

Magnifying Lacan's "Mirror Image" (1949) to Develop the Undeveloped Notion of 'Being-Towards-Birth' in Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927)

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Abstract: This essay will attempt a line-by-line reading of Lacan's famous "The Mirror Image as Formative I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience" (1949) published in the collected volume of essays, *Ecrits* (1966). The article attempts to show that Lacan's essay opens a space of primordially, whereby we can revisit Heidegger's critique of subjectivity and the Cogito, terms that originate with Descartes and evolves to Kant's *Critiques* of dogmatic metaphysics, particularly in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. These are steps Heidegger takes to set up his attempted critique of Hegel, who in turn tries to surpass the history of philosophy rooted in modern subjectivity, particularly in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). However, missing in Lacan's essay and what remains unarticulated in Heidegger's *Being and Time* is the following: relation between time, movement, and the space of primordially where all notions of factual existence dissolve. Being born in time, developing in time, being in or at time, and being-towards-death, as Heidegger struggles to deconstruct – by way of his unique appropriation of phenomenology in *Being and Time* – can be questioned. Indeed, what Heidegger fails to develop, and he admits it explicitly, is the other side of his 'one-sided' treatment in the investigation: he only analyzed death as a possibility of Dasein's greatest possibility to 'be-Whole' authentically (1962, 277) and completely neglected 'being-towards-birth' as the 'other end' of Dasein's movement (1962, 425). We will argue that one is never born as a biological fact of existence, a social construction assigned at physical birth, like a gender or sex, or any religious notions of a created being from God the Creator, or any notions of rebirth, reincarnation, or resurrection, namely from religions in the West, like Roman Catholic Christianity, and the East, like Hinduism. Rather, 'being-towards-birth' in relation to the linear time of flowing now-points (past as no longer now, present as now, future as yet to be now), or 'being-within-time,' (Heidegger 1962, 457) is temporalized other than a dateable origin in spatialized time or history.

Keywords: Lacan, Heidegger, metaphysics, time, movement.

Main Text

Before we begin the reading of Lacan's opening moments, we need a few incipient reflections. The mirror (physical mirror as object bounded by a frame) is only a metaphor even though Lacan is literally discussing the first moments when an actual human infant (in contrast to the animal) fashions an image of itself in a physical mirror. Losing oneself in the mirror as the analogy of the exteriority of being-one-self when that is not consciousness of self as body, body as

consciousness of self, consciousness as consciousness of and as body and self, and all interrelations and fusions of all the terms. One never sees anything, the deeper they see into the mirror that is embodied life. One can never see their body, their face, and any ontic register to see the 'I' or 'self' within those physical structures; they never see, embodied seeing, the act of seeing regardless of what they see. This is, strangely, both an ontological and ontic-physical fact. You cannot see your own face, including the one in the mirror. The schism/delay/différance to use the Derridean term is your 'face.' Now imagine that 'face' (never an object in a mirror or in a picture or one's memory of both) in relation to the other's face when they are going through the same thing, and the double elision constitutes the mutual reciprocal gaze of one to the other and vice-versa. The relation is a doubling of a void. One constantly erases the other in a relationship, and that is the paradox. The persistence of the 'I' (subject as substance) in and through time is an illusion. In other words, two faces become the masks of the other, or even better the face is a mask that covers a non-being. So now we can return to Lacan's text before we move to Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

Lacan's 'Mirror Stage' as the Infinite Void

In the opening moments, Lacan draws a distinction between the child and an animal, say a monkey. Without invoking any biological reductionism or essentialism, there is a primordial event or break in the child's behavior, whose temporality is unknown, because the 'age' is only for a 'short while.' (Lacan 2006, 75) There is no way for our rational adult consciousness, which has ripened over time, where reason tries to explain events and development based on experience, to penetrate this short transpiring of time. And no human being can remember an event before the age of 1, and most likely unable before 2 or 3. So this space is a mystery, this space of initial differentiation between child and animal (a monkey) of any age, young or old. But Lacan hypothesizes an observable phenomenon by way of a sophisticated theoretical description; at some 'moment' (2006, 75) the child "can already recognize his own image in such a mirror." (2006, 75) The image is not a pure representation of an actual physical body that exists outside of the mirror. Leave aside for a moment the complexity of Saussure's linguistics of the sign, signifier (word-oral or written) and signified (mental object or image). We cannot say with certainty how the image is available to not only the consciousness of the child but the consciousness of that consciousness, or self-consciousness, if we want to wade into Hegelian terms. We will bracket this for a moment because a return to Hegel, albeit through a non-dialectical deconstruction, will become necessary.

The animal may have a higher 'instrumental intelligence,' (Lacan 2006, 75) or the ability to utilize their body to achieve certain actions like walking, jumping, climbing a tree, etc., that a human infant cannot. But they – the animal – never cross this mysterious threshold of 'seeing an image of the self' according to Lacan. We are concerned with the phenomenological elucidation of this Lacanian

distinction. Let us assume counter-intuitively, there is no physical-biological child (say a nine-month-old baby) and an animal in the wild. Rather, the specular image is fashioned out of a void for which representations evoke a bad regress: namely the image is a representation of a representation on to infinity with no trace of a definable origin in time. The animal is the immanent entity of consciousness of a body, not a self as imagined in space; whereas the human baby is the non-consciousness of a body for which no identity of self (and moreover a nameable self) can be attached but rather 'some image' occurs. There are more distinctions to be drawn here, but we need to move on with Lacan's text.

To reiterate, Lacan says 'already recognizes,' which presumably means that even at a young age the baby can do what the animal cannot – namely see the image of self in the mirror. But it also means a prior disposition, a type of facticity to bring in Heidegger's language of already 'being-in-the world' as 'having-been.' (1962, 375) And with Heidegger's ontological distinction, this is not simply a present now that is no longer now and has become a dateable past, i.e a chronological date or an artifact, like a photo of one when they were a baby. This past has never been a present now, but part of Dasein's constitutional makeup is the mystery of temporality itself; one that gives rise to the ordinary notion of linear, spatial, flowing time of now points (Heidegger 1962, 377). This means we cannot simply go back in time with our own self or identity now, as if traveling in a Lacanian-built time machine, and revisit that first time we looked in the mirror and saw an image of a self. And if not a 'self,' then some-thing. Ironically, the Kantian limit of never getting to the thing in itself is inscribed in that scission-decision, which is the event of the first encounter with the mirror stage. Leaving aside the enormous question of the relation between language and sense in the early infant stage, we would not even be able to communicate with the baby version of ourselves as to what we are actually seeing. Nominally, the 'image' in the mirror could be of anything, even beyond the threshold of language.

