

The Buried Promise of Sections 74 and 75 of Chapter V of Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) in light of *New Testament Christianity*

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Abstract: This article will offer a close reading of sections 74 and 75 of “Chapter V: Temporality and Historicity” of Division Two of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927). Our goal is to expand on a speculative metaphysical reconstruction of Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John, when Jesus is finished speaking to the disciples and is addressing the Father alone. This is right before his Passion, namely the arrest, trial, crucifixion, and ultimate Resurrection. The work is not situated in either abstract systematic or biblical theology, which seeks to defend faith, particularly using modern continental philosophical resources, such as the early Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Then again, it is not a philosophy of religion either, in the sense that it is not concerned with investigating the nature or essence of religion. Rather, it is trying to move within *Being and Time* to construct anew its ‘missing Division Three’ by creating new terms and distinctions beyond what is offered in the first Two Divisions. Our hypothesis is this: the supersession of *Being and Time* requires an imaginative metaphysical expansion of hidden secrets buried in the Gospel regarding a strange double temporalization in the discourse of Jesus to his Father. These two temporal planes are phenomenologically irreducible to either the linear sequence of events of his life as narrated in the four Gospels; or the history of theological attempts, particularly twentieth-century theological giants (Barth, Tillich, Rahner, Moltmann, Pannenberg), to think about the time-eternity-history relation with regard to the Kairos (through the Incarnation of the Son) at the fulfilled time and the Parousia, namely the Second Coming at the eschatological end of time. The article concludes with certain criteria regarding judgements on the undecidability of theism vs. atheism when attempting to go beyond Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. The ontological consequences, and therefore meaning of such an undertaking at a step beyond *Being and Time*, remain indiscernible for specific reasons.

Keywords: Heidegger, New Testament Christianity, time, movement, being.

Introduction

This exposition will offer a microscopic reading of sections 74 and 75 of “Chapter V: Temporality and Historicity” of Division Two of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (1927). Our goal is to advance a speculative metaphysical reconstruction of Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John, when Jesus concludes his discourse to the disciples and is reaching out to the Father in apparent solitude. This precedes his

Passion, namely the arrest, trial, crucifixion, and ultimate Resurrection. The labor of thought in this reflection is not located in either abstract systematic or biblical theology, which seeks to buttress faith, particularly through the appropriation of modern continental philosophical resources. One such resource is the early Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Inversely, the analysis undertaken here is not merely a secular philosophy of religion either, in the sense that it is not absorbed in investigating the nature or essence of religion.

Rather, it is trying to navigate within *Being and Time* to create anew its 'missing Division Three' by formulating new terms and distinctions beyond what is presented in the first Two Divisions. Our singular hypothesis is this: the surpassing of *Being and Time* necessitates an imaginative metaphysical penetration of concealed secrets buried in the Gospel of John regarding a perplexing double temporalization in the speech of Jesus to his Father. These two temporal planes intersect but are phenomenologically irreducible to either the linear sequence of events of his life as attested in the Gospel writers' biographical accounts; or the history of theological systems, particularly by twentieth-century giants (Barth, Tillich, Rahner, Moltmann, Pannenberg), to think about the time-eternity-history relation with regard to both the Kairos through the Incarnation of the Son at the fulfilled time and the Parousia, namely the Second Coming at the eschatological end of time.

By concealed secrets, we mean secrets that we failed to know were there because they had to be invented to appear now. The invention of a secret is rather uncanny. For if I say that I have a secret when there is none, you will never know whether there is a secret or not unless I choose to come forward and disclose that there is not. But similarly, if there is a secret whose content is not disclosed, then one can remain undecided as to whether the secret conceals something or not. We will have to attend to this undecidability regarding a secret we claim exists in the Gospel that can be used to expose the limitation of what *Being and Time* is truly concealing regarding its own impasse, incompleteness, and perhaps failure. The double movement of *Being and Time* to the Gospel and from the Gospel to *Being and Time* is neither strictly within worlds of theological research on the one hand nor secular philosophy of the human on the other.

Instead of engaging systematic or biblical theology through a philosophical lens, we seek to draw a distinction between A.) the relation between Jesus's pre-death on the Cross double temporalization and his movement-towards-death but also movement-towards-birth and B.) the ontological distinction Heidegger already makes in Division Two in *Being and Time* between "primordial," "ecstatic," "authentic," "finite," unified "temporalizing of temporality" in section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the ordinary, inauthentic notion of linear time as flowing now-points with present as now, past as no longer now, and future as yet to be now. For sure, we cannot begin by assuming an entity that is "present-at-hand" or "ready-to-hand" to use Heidegger's language in describing Dasein (Heidegger 1962, 67, 98).

