundamental ontology period, and this will require a passage-supersession of Being and Time’s Two Divisions into a realm that Heidegger did not articulate, including the later period. And if he did articulate it to himself, and no one else, but did not write it down, let alone publish it, then we feel comfortable in our claim of making ’new and original’ contributions to the problems of ecstatic temporality, transcendence, and movement; that is as if they were appropriated, lifted out of, and re-planted on a new soil outside Being and Time. Four-dimensional time conceals a moving set of interrelations of origin, end, non-origin, and non-end and what is other to them that could constitute the ’transcendence with an ecstatico-horizontal foundation.’ (Heidegger 1962, 418)

We can say, preliminarily, that none of this thought can be spatialized; that ’transcendence’ and ’horizon’ (Heidegger 1962, 418) are somehow above, and ’foundation’ (Heidegger 1962, 418) is somehow below. What is driving Heidegger’s intuition is the interconnectedness of the senses of the terms even though literally they mean certain things that seem incompatible? How can the horizon of the sky also be the ground or foundation of the earth? Hence, we have to probe more deeply using the powers of phenomenological reduction to dispense with all immediate senses or intuitions that come to mind when

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12 Volume 66 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, which includes his Besinnung (1938/1939) written after his monumental work of the later period, the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) written from 1936-1938, there is an appendix translated as The Wish and the Will: (On Preserving what is Attempted). The latter text is available in the English translation of the Besinnung titled Mindfulness (Heidegger 2016). That short appendix was composed in 1937/1938 (Heidegger 2016, xv). In the works of this period, which basically launches Heidegger’s next major original effort in his thinking after Being and Time, namely the Beiträge, Heidegger, avowedly, states that he is not out to ’complete’ Sein und Zeit (Heidegger 2016, 362). We will state that our project is not only diametrically opposed to this ’shift’ (Heidegger 2016, 362) in Heidegger’s thinking, we are not engaged in any analysis of this later period in Heidegger, at least in this essay. As for Heidegger’s project, from at least that time onwards, he states: “These ‘approaches’ do not intend to ‘complete’ Sein und Zeit. Rather, they hold fast more originally on the entire inquiry and shift this inquiry into the proper perspective. Since the spring of 1932 the main thrusts of the plan are firmly established that obtains its first shaping in the projecting-opening called ’From Enowning.’ Everything advances unto this projecting-opening, and Eine Auseinandersetzung met ‘Sein und Zeit’ also belongs to the domain of these deliberations.” (2016, 362) If this later poetic-type philosophizing of Heidegger, that is of the later, creative period of the 1930s, is engaged with an ’Auseinandersetzung’ (Heidegger 2016, 362) with the Heidegger of the more scholastic Being and Time of the late 1920s, then we can only say that our project is an Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger’s own Auseinandersetzung between the later works of the 1930s and Being and Time. And we have said this before, ours is an Umbesetzung – re-occupation – of Being and Time. We cannot ignore the later period; we just have to bracket it for now for future consideration.
encountering these Heideggerean formulations. And since we have the twin ontological differences of 'movement/Bewegheit' from 'motion/Bewegung' (Heidegger 1962, 427) on the one hand and ecstatic temporality and spatialized, linear, calendar, clock, chronological flowing time (Heidegger 1962, 377) on the other, then the relation between the two sets of ontological difference become paramount. We speak of a fourfold difference. This is how we can get to the question of 'transcendence as a horizontal foundation' (Heidegger 1962, 418) that is 'ecstatic' in nature, or 'outside-of-itself in and for itself.' (Heidegger 1962, 377)

Conclusion

The great achievement of Heidegger is to cast aside any external object or internal subject/mind as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, and so if anything arises to the level of presence in our inquiry, then that means we have not entered the right space of reflection. To use his language, 'the there' has not been properly 'cleared' (Heidegger 1962, 401) because there the 'there' is not a point in fixed, empirical, or mathematical space and time; the 'there' as 'opened and cleared' (Heidegger 1962, 401) is grounded in the 'ecstatic temporalizing of temporality.' (Heidegger 1962, 401) Therefore the 'opening' and 'clearing' (Heidegger 1962, 401) have some intrinsic relation with the 'process' (Heidegger 1962, 377) that is the ecstatic temporality of temporality. In our language, time must be approached as a question in terms of a non-spatialized interrelational-movement-event, rather than just as the horizon to answer the question of the meaning of Being, or the first Two Divisions of Being and Time. But this means that we must, unceasingly, retread all of Division Two of Being and Time even when Heidegger attempts to 'destroy' (1962, 41) the history of ontology and metaphysics; that means direct confrontations with key passages in Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine leading up to the final confrontation with Hegel at the end of Division Two. As we know that Division and the work ends abruptly, leaving us in suspense as to where else Heidegger was seeking to go, particularly with the missing Division Three. For Heidegger scholars, major works after Being and Time, such as Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure

13 Levinas understood that Heidegger's project of 'destruction' was not simply destroying arguments via logic in correcting errors made in the history of philosophy. Levinas states: "In virtue of the very state of things, Heidegger conceives of the history of philosophy as a destruction [destruction], namely, essentially as an attempt to get back one's bearings after the fall. For this reason, also, the history of philosophy thus conceived is not a simple aid to systematic philosophy-whether in the form of information or of critique of errors in the tradition-but the historic element is a constitutive movement of systematic philosophy itself. The second volume of Sein und Zeit was proclaimed in advance to be dealing with this destruction, and we can say now that this will not be a matter of the history of philosophy but of philosophy. On condition, however, that this mere history becomes a destruction and that it is not restricted to exposing and critiquing errors in the tradition; it is a question, in fact, of destroying something more profound than error by returning from the fall to authentic existence." (1996, 27)
Reason (1927), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928), The Four Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929), Lecture on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1930-31), and finally the Lecture on Aristotle’s Metaphysics-Book IX (1931) give us some clues. We cannot ignore this immediate, significant post-Being and Time efforts from 1927 to 1931. We shall return to them.

But for now, we must stay close to sections 69 and 74 as we approach the problem of the ‘Hellsichtigkeit/clairvoyance’ (Heidegger 1962, 436) to get at the all-important Dasein’s Being as being ‘in the moment for its time’ and how ‘authentic temporality, as finite, make possible fate-or authentic historicality.’ (Heidegger 1962, 437) This is where we are heading. To help us on our way, we will take a slight detour through Hegel, particularly the last chapter of Volume Two: The Science of Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Concept, namely The Absolute Idea, in his greatest and most difficult work, The Science of Logic (2010, 735). The reading of Hegel to set up the possibility of re-occupying Heidegger’s Being and Time – as an event of passage beyond Heidegger – comprises Part II of this two-part article series.

References

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