At this point, we want to quote the full passage in Lacan's text that really launches his entire essay:

the human child... can already recognize his own image as such in a mirror. This recognition is indicated by the illuminative mimicry of the Aha-Erlebnis, which Kohler considers to express situational apperception, an essential moment in the act of intelligence.

Indeed, this act, far from exhausting itself, as in the case of a monkey, in eventually acquired control over the uselessness of the image, immediately gives rise in a child to a series of gestures in which he playfully experiences the relationship between the movements made in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates – namely, the child's own body, and the persons and even things around him. (2006, 75)

As much as we want to move on to most of the text, a mere seven pages in the English translation (Lacan, 2006), we will have to dwell here for a while. And

then we will take the plunge back into Heidegger's *Being and Time*, particularly Chapter IV of Division One on the question of 'who' Dasein 'is' (1962, 149) before setting up the possibility to engage in the question of 'being-towards-birth.' (1962, 375) The key issue that is missing from both Lacan's text and all of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, as we will argue, is the deeper primordial link between a non-linear 'temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 377), a notion other than 'within-time-ness' (Heidegger 1962, 465) and 'movement,' (Heidegger 1962, 441) as not the movement of something in time or the movement of an object in space. It has nothing to do with physical space-time and its relation to gravity, light, energy, mass, etc. in theoretical physics either. As for Lacan, we see the problem of movement present itself right in this opening passage.

Lacan links 'situational apperception' with an 'essential moment in the act of intelligence.' (2006, 75) One is tempted to return to the ancient Greeks, particularly Plato and Aristotle, to examine all the ways something like 'intelligence' and 'intellect' were understood, even as far as metaphysics of divine thought thinking itself (as in Book XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*). But, for now, we can work with the ordinary, modern connotations of apperception. This is not just the act of perceiving something; it is the motor-workings of the internal mechanisms by which a perception is created internally, presumably through some mysterious conformity of what the mind is doing in the act of perception and what may be perceived. It can also be the internal perception of the 'inward' space that makes possible all external perceptions. We are all in Kant's debt on his distinction between 'empirical' apperception and the 'transcendental' apperception (1998, 232). As Kant says in the first *Critique*:

Now this original and transcendental condition is nothing other than the transcendental apperception. The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and is customarily called inner sense or empirical apperception. That which should necessarily be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought of as such through empirical data. There must be a condition that precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible, which should make such a transcendental presupposition valid.

Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental apperception. (1998, 232)

So even changing notions of our self-perception through various experiences require a more fundamental, underlying, and permanent substrate known as the 'pure, original, unchanging consciousness.' (Kant 1998, 232) But this is precisely what invites us to speculate on how Lacan's usage of the term – 'situational apperception' – is also a critique of the Kantian notion of an 'original, pure, unchanging' but also invisible transcendental concept. Not only are we

dealing with a pre-walking infant stage of an actual human being, and therefore no consideration of adult reason, consciousness, experience, perception, etc., we have to come back to the Lacanian text of how this non-perceptive image of self is fashioned, almost creatively, in an 'illuminative mimicry.' (Lacan 2006, 75) The first primordial image of self is actually something artificial, and therefore even imaginary. The scary thing is that whatever emerges later in advanced childhood and certainly by normative adulthood is also an illusion.

We are concerned with the 'illuminative mimicry,' (Lacan 2006, 75) which invokes a lighting up repetition, and primordial original event as a double, which exceeds the simultaneity and succession of two events. Let us try to explain this further. In other words, we need to resist every temptation of our adult reason, language, experience, and conceptualization to try and describe this 'situational apperception.' (Lacan 2006, 75) We have the baby inside and outside the mirror, the baby, and the mirror, and as the mirror mirroring itself in an infinite vertigo and elision. There is no image in that regard that references the thing itself. 'Situational apperception' is not Kant's 'transcendental apperception.' (1998, 232)

The child cannot muster the 'instrumental intelligence' of the monkey, the animal's Aristotelian *techne*, or practical knowing, from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The monkey sees itself as another version of itself, literally jumping around as if it were playing with another monkey. But this is not what the very young child is doing. The monkey can advance neurologically to adult monkey movements without advancing self-consciousness, say given its complex description in Hegel, or come back from its sense of finitude, guilt, conscience, and the possibility of death as Heidegger describes in the 'moment of vision.' (1962, 437) Or so we must assume. But the human child is not an adult *Dasein* either. Yet it has its own primordial Ereignis, if you will, involving the 'illuminative mimicry' (Lacan 2006, 75) or non-transcendental immanence in the infinite vertigo of alterity of mirrors reflecting each other to use our language, and the 'situational apperception,' (Lacan 2006, 75) which is neither Kant's empirical nor transcendental apperceptions. Let us not confuse this apperception of the 'situation,' whereby the situation connotes an event in space-time, whether an empirical intuition or the product of the imagination, or the event as space-time as the warping effect of gravity, for example the mysteries of theoretical physics.

The next passage in Lacan's text is difficult to interpret. But we quote the original English translation again:

Indeed, this act, far from exhausting itself, as in the case of a monkey, in eventually acquired control over the uselessness of the image, immediately gives rise in a child to a series of gestures in which he playfully experiences the relationship between the movements made in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates - namely, the child's own body, and the persons and even things around him. (Lacan 2006, 75)

This 'act' is the primordial event of the leap, which can never become an object of consciousness to the infant or retroactively through memory when the older child or adult tries to reflect on the very early past infancy. In the case of the animal, the monkey reaches a limit, the point of 'exhaustion,' where they give up in trying to master through reason the creation of a possessive image of their 'self'; they do not understand the utility of the image as it is not something they can immediately consume or relate to for practical-technical purposes, say befriending another monkey in the wild. But the human baby is doubly distinct from A.) the animal's limit, the impossibility of crossing from sensorial consciousness of the world to self-consciousness of being-in-the-world, and B.) an adult human with their false sense of self-conception, whether narcissistic or not, in gazing into the mirror in seeing one's face with either delight or repulsion, familiarity or incessant surprise. We, of course, can deconstruct this simplistic characterization of 'animal intelligence' and try to imagine something more complex than our human interactions and representations allow. Derrida, for one, attempts this in his *The Animal Therefore I Am* (2008).