To construct the missing Division Three, we need to move past Heidegger's distinctions in *Being and Time* and on to a complex double temporalization at work in Jesus's anticipation of physical death on the Cross, in which the polarities of birth and death meet certain alterities while complicating what it means to be-in-time. Before we assume any understanding of either Jesus or ourselves as being-in-time (and being in historical time in the case of Jesus as the historical person who lived over two-thousand years ago), we need to consider being-towards-birth, and not just 'being-towards-death.' And in that, we must do so in new ways. They are dynamic events that form a complex set of moving interrelations for which the spatialized line or circle cannot help us. Heidegger readily admits the incompleteness of his investigation within *Being and Time* in which he fails to treat, sufficiently, "being-towards-the beginning" or treat it at all as much as he did "Being-towards-the-end" (Heidegger 1962, 424-425). But in the case of Jesus's being-towards-birth and being-towards-death, as we shall argue, in Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John, this is all prior to his actual death and Resurrection, and therefore irreducible to Christian faith too.

In other words, we do not seek to expound theologically the question of Jesus's 'Pre-existent Logos' (in the Prologue to the Gospel of John) or the meaning of the Resurrection after he is raised from the dead and ascends to the Father. As Hegel taught us in 'Revealed Religion' of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, those are all forms of "picture-thinking" (Hegel 1977, 477) and that something else, namely the philosophical "Notion's Time" or "Absolute Knowing" (Hegel 1977, 493) – must take its place. The rising passage of epochal shifts is what is being conceptualized through its actualization. The ontological consequences of this undertaking in terms of what this all means remains indiscernible as we conclude the investigation. Therefore, the work does not seek to engage in debates about faith or heresy regarding theology. And within Heidegger scholarship, the role of religion, in his avowedly secular philosophy, is a separate arena of debate and discussion (Caputo 1993). We will turn our attention elsewhere from both theology and mainstream continental philosophy.

Reading Sections 74 and 75 of "Chapter V: Temporality and Historicality" in *Being and Time*

Let us begin with arguably the most important passage in all of "Chapter V: Temporality and Historicality" of Division Two of *Being and Time*, and perhaps the work as a whole:

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual 'there' by shattering itself against death – that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process if having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate – that is to say, authentic historicality (Heidegger 1962, 437).

When Heidegger says, 'in its Being' as 'essentially futural,' then we must not lose sight that he is talking about an event-motion; but it is one unlike flowing now-points within linear time that can be measured by clocks and calendars. The being of this motion-event is not a being-in-time that can be spatialized. Whether human beings, who are born and die, have their own internal clocks that shape their self-consciousness about their own anxious passage in time, or whether they measure that internal sense against observing an external mechanism or spatial object like a clock or calendar is not the issue. We must erase notions of past as no longer now and future as yet to be now. We are not starting with the living present. Yesterday was a certain day, today is a certain day, and tomorrow is a certain day as they all follow one another in a line, and each cannot take the place of another; that is the commonplace experience of most people. But suspend being present for a while and do not start with a human or animal/plant subject that typically is born at some point and then must die.

Furthermore, to think the complex interrelations of past, present, and future within a moving whole that is itself irreducible to any of those three axes of time raises the specter of the complex metaphysical problem of movement going back to the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle, in particular Plato's *Parmenides* and Book XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. We must elaborate on the mystery of this all-important paragraph not only in this section of this chapter but all of Division Two and one can say all of *Being and Time* as a whole. For *Being and Time* is nothing but one gigantic response to the history of Western philosophy beginning with the Pre-Socratics to Plato, Aristotle to Descartes, Leibniz and then to Kant and Hegel. Quite frankly Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche too are reckoned. It is also one massive reaction to Western Christian thought of which Augustine, Aquinas, Eckhart, and Luther are paramount (Kisiel, 1995).

Returning to Heidegger's text, let us break up the paragraph into parts and quote the actual phrases –

In its Being
Essentially futural
Free for its death
Let itself be thrown back upon its factual there
Shattering itself against death
As futural is equiprimordially in the process of having been
Handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited
Take over its own thrownness
Be in the moment of vision for 'its time'
Authentic temporality as finite makes possible fate
Authentic historicity (Heidegger 1962, 437).