Getting back to Lacan, all we can say is that the irreducible space of primordality can never be equated with an actual past present, a present now, which is no longer, that comes to representation through memory, nostalgia, or even fictional affection, a super-luminary expansion of a real possibility that was experienced. The adult analyst can witness the child's behavior and try to describe it in the manner Lacan does. Something occurs in the child, which Lacan says, namely the "series of gestures in which he playfully experiences the relationship between the movements made in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it duplicates – namely, the child's own body, and the persons and even things around him." (2006, 75) We must attend to the nature of this 'play,' what it means to experience anything, the question of a 'relationship,' and the baby's apperception (not of an internal mental space generating representations of itself, the outside world, and the relations between them) of 'movements.' But what are these 'movements'? Lacan says movements in the image (presumably the baby's witnessing an image of 'itself') but also that which surround the image in the environment outside the mirror, perhaps toys or other objects surrounding the baby. Lacan calls these the 'reflected environment,' (2006, 75), which has no simple relationship to the 'situational apperception.' (2006, 75) And then we crescendo to the apex of the passage regarding the 'virtual complex,' (Lacan 2006, 75) a rich reality unto itself, which presumably 'duplicates' some other original 'reality' that is already out there. This reality is composed of the child's physical body and surrounding objects outside the mirror.

But let us complicate things a bit. The 'virtual complex' (Lacan 2006, 75) is not some artificial, illusory, derivative, inferior copy of a deeper, more sound, empirical 'reality.' (Lacan 2006, 75) The event of 'duplication' (Lacan 2006, 75) is not a simple representation that follows as the secondary point in a line of events: for example, taking a picture of oneself, whereby the real physical body of oneself

precedes the photocopy of it. Prior to all this is the mirror-play, the quaternity, that exceeds all binaries of self as subject or self as object, the dialectics or hermeneutics of subject-object distinctions and relations. We cannot move to the later Heidegger just yet on his notion of the 'mirror-play' and 'fourfold,' for example in his enigmatic work, *The Thing* (2001). We will have to pass through *Being and Time* first on the 'who' question of Dasein in Chapter IV of Division One. Whether the human baby or adult, we have to acknowledge the a priori facticity of never being able to see our own face directly, the impossibility of a direct face-to-face encounter, opens the infinite alterity and limit of transcendence, the Mosaic impossibility of seeing Yahweh from the Hebrew Bible without perishing since 'I am' is never an object, icon, presence, or image. Our face is used to see everything if we have sight (as some are born without sight and perhaps the blind has a better chance to 'see' their face); but what is behind the face is the face that can never circumvent itself, come around itself and face it directly to see the face of oneself. Since the mirror image is a false copy, and the face can never see itself, then, solipsistically, one could deduce that the face does not even exist. The surface of the ocean cannot see the depth beneath it, but the depth is always facing upwards and downwards towards and away from the surface. The face has to turn away from itself.

Lacan wants to do something with this aporia of these interrelational movements, which become the primordial creation of the image of the body and outside world of objects. The mirror may be a neutral reflection of an outside world that adults understand as existent reality with all its objects, including the adults themselves. Not so for either the human baby or for the animal. Yet this constitution of the 'I', as Lacan says, in the opening moment, deciphered as an 'experience' – that psychoanalysis tries to describe – is ontologically distinct from the certitude and fortitude of the philosophy of the 'cogito,' (2006, 75) one can say subject, self, and soul too. This ontological difference means everything because we want to resist the notion of linear time, whereby our baby self is in the past (given to us through pictures taken of us), and the mature child or adult self that is now, present, writing this text. That life is present, and death is absent, which Derrida (1967) and Heidegger (1927) would both deconstruct in their own ways. All concepts of life and death are inadmissible in this realm. Whatever the ontological status of our 'being' is and what it means cannot be taken for granted. We could just be a more 'advanced' version of the human baby at the mirror stage, the interrelational movements of the vertigo in the 'virtual complex' (beyond fake representation of a real world) that totters on falling back to the 'instrumental intelligence.' (Lacan 2006, 75) Our bodies, faces, their relations, and the specular image in the mirror are not what we think they are.

The 'Who' Question of Dasein in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

This sets up the transition to Heidegger's *Being and Time* to which we now turn. We will attempt a slow reading of Chapter IV of Division One titled: "BEING-IN-

THE-WORLD AS BEING-WITH AND BEING-ONE'S -SELF. THE "THEY'." It's quite astounding that just over ten years that Heidegger publishes in German his masterpiece, *Sein und Zeit*, Lacan is articulating the 'mirror stage,' (2006, 75) He tries to develop his own ontological distinction between A.) the human baby, or the interrelational-movement 'virtual complex' and many other concepts that follow in the essay, such as the 'prematurity of birth,' (Lacan 2006, 78) as a universal truth of being, and B.) the adult with reason, imagination, experience, and their interrelations so deftly analyzed by Kant, in the constitution of representations of body and face, the pillars of self-conception itself, whether through transcendental a priori rules or not, i.e. empiricism. Nevertheless, Lacan is a psychoanalyst. Presumably, his sole aim is to help people alleviate their suffering.

Although we will spend most of our time with this one chapter in Division One, what we have in mind is the possibility of articulating what is not developed at all in Division Two, let alone what is not offered since Division Three was not included in the original publication of *Being and Time*: namely 'being-towards-birth,' (Heidegger 1962, 425) And then in the future, we need to return to Lacan's text and further explore the problematic of the 'prematurity of birth,' (2006, 78) not to be confused with actual premature births or births that occur before 37 weeks of maternal gestation. What we said earlier is that do not think of physical-biological birth as past (i.e., your birth certificate) and eventual physical perishing and death as future, i.e., a patient with a certain terminal disease. Also forgo notions of an eternal repetition of the birth event that never progresses or actualizes to an end point. And, lastly, suspend any faith-based or religious-metaphysical notions of reincarnation after death or resurrection to an eternal life. Rather, ontologically speaking, if birth turns out to be a type of continuous transpiration of one distending event as a horizon and nothing present, then how we 'come' to that horizon evokes the problem of movement. It could well be that birth is more like what we would normally consider the endpoint or telos, not the beginning. True birth comes at the 'end,' whereas the Lacanian 'mirror image' is some strange hybrid of the monstrosity of the pure, auto-affection without a unified self, and the oxymoron of sinister innocence. But even these evoke spatial registers that must be destroyed. That will have to come later.

Heidegger opens this much discussed chapter by posing the question of 'who' Dasein is in its 'everydayness.' (1962, 149) Obviously, one, immediately, is inclined to think of oneself waking up every day, doing some things through the course of the day, and then going to sleep at night. At least most of us do that as a daily routine. But things get strange quickly. We want to think about the totality of Dasein's whole authentic being, which would be inclusive of its two ends (being-towards-birth and being-towards-death), everything in-between as it is in the world; and leaving the world is not just dying, leaving a dead body behind, and a soul floating off to another metaphysical realm beyond this world. Those are all moments of 'picture-thinking' as Hegel says in 'Revealed Religion' of the

Phenomenology of Spirit (1977, 479). One can no longer be in the world as a possibility within the world. We are racing head to Division Two, particularly chapters III to VI.

The whole treatise starts out with Dasein's 'basic state' as 'being-in-the-world.' (Heidegger 1962, 78) Do not think of that as an existent being in some physically bounded space based on some kind of Cartesian coordinates; and do not think of that as a subject whose transcendental apperception makes possible any experience of a world either. Instead, Heidegger says that these 'structures' are 'equiprimordial' with Dasein's 'basic state' as 'being-in-the-world.' (1962, 149) All of them gather up into the question of the 'who.' The 'structures' are: "Being-with and Dasein-with [Mitsein und Mitdasein]. In this kind of Being is grounded the mode of everyday Being-one's-Self [Selbstsein]; the explication of this mode will enable us to see what we may call the 'subject' of everydayness-the 'they.'" (Heidegger 1962, 149-150)

The intriguing nature of this non-virtual complex, if you will, is this composition of the 'question of the who': one as involving an 'equiprimodality' of structures that may be discussed one after another, but their togetherness as 'whole' does not mean one is prior. To reiterate, there is no prior state either in terms of temporality in a linear sequence or as a transcendental category that makes something possible. It is as if they are not isolated moments hanging together somehow, but all 'are' the whole of Dasein, at least in its 'everydayness.' (Heidegger 1962, 149) And keep in mind that Heidegger's revolution is to rewrite mystery back into the immanent and separate the ontological question of what it means to exist - factually - from the ontic description of just existing and doing things daily, i.e., the normal fact of everyday life. If we examine all these 'structures' carefully but re-transcribe them into the gaps and margins of Lacan's 'mirror image' text, then some uncanny results follow.

We are not going to arrive at any empirical 'I' as opposed to a 'they' as common humanity. But Heidegger does say at the outset that if we have any 'subject' with which to deal, it is 'the they,' which means the 'they' (however inauthentic and burdensome it might be) is built into a greater totality called Dasein; it does not lie outside Dasein. The 'they' is not Plato's Parmenidean problem of the One and the Many. This is not about mathematics either. In a way, the human infant, the animal/monkey, and adult human tripartite distinctions are also equiprimordial regarding an 'ontological structure of the human world' that Lacan describes as 'paranoiac knowledge.' (2006, 76) But with Heidegger, we do not want to begin or end with the human being, and therefore we are not doing any psychoanalysis at all. A psychoanalysis that does not deal with an infant stage is no psychoanalysis.

Back to Heidegger, let us continue reading his chapter. A quick summary could suggest that 'Being-with' (Heidegger 1962, 156) is merely the entire architectonic of the treatise whereby the question of the meaning of Being is built into Dasein's constitution (Heidegger 1962, 27), temporality becomes the horizon

to understand Being (Heidegger 1962, 19), Dasein is 'radically individuated' as the 'relation of transcendence' (Heidegger 1962, 62) and is constituted by the 'primordial finitude of temporality,' (Heidegger 1962, 438) which underpins Sorge/Care/Dread/Concern (Heidegger 1962, 237) as the basic core of Dasein's whole. Ultimately, Sorge constitutes the famous tripartite structure of "ahead-of-itself-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)' that constitutes the 'ontological structural whole" (Heidegger 1962, 237) of Dasein. 'Dasein-with' (Heidegger 1962, 155) is not simply being in the world with and as others as empirical beings; whereby, I can just be alone in the absence of others or merge into the crowd. Rather, the 'Dasein-with' is other Daseins, like Dasein, who are also in the world but not simply present-at-hand or ready-to-hand like other ontic entities (Heidegger 1962, 154). Do not think of an athlete on a team who is the first to show up to the locker room before their teammates arrive and therefore is simply alone. A real teammate is always with their team, whether alone or playing in the game. Even remember that Being-with and Dasein-with are 'structures 'equiprimordial' to the 'who' question of Dasein (Heidegger 1962, 149). Dasein is always-with one can say regardless of whether an individual self exists in contradistinction to other members of the human species. 'Being-one's-Self' is not the isolated subject or self in solitary confinement. It belongs with the 'Being-with' because the inauthentic 'they-self' of the individual Dasein is not something negative but a 'positive constitution' of Dasein as a 'primordial phenomenon.' (Heidegger 1962, 167) All four - 'Being-with, Dasein-with, Being-one's-Self, the They' (Heidegger 1962, 149-150) - hang together in an equiprimordial manner and through a complex set of interrelated movements that comprise one large Event. The phenomenological reduction suspends all and any immediate intuitions that can shape sensorial consciousness based on the experience of being an individual in relation to others. How this is so becomes an open question.

However, this analysis is not without problems. It appears to be too quick of a summary, and so we must bracket what we have just said in light of the previous distillation of Lacan's text on the epochal threshold of the 'mirror image' - not simply as an early stage of human development but the ontological foundation of how we get at the truth of the very formation of any 'I.' Now we have the arduous task of bringing Heidegger and Lacan together on the question of time and movement as we take on the enormous question of the 'who.' We, like Heidegger, are not asking 'who' such and such a person is, like a celebrity we cannot recognize, or the old existential and metaphysical question of 'who' is the human being, i.e., a creature from the Creator God. The 'who' remains invisible and becomes the answer to another question which remains unarticulated. Our hypothesis is that the fundamental ground that eludes Lacan and Heidegger alike is a daimon-like fourfold of moving polarities between origin, end, non-origin, non-end and what are also others to all four. But the others share relations of difference with the four and do not therefore comprise an eight-fold. We know this

is hideously complex but let us make this the horizon for our inquiry as we try to develop, now, the birth-problem that mystifies Lacan and escapes Heidegger's grasp in *Being and Time*. The timing as being, the time of being and the being of time, the temporalization-event, not of being-within-time, but temporality as the passage from the question of the meaning of Being to the answer that should turn out to be time itself – the great horizon – which concludes *Being and Time*. All of this is what compels us to go forward. But to answer this question means developing some sense of possibilities of how to articulate the immature, if you will, notion of 'being-towards-birth' (Heidegger 1962, 425) in *Being and Time*.