One would think that the complex interrelations of all these terms and phrases constitute one massive Event, one that is not linear, circular, or rectilinear even though the passage appears to be a linear succession of words and phrases. But we have to resist this interpretation towards a linear reading and try to capture the Gestalt intuition of the whole in which the different parts intermingle

with one another, realizing new configurations. (One could easily read the passage backwards or start from the middle and go in both directions at the same time.)

The interesting thing is that one is inclined to utilize all one's intuitions to create a spatial representation of such a massive, interrelated Event; but this is impossible for one reason. Dasein is never present, and as long as it 'is,' it is incomplete; but what makes Dasein's Being whole is death, which is a 'possibility,' not an external limit to which one can cross into a beyond of this world (Heidegger 1962, 276-277). Death is also not negation of presence or mere absence. Death, as pure possibility to be, cannot be represented in this life or the next by oneself or another, even the death of the other who is mourned. If it - Dasein as 'being-there' - were to 'complete' itself, it would no longer be, and that is the paradox. But it is more than that; death is the non-visible, non-entity as a tracing horizon that makes possible the completion of a totality, which only, inauthentically, appears to be a succession of moments that constitute a life unfolding from beginning to a would-be end. However, death is not negation or an end point in linear time since it is the possibility to be, but being is no longer being in the world, namely impossibility. The lived empirical world is not the world, and the afterlife is not the supersession of either the empirical world, or fantasy/fictive worlds that emerge at the intersection of experience and imagination. The past is not in the future or behind the present. Rather, death could be englobed in a larger expanse that has nothing to do with the religious or spiritual realms. Ontologically, it has nothing to do with medically pronounced biological death. Perhaps, we need to erase any sense of what the word even means, across languages, civilizations, and histories. And that event would constitute an unthinkable moment of transcendence: one that even goes beyond the thought that death is an 'illusion' or 'fiction' that human beings, across time, invented because they cannot come to grips with the fact of their inevitable mortality. Religion becomes the first antidote to this malady.

Simply put, if one were to use a living human subject as an example, death seems to be in the future, but one will never live past it. Or on the other side, one would never know when it is coming (the actual event of transpiring and passage) even if one were to plan their suicide, say utilizing physician-assisted dying; and in that case, a doctor could tell the patient how long a lethal concoction would take to actually kill a person. That means the anticipation of death is also not in linear time because the whole death event is not in linear time. And although it would appear that we are becoming as we flow in linear time towards some future date of death, that event is still in linear time as we imagine it and our approach to it; but the event is not whether we approach it or not. All said and done, it is not 'within-time,' which Heidegger tries to derive from something deeper in chapter VI of Division Two of *Being and Time* (1962, 456). Therefore, the relation between the 'being-towards,' its unique movement, and the being at 'its time' called death is irreducible to anything like a human being aging and approaching the finality of biological or medically pronounced death. For Dasein, death is not the unthinkable tragedy of losing a young person to an accident either. Any imagining of what

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happens after our death (as most religious conceptions of the afterlife try to espouse) is inadmissible. This is not about others witnessing or testifying to our death after we die, say at our funeral. So, we turn to another hypothetical entity, which is not exactly human but not exactly not human either. Something is both fully human and other to human.

The Christological substance from the Chalcedonian Creed in response to *New Testament* Christianity reads:

We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and also perfect in manhood; truly God and truly man, of a reasonable soul and body; consubstantial with us according to the manhood; in all things like unto us, without sin; begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the virgin Mary, the mother of God, according to the manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ, as the prophets from the beginning have declared concerning him, and the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us, and the Creed of the holy Fathers has handed down to us (Chalcedonian Creed, n.d.).

And of course, the Christological substance (2 natures = 1 Person) who with two other Persons (Father and Holy Spirit) = One Trinitarian Christian God. Yet the monotheistic principle is sacrosanct and unquestioned, and it is not the job of faith to trespass what reason cannot accomplish on its own. To speculate about the complex interrelational movement event within the unicity of the Christological substance is one thing; and then to situate that substance of One Person in the equiprimordial interpenetration of the Two other Persons to comprise the Trinity is another. The great Western and Eastern Church Fathers up to Aquinas attempted that. Needless to say, this cannot be reduced to idol worship of an object or raised to a speculative abstract concept; it can only be felt through faith by way of intuition that springs from the heart and conscience when a person is addressed by this ineffable God who speaks to their soul. But that is a theological project for another time.