Being-towards-birth and the Mirror Stage

If we say birth is what we must 'arrive at,' but not like a change of location in terms of a moving object, something moving in space, the movement of space itself, then birth has yet to happen. But the 'yet' is not a future now like tomorrow on the calendar; this is not even the possibility of tomorrow repeating itself as a possibility, almost infinitely, and therefore never arriving. We feel a movement that seems to reverse time, pulling us back, sometimes through trauma and repression, the 'origin' that was there as infants. But this does not exist, and movement can, paradoxically, originate from a non-origin. Therefore, movement is not spatialized as linear, circular, or rectilinear, or even non-Euclidean. The realization of the human infant and animal 'instrumental intelligence' (with no self-consciousness) distinction is also the elevation of that distinction into another sphere. The eerie question is whether a whole lifetime is spent trying to fashion birth out of the Lacanian 'virtual complex' and its doubling in the mirror; this is so despite the assuredness that adults give themselves as having matured past infancy and nearly two decades of childhood and adolescence. Just because as mature children and adults, most of us can walk and talk does not mean we can prove we were born; this also attests to the dignity of peoples with disabilities who transcend normal ontic registers of what it means to 'walk and talk.' In short, questioning time and death as illusions is one thing; questioning that birth even happened seems even more improbable.

One experiment we can try is to reread section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two of *Being and Time* on 'primordial, ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the statement – the 'meaning of Dasein is temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 380). But we can do it backwards. This does not mean taking every one of Heidegger's formulations and saying them in terms of their opposite. There are no hidden dialectical relations to uncover. We can say we must read them differently, against the grain of their tendencies, inversions of possibilities that were never articulated, but in tracing them we are already inverting and distorting the original intuitions that appear to us when we first read section 65.

In some senses, that does mean, literally, reading the section from the end to the beginning. The end leaves us in suspense without further developing the 'equi-primordially' of the ecstasies of temporality in which "each temporalizes

itself in relation to the others" (Heidegger 1962, 378) in their own ways. We are certainly not talking about a fixed, unchanging line in which present now points slip into past no longer now points while future now points arrive to replace the 'current' present now point; and this movement has its own viscosity in which past relates to present and future in its own way, present in relation to past and future, and future in relation to past and present. It is not about two empty spots called the no longer now past and the yet to be now future as empty holes, in which the present, like a well, fills up and overflows in two directions to occupy them. This is not about counting the number of possibilities of interrelations of temporal relations (with three nexuses) but not because we are seeking one, unified ground of everything; that is the elusive substance highly sought after in the history of Western metaphysics.

Rather, we are concerned with focusing on developing 'being-towards-birth' (Heidegger 1962, 425) as a type of motion out of the interplay of the three ecstasies so profoundly described in section 65. The 'ekstatikon' that Heidegger introduces from the ancient Greek as the "primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself" (1962, 377) is not a dialectics of an 'in and for itself' like we find in the tradition of German Idealism. Heidegger introduces the problem of exteriority beyond the binary distinction of inner and outer. Standing out from 'itself' is not leaving behind a core entity in space and time that one can look at from above; but the exteriority of the unseeable presence behind the face looking in the mirror, englobing the seer, the mirror, and the seen tempts us to describe its nature. This is not the Heraclitian nature that loves to hide. But we also do not want to move in the territory of Merleau-Ponty, particularly in appropriating his magnificent ideas of the 'Flesh' in *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968).¹ Then again, we cannot jump

¹ Merleau-Ponty states: "The visible about us seems to rest in itself. It is as though our vision were formed in the heart of the visible, or as though there were between it and us an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand. And yet it is not possible that we blend into it, nor that it passes into us, for then the vision would vanish at the moment of formation, by disappearance of the seer or of the visible. What there is then are not things first identical with themselves, which would then offer themselves to the seer, nor is there a seer who is first empty and who, afterward, would open himself to them – but something to which we could not be closer than by palpating it with our look, things we could not dream of seeing 'all naked' because the gaze itself envelops them, clothes them with its own flesh. Whence does it happen that in so doing it leaves them in their place, that the vision we acquire of them seems to us to come from them, and that to be seen is for them but a degradation of their eminent being? What is this talisman of color, this singular virtue of the visible that makes it, held at the end of the gaze, nonetheless much more than a correlative of my vision, such that it imposes my vision upon me as a continuation of its own sovereign existence? How does it happen that my look, enveloping them, does not hide them, and, finally, that, veiling them, it unveils them?" (1968, 131)

And then the editor's footnote to that passage: "Here in the course of the text itself, these lines are inserted": "it is that the look is itself incorporation of the seer into the visible, quest for itself, which is of it, within the visible – it is that the visible of the world is not an envelope of quale, but what is between the qualia, a connective tissue of exterior and interior horizons – it is as flesh offered to flesh that the visible has its aseity, and that it is mine – The flesh as Sichtigkeit

to the ethics of Levinas and his key term 'exteriority' in the face of the Other.² Whether it's the body for Merleau-Ponty or the ethical relation to another for Levinas, both presuppose the human being, although as ontological given the influence of Heidegger and phenomenologically explicated given the influence of Husserl. To give these iconoclastic thinkers their due, the human is not empirical or the Cogito or transcendental subject either. The immanence that is the within-ness of being in a world is not of the empirical sense or transcendental imagination; it is so real that it eludes any real representation as truth or fact.

Ironically, if there is any nucleus to Heidegger's 'ekstatikon,' it lies on the 'outside-of-itself' component which constitutes time as transcendence. Hurling towards both 'ends' always, Dasein as being-towards-death and being-towards-

and generality. – 'whence vision is question and response...The openness through flesh: the two leaves of my body and the leaves of the visible world... It is between these intercalated leaves that there is visibility... My body model of the things and the things model of my body: the body bound to the world through all its parts, up against it –' all this means: the world, the flesh not as fact or sum of facts, but as the locus of an inscription of truth: the false crossed out, not nullified." (1968, 131)