Instead, we will read – deconstructively – Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John where Jesus is no longer with his disciples but talking to the Father only about “not being in the world” (John 17:11) right before his Passion – namely his arrest, trial, and actual death on the Cross, let alone the Resurrection (of an actual body, not just an immaterial spirit) in the sealed tomb with no witnesses. The nature of His suffering cannot be accessed, understood, or replicated by any other human being. Jesus is conveying a type of non-mythic, non-cosmology that points to another temporalization in which one can be in the world but not be in the world, which is not simply articulating that one is not in the world while being in the

world. Jesus the historical person, unlike Odysseus, was in the world. But in the pre-Passion moment, the being that is not in the world has something to do with what is prior to birth in this world and after death in this world; but it also crosses out those polarities because we see a higher level of transcendental consciousness in the relation between Son and Father, namely the movement of his “coming” (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) to the Father and a realm “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.). Those are not points situated in spatialized linear time where we can equate ‘prior’ with past and the arrival to what Jesus is ‘coming’ to as future. If we say the lived Jesus’s ontological whole must include those moments in addition to his lived time on earth (virginal birth and death on the Cross as a succession of discrete events), then, obviously, we are talking about something far more complex as a movement-event, which engulfs and shrinks down linear time within a larger horizon. But this brings back the temptation of spatialized thinking as if we were talking about something empirically real. Attempting a meta-physics of this complex event in dialogue with contemporary theoretical physics – Black Holes, Wormholes, Relativistic Cosmology, Quantum Gravity, String Theory, Multiverse – would be exciting. But it does not advance the project undertaken in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* that relegates all human, social, and natural science to the ontic realm of entities that exist and appear to observation, experience, or even mathematical description (1962, 29-31).

But what does all this have to do with Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, particularly Division Two? There is no way we intend to argue that Heidegger is simply talking about Christian dogma in secular disguise with his entity named Dasein in *Being and Time*. We are also not putting forward a defense of Christian faith. Rather, we speak of an Appropriation out of the faith-context and into a speculative metaphysical realm for which mainstream Christians would not follow. If we were to proclaim this as the truth of the Christian faith, then the accusation of heresy would be warranted. But we do not speak on or behalf of theology for its defense. If one wants to call it a speculative metaphysical philosophy of religion, then so be it. But that is not the intention either since we are not interested in the nature or essence of religion. We care about responding to Heidegger and going into realms that he himself could not traverse.

Rather, we seek to map out eerie resemblances between what Heidegger is articulating in his text, which he says in the very “Introduction” is not theology (Heidegger 1962, 30) and what we see as a philosophical possibility buried in the *New Testament* Gospels unbeknownst to faith. Theology, either through faith, intuition, or systematic philosophical language, tries to attest to something like the experience of God – whether that is construed positively as an ontological entity or through negative theology as that which, apophatically, exceeds all conceptual representation to the point where we can only declare what God is not: namely, that it is not this or that entity in or as space and time. Christian dogmatic religion also must believe in the literal events of a Trinitarian God (1 God = Three

Persons), which undergoes an actual human death and an actual resurrection, with a Pre-existent Logos become incarnate (Kairos) and prophesied Second Coming (Parousia) at the end of time. We are not endorsing or describing any of this age-old content. Something has to sublimate this whole structure, as if it were coming from within it, but in fact is wholly external to it. It is truly Other.

Hence, we intend to re-occupy *Being and Time* with aquatic gear that will allow us to move and visualize within it something that cannot be seen from outside the depths of the ocean, say on the shore, or from a boat on its surface. This is strictly the work of philosophy but one that does not seek to contribute or adhere to Heideggerian scholarship. Hence it is attempting something 'new.'

Let us resume the work. Coming back to Heidegger's all important propositional structure and its component parts:

In its Being
Essentially futural
Free for its death
Let itself be thrown back upon its factual there
Shattering itself against death
As futural is equiprimordially in the process of having been
Handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited
Take over its own thrownness
Be in the moment of vision for 'its time'
Authentic temporality as finite makes possible fate
Authentic historicity (Heidegger 1962, 437).