² Levinas states in his magisterial *Otherwise than Being and Beyond Essence* (originally published in French in 1974 and the chapter in that volume originally published in 1968): "My responsibility for the other is the for of the relationship, the very signifyingness of signification, which signifies in saying before showing itself in the said. The one-for-the-other is the very signifyingness of signification! It is not that the 'beyond' would be 'further' than everything that appears, or 'present in absence,' or 'shown by a symbol'; that would still be to be subject to a principle, to be given in consciousness. Here what is essential is a refusal to allow oneself to be tamed or domesticated by a theme. The movement going 'beyond' loses its own signifyingness and becomes an immanence as soon as logos interpellates, invests, presents and exposes it, whereas its adjacency in proximity is an absolute exteriority. Incommensurable with the present, unassimilable in it, it is always 'already in the past' behind which the present delays, over and beyond the 'now' which this exteriority disturbs or obsesses. This way of passing, disturbing the present without allowing itself to be invested by the arche of consciousness, striating with its furrows the clarity of the ostensible, is what we have called a trace. 1 Proximity is thus anarchically a relationship with a singularity without the mediation of any principle, any ideality. What concretely corresponds to this description is my relationship with my neighbour, a signifyingness which is different from the much-discussed 'meaning-endowment,' since signification is this very relationship with the other, the-one-for-the-other. This incommensurability with consciousness, which becomes a trace of the who knows where, is not the inoffensive relationship of knowing in which everything is equalized, nor the indifference of spatial contiguity; it is an assignation of me by another, a responsibility with regard to men we do not even know. The relationship of proximity cannot be reduced to any modality of distance or geometrical contiguity, nor to the simple 'representation' of a neighbour; it is already an assignation, an extremely urgent assignation – an obligation, anachronously prior to any commitment. This anteriority is 'older' than the a priori. This formula expresses a way of being affected which can in no way be invested by spontaneity: the subject is affected without the source of the affection becoming a theme of representation. We have called this relationship irreducible to consciousness obsession. The relationship with exteriority is 'prior' to the act that would effect it. For this relationship is not an act, not a thematizing, not a position in the Fichtean sense." (1989, 90)

birth evokes a much larger phenomenological complexity of movement than what is offered in *Being and Time*. But this one going in two directions does not have a center like an octopus stretching its tentacles in different directions. Nothing is present-at-hand, including the event of movement. Such a movement is not circular, linear, or rectilinear, and there is nothing conceptualizable from ancient Greek metaphysics (Xeno, Plato, Aristotle, others) that can help us here.

Returning to the problem of birth, we have several intuitions that need to be deconstructed. If one were to say that your birth will only occur in the future, one does not mean posthumous fame in the present about the future world where you will no longer exist. Birthing out of the future is also not being-towards-death as the 'possibility of impossibility' and the possibility of no longer being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1962, 294). Since in *Being and Time*, death is not cessation of something or perishing of a living thing, and certainly not religiously derived or medically certified, then birth is not the beginning of a life form or anything else for that matter (an epoch in history, an artwork, a social movement, etc.). Perhaps, we have to see that in fact birth is attached to death, both as possibilities, and neither something we experience while we are in the world since they remain possibilities; and this does not simply mean one cannot travel back to a time before they were in the womb or live to tell what the death event is like by coming back and attesting to it with friends and relatives. We do not speak of past lives or future ghosts. The relation is an uncanny one because of the question of movement, not lived human experience.

We can try a thought experiment here, which we do not find in Lacan, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty, when we consider the question of the face, the body, and the Other. And this is certainly not something that Heidegger, the fundamental ontologist, would consider. Instead of one human baby and a mirror from which the 'play of movements' (Lacan 2006, 75) occurs in the child that generates an image, imagine two mirrors facing each other. And furthermore, let us grant there are two sets of mirrors. The human face looks outwards to perceive an external world beyond one's body; but the skull beneath the face is what the face cannot see. It is like the back frame within which a mirror sits. But in this case the mirror itself is likened to a face that sees rather than an image that is seen within it. The point is that a mirror cannot see itself. Whatever images that are generated within the mirror are just as real as the external objects that are supposed to be reflected in the images that appear in the mirror. Furthermore, the mirror itself, as a physical object, is only an image itself, and hence an image that generates images, etc. Obviously, this scheme defies any simple binary distinctions.

Now imagine that the two mirrors face each other, while each of their backsides point in opposite directions. Whether there is a gap between the two mirrors or no gap and they are adjacent to one another, there is no way to tell from which mirror an image originates because the event of movement (in which neither mirror is the origin) is the frenzied interplay in deepening the invisibility of space, which reflects the true presence within each mirror. One can say the

double movements bring the mirrors alive with nothing reflected in either one. Distinctions between past, present, and future become indiscernible, but they still exist. Let us take the other set of mirrors too. They have their backsides attached to each other, and each mirror faces in the opposite direction, each, presumably, reflecting what is outside of it, i.e., the real external world. The baby who sees in one mirror has its image appear in the other (like a quantum wormhole) and vice-versa, or it appears as if there are two babies each looking into their own mirror. But this 'duplicity,' (2006, 75) as Lacan says, is already built into 'one' baby. The point is that there is much to speculate, metaphysically, when it comes to crossing out traditional notions of origin and end, and therefore anything like the event of birth (and death). This exposes a deeper 'ground' (that is beyond the distinction of presence and absence) from which all notions of origin, end, consciousness, self-consciousness, presence, even the baby and the primordial mirror image it sees of itself.

Coming back to Heidegger's ecstatic temporality, we can keep in the background these examples of two sets of mirrors. The linkage between the 'equiprimordially of the ecstasies of temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 378) in section 65 and the problem of movement and Dasein's 'two ends,' (Heidegger 1962, 425) or 'being-towards-birth and being-towards-death,' in sections 72-75 remains unarticulated. The main passages where the 'ecstasies' (Heidegger 1962, 377) are most developed are on pages 372-374 of the Macquarrie and Robinson English translation (Heidegger 1962). Unfortunately, we may have to quote all those paragraphs in full (including the footnote numbers without the translators' footnote texts) and then try to read them backwards. This will require the invention of new terms. Heidegger states:

That which was projected in the primordial existential projection of existence has revealed itself as anticipatory resoluteness. What makes this authentic Being-a-whole of Dasein possible regarding the unity of its articulated structural whole? 2 Anticipatory resoluteness, when taken formally and existentially, without our constantly designating its full structural content, is Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being. This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus **letting itself come towards itself**-in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards. 3 If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural [als zukünftiges], in the sense which we have now indicated, and which we have still to define more closely. By the term 'futural,' we do not here have in view a 'now' which has not yet become 'actual' and which sometime will be for the first time. We have in view **the coming [Kunft]** in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself. Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself-that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general.

Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty. This understanding means that in existing one takes over Being-guilty; it means being the thrown basis of nullity. But taking over thrownness signifies being Dasein authentically as it already was. 1 Taking over thrownness, however, is possible only in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost 'as-it-already-was' – that is to say, its 'been' [sein 'Gewesen']. Only in so far as Dasein is as an **'I-am-as-having-been,'** can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back. 2 As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as 'having been.' 3 Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one's ownmost 'been.' Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of **'having been' arises, in a certain way, from the future.** 4

Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the current Situation of the 'there' in such a way that existence, in taking action, is circumspectively concerned with what is factually ready-to-hand environmentally. Resolute Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand in the Situation-that is to say, taking action in such a way as to let one encounter what has presence environmentally-is possible only by making such an entity present. Only as the **Present [Gegenwart]] in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is:** namely, letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it seizes upon in taking action.

Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of 'having been' arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which 'has been' (or better, which 'is in the process of having been') releases from itself the Present. 2 **This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as 'temporality.'** 3 Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care (Heidegger 1962, 372-374).

Let us make one thing clear. You may want to start with yourself as a living subject in the present doing something right now at this point on the clock or the calendar. And then as time passes in a linear, one-directional flow, you start doing other things without being able to return to your previous moment because you cannot reverse time. You could repeat the same event, perhaps eternally, but that does not stop the linear flow of one-directional time. Things start to happen to you as you age, like your skin withering; but time does not go in reverse, or your skin getting younger until it looks and feels like it was when you were a baby. This then generates a complex viscosity of moving into the future and the past at the same time; you go into the future, but your acts and decisions are always receding into the past. But we must abandon all of this completely. We are not starting with a biological-physical-empirical human being on the one hand. On the other hand, as tempting as it is, we are not going to unravel the complex aporias and knots of the Christological substance (dual natures – divine and human – as one being) of Jesus living out his days and flowing through time before his climatic death and resurrection. For Jesus, the possibility of conquering death is already inscribed in

the life unfolding as a being-towards-death culminating in an actual death of a human being; but the story does not end there as the Christian world knows.

Instead, we will develop a sense that as much as we want to read ecstatic temporality in section 65 in relation to the problem of Sorge/Care and being-towards-death, we need another term other than Sorge/Care as we think about being-towards-birth; but these two 'ends of Dasein' (Heidegger 1962, 425) are neither successive nor simultaneous. To think them together in terms of the 'enigma of Being..that of motion' (Heidegger 1962, 444) requires a stitching of 'equiprimordiality' (Heidegger 1962, 378) of the interrelations of the three 'ecstases' (Heidegger 1962, 377) into each individual ecstasy described in section 65 in the above quoted passage. Then we start to get a fuller picture of the enormous complexity of the totalizing 'process' (Heidegger 1962, 377) of the 'temporalizing of temporality' in general; or that primordial event that temporalizes and derives the 'endless,' commonplace, inauthentic, spatialized linear flow of now points, whereby past is no longer now, present is now, and future the yet to be now (Heidegger 1962, 379).

Somehow the 'equiprimordiality' (Heidegger 1962, 378) of all three ecstasies in each ecstasy but each in their own unique way of movement suggests a type of mirroring-play that is irreducible to the Lacanian tripartite structure of animal, human baby, and adult or the later Heidegger on the 'mirror play' and the 'fourfold.' (2001) We do not want to go to the later Heidegger just yet, hence we must delay and differ that encounter.

Here are the terms we have to work with from Heidegger:

'letting itself come towards itself' (1962, 372)

'the coming [Kunft]' (1962, 373)

'I-am-as-having-been' (1962, 373)

'Present [Gegenwart] in the sense of making present, can resoluteness be what it is' (1962, 374)

"Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation by making present. The character of 'having been' arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which 'has been' (or better, which 'is in the process of having been') releases from itself the Present. 2 This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as 'temporality.'" (Heidegger 1962, 374)

Again, resist all temptations to turn, immediately, to the *New Testament* when the living Jesus before his death and resurrection keeps temporalizing Himself in several bizarre registers (for example 'no longer being in the world or coming to the Father' in John Chapter 17) precisely as he – the historical person – is occurring and flowing in endless, one-directional linear time. Those resemblances are quite eerie as they are. Rather, we want to resubmerge back into

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the possibility of doing fundamental ontology again, where *Being and Time* leaves off. Here are our registers:

Origin

End

Other than Origin

Other than End

Non-Origin

Non-End

Other than Non-Origin

Other than Non-End

The goal is to flesh out the 'equiprimordially of the ecstasies' (Heidegger 162, 378) while considering the complex movement of 'being-towards-birth' and 'being-towards-death' as Dasein heads to both of its 'ends.' (Heidegger 1962, 425) There is no room for faith here in the human-God who lived two thousand years ago, conquered death, and ascended to some heavenly realm as we on earth await His expected return or Second Coming.

We listed eight phrases using our terms, and the idea is to blow up Heidegger's phrases from section 65 so that a fuller notion of the 'equiprimordially' comes to light with regard to the problem of motion. And the problem of motion (Heidegger 1962, 444) remains incomplete if 'being-towards-birth' is not considered (Heidegger 1962, 425). We remain focused on a four-dimensionality, ultimately, and not the counting of eight items. The goal is not some super-synthesis that will yield a monotheistic Oneness, which would then re-instantiate the Western metaphysical onto-theological logoi.

For Heidegger alone (not our project), starting with the 'letting itself come towards itself' (1962, 372) and the 'coming [Kunft],' (1962, 373) we are not talking about a starting point releasing itself and arriving at itself to another endpoint; for example, a child growing over the course of a few months in a measurable time span. We must bracket the 'I-am-my-having-bee-ness arises from the future' (Heidegger 1962, 373) *while* the "future as having been or in the process of having been releases the present." (Heidegger 1962, 374) The simultaneity of the *while* is problematic because one is bound to take these relations and say they are happening at the same time in a nucleus that hatches a present. That would then be the ground of linear time based on the a priori presence of a notion of either linear, rectilinear, or circular time. Even though this is distinct from spatialized, endless, linear time of flowing now-points (present now becoming past now and future yet to be now taking the place of present now), Heidegger's 'primordial, finite, authentic, ecstatic temporalizing of temporality' (1962, 380) does not necessarily divide the 'having been arising from the future' with 'the future as is in the process of having been.' (Heidegger 1962, 373) And 'making present' (Heidegger 1962, 374) is not simply a self-showing process like a phenomenon in which presence is fashioned regardless of what thing or event

is being made present, including those double interrelations of 'having been' and 'future.' They all fall under the umbrella of 'resoluteness.' (Heidegger 1962, 374)

The resolve to be the authenticated whole 'stretching-along and self-stretching' of life (Heidegger 1962, 426) one is given is because of the mindful transcendence over death (which is neither accepted nor feared in linear time by human psychology). This magnanimous whole points to the very 'finitude of temporality.' (Heidegger 1962, 379) Instead of focusing on the future as 'primary' (Heidegger 1962, 378) and being-toward-death as the 'radical individuation as relation of transcendence' (Heidegger 1962, 62) because death as possibility (never an event in time) is 'certain and indefinite,' (Heidegger 1962, 310) we must pivot our attention. Furthermore, the possibility of death as the 'ownmost and uttermost non-relational impending distinctiveness' (Heidegger 1962, 294) is held out in suspense as we theorize, anew, 'being-towards-birth.' But how would that look distinct from what Heidegger says in sections 65 (on temporality) and 72 (on motion), let alone all of the first two divisions of *Being and Time*?

First, we can say that the future *futurizes* out of the having-been, not just 'in the process of having-been.' (Heidegger 1962, 374) What this means is that our normal intuition of what is origin as past (unless something is originating right now) is crossed out by what is other to the origin. This other is the future hatching out of the having-been since the having-been is not present past to memory or chronologically datable like the birth certificate. One could say, superficially but at some risk, that the future gives birth to a past that does not exist. What Dasein is 'coming up to' (Heidegger 1962, 373) and against, as in being held to account, is the meaning of birth as possibility, not death. We are moving towards our true birth. Being-towards-birth is not an encirclement of the so-called ontic-physical birth from the womb that took place in the past. It is not the Preexistent Logos from the Prologue to the Gospel of John or the virginal birth of Jesus either. Linking the future with birth, whereby the future futurizes out of having-been, in contrast to the past 'historizing' out of the future through 'fate and repetition' (Heidegger 1962, 535, 437) requires new categories other than those offered in *Being and Time*, and even the overriding question of death that pervades the entire Western logos and its metaphysical religions. This brings in the dimension of what is other to an end that is also not a repetition, reincarnation, or resurrection.

We are getting closer to the possibility of articulating 'being-towards-birth' ontologically if we distinguish it from A.) all ontic registers of physical, biological, historical, social, cultural, legal, political, economic, religious, theological and scientific views of birth and B.) Heidegger's already established ontological difference between death as possibility to be from both 'perishing,' (1962, 291) as in physical withering away (which is what most people think death is), and the qualified allocation of 'demise as dying,' or a 'way' to be and a movement 'towards' death as 'living out one's life.' (Heidegger 1962, 291) This is not the existential malaise of a dying soldier in battle. Rather, it is a transcending-finite

temporalization based on a 'radical individuation' (Heidegger 1962, 62) as the locus and inscription of 'phenomenological truth.' (Heidegger 1962, 62)

We, however, think of something other to that Heideggerean characterization, but maybe not opposite or contrary. Being-towards-birth is the possibility of erasing the origin (and therefore all linear or circular teleologies towards end) by becoming-the-death inscribed in the origin. But now we have to define what those terms mean if we do not want to repeat Heidegger's compelling definitions against what has been postulated in the history of Western metaphysics and religions. *Becoming-death-in-the-place-of* the origin seems like the reverse temporalization of Eastern reincarnation, or being born in a body, the body dying, and being reborn in a new body with the same transmigrating soul. We must 'destroy' (Heidegger 1962, 41) the history of ontology of all conceptions of birth and rebirth in the West and East, in both traditions' metaphysics, religions, and theologies. The hypothesis is that the horizon of four-dimensional time-interrelations-movement-event will allow us to accomplish this task. What is less clear is how this allows us to go 'beyond' *Being and Time* by reoccupying it to complete its incomplete missing Division Three. Because extending or completing *Being and Time's* project is not our intention. It looks like a 'authentically resolute repeating of a possibility that is handed down' (Heidegger 1962, 437) to invoke Heidegger's language. But again, that is not our aim. The uncanny resemblance between extending and completing on the one hand and surpassing, taking-the-place, and re-placing on the other hand reveals the uncertainty inherent when having two mirrors face themselves or turn away from themselves.

This, of course, is all preliminary talk. The substance is still out-standing. The road ahead is long and winding. To develop the four-dimensional time-interrelations-movement-event of being-towards-birth with being-towards-death (already articulated in *Being and Time*) in light of the underdeveloped 'equiprimordiality' of section 65 on 'ecstatic temporality' (Heidegger 1962, 378) requires terms other than 'fate, repetition, historicity' from sections 74 and 75 (Heidegger 1962, 437). Long as we keep in mind that birth is not origination, beginning, genesis, or genius. It has its other too, which is not death or reincarnation. Movement can in fact 'occur,' even when notions of origin and end split themselves into alterities, and, also, their non-dialectical opposites of non-origin and non-end and their alterities. We must become comfortable with this ultimate prospect: how all philosophical and religious traditions – West and East – have characterized time utilizing, predominantly, three aspects (past, present, future) is not an indisputable limit to the human imagination. Rather, those traditions must yield to a greater, heretofore, undisclosed complexity of intertwining dimensions.

Conclusion

The perplexity of Lacan's famous 'mirror stage' concept served as a catalyst for reflections on birth in general. But this is not the intent of Lacan's iconic essay,

which uses the infant stage to question the history of philosophy based on the subject and the Cogito (2006, 75). However, all this preambing reawakened a long, abiding concern with what has been missing in *Being and Time* and its legacy for twentieth-century continental philosophy, the philosophy of religion in all traditions, and any allied treatments in predominantly Western Christian systematic theologies, which have been influenced by Heidegger. Considering the problem of time and movement in attempting to destroy both Western and Eastern metaphysics and religions requires a creative leap, a non-original event of origination but also what is other to the non-original without relapsing back into any simplistic concepts of an origin. What has not been revealed is the underlying drive or even 'resolve,' which is not based on an intending human subject, one that seeks to understand itself as an individual living out a life. For this we must bear fault. But this is not about conscience or guilt. It is also not about the entity – Dasein – in *Being and Time*.

Rather, as always, everything in *Being and Time* tends towards its own end, that is the end of Division Two. And we know what happens there, namely the encounter with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. We hold to the conviction, as undeniably true, that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in *Being and Time* is, of course, not the original *Phenomenology of Spirit* in Hegel's words that the tradition has tried to understand for over two centuries. Then again, the attempt by *Being and Time* to lump the *Phenomenology of Spirit* with the rest of the metaphysical traditions that have treated time in the West, namely Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine (Heidegger 1962, 475, 479-480), is cursory, if not inaccurate. But that is something that must be demonstrated, not asserted. What is buried as a lost possibility in 'absolute knowing' (Hegel 1977, 479) of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the challenge to reconceptualize what the Being of Time is when one is not a slave to the nexuses of past, present, or future and how they have been associated with all notions of origin as birth and end as death. And this is not just equating past with birth and future with death, or future with birth and past with death, but each time axis in relation to the other two, namely three triangles, let alone their interrelations. It means canceling the Christian resurrection too (the pictorial notion of a renewed body that had been physically dead) and the concept of the parousia or Second Coming while elevating it to a whole other 'Notion.' (Hegel 1977, 493-494) What can be Other to both the Resurrection and the Parousia? How is the Being of Time other than the great work, *Being and Time*? That is the interrelated question we will attempt to answer in our next undertaking.

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