Being forward looking, running ahead of the now, divorcing oneself from the now, stretched out but not from a center point called being-present; all these connote, that is outside oneself in another realm, almost looking back and coming to that non-place of exteriority. Exteriority is not what is outside of one's body and mind as they relate to time or are infused by time, particularly the passing astrophysical time of days, months, years, decades, etc. One should not think that one is racing ahead in their mind to all the things they must do tomorrow or looking on a calendar for an event or project they must prepare for. From section 65, we must consider a more primordial sense of "letting itself-come-towards itself" (Heidegger 1962, 372); but as a "coming up to" (Heidegger 1962, 373) and up and against, one can say, and standing before, a kind of 'Coming', arrival, presencing as if it were something menacing. But again, do not start with a subject located in space and time, and some external event that is about to land on someone or something, like an asteroid timed at a certain point to hit the earth. Therefore, the 'coming towards' – as a motion-event – could but should not be mistaken as something coming towards one (as if one were situated as a point in space-time) or one going towards 'something.' Becoming is not the becoming of something in something else; nor is becoming some kind of substance itself that undergoes change or changes itself while actualizes itself as both. We would be back to the tradition from Aristotle up to Bergson in the nineteenth century,

Furthermore, death, which is not an event in time, is like an encircling arc but only 180 degrees, not a full circle, trying to go around one; but also, it is not fully entrapping oneself in a circle, which means the bottom half where the circle does not close is like a groundless ground. Another temptation in terms of metaphors is to think of one's time as a finite amount of water contained in a bucket at birth; but simultaneously at birth, a hole is poked in it, and little by little the water drains out until it is completely gone. If one were the bucket, then one would have a sense of losing more and more weight within it; the anxiety increases as each drop leaves. Or a finite amount of water in a bucket without a lid, and the water slowly evaporating is another example. One is tempted towards such metaphors about the finitude of time and how it gets "consumed or used up" (Heidegger 1962, 381), but Heidegger warns against any ontic registers throughout *Being and Time*. A human being who feels like they are 'losing' something or 'gaining' more of it, namely time, points to artificial and derivative registers. Hence the task of fundamental ontology necessitates an existential-analytic of Dasein to go back to the very beginning of the work (Heidegger 1962, 32; Dahlstrom, 2005).

Simply put, the time-death relation for Dasein is uncanny to say the least; by which "being futural in its essence" (Heidegger 1962, 437) requires us to imagine an entity that is not simply human in any ordinary way. It may appear as such given how "guilt and anxiety" are equiprimordial with Dasein's being-towards-death (Heidegger 1962, 437). So, to interpret the Heidegger passage, maybe we can bring in another hypothetical entity, who in a certain scene has yet to physically die, namely Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane praying to his Father before he is arrested, tried, and crucified.

Let us read chapter 17 of the Gospel of John:

1

These words spake Jesus, and lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said, Father, the hour is come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee:

2

As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him.

3

And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.

4

I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do.

5

And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.

6

I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them me; and they have kept thy word.

7

Now they have known that all things whatsoever thou hast given me are of thee.

8

For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me; and they have received *them*, and have known surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me.

9

I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine.

10

And all mine are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them.

11

And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we *are*.

12

While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled.

13

And now come I to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves.

14

I have given them thy word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

15

I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil.

16

They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

17

Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth.

18

As thou hast sent me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world.

19

And for their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also might be sanctified through the truth.

20

Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word;

21

That they all may be one; as thou, Father, *art* in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.

22

And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one:

23

I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me.

24

The Buried Promise of Sections 74 and 75 of Chapter V...

Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.

25

O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I have known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me.

26

And I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare *it*: that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them. (John 17:1-26, King James Bible Online, n.d.)

Ideally, we would treat the original ancient Koine Greek, but for now we will do this quick read before returning to Heidegger's text. Being 'free for death' in no way signifies the human psychological idea of being brave in facing death like a soldier boldly dying for his comrades to save them, say during war. It cannot mean simply ignoring death or running away from 'it' especially since, inauthentically, we would not know what we are running from if we do not even know both the thing we think we are running from; or the fact that we are not even conscious or aware of the fact that we are running from something. There is no thing we are running from – whether we know the thing or the running; or do not know either or both or neither. Freedom, therefore, can mean (not without anxiety per say) an embracing and going into but also around and back to retrieve from oneself; one only suspends oneself from the here and now, but also any present relation to a past (say a memory of childhood) or a present relation to a future (one's upcoming birthday). Freedom is the refusal to accept being now and heading towards an end, but not because one knows one can outlive their death through faith in a resurrection as the Christian kerygmatic proclamation offers. We could not even have a conception of eternal life if all that means is the banal notion of this life we are living going on forever in both directions, a time before our birth, a time after our death, and everything in between. This includes a one-time occurrence repeating itself eternally.

Rather, let us venture what could be going on in the mind of Jesus but using the language in the text of *Being and Time*.

Let us isolate these verses from Chapter 17 in the Gospel of John:

1

These words spake Jesus, and lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said, Father, the hour is come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee:

5

And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.

11

And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we *are*.

12

While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled.

13

And now come I to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves.

14

I have given them thy word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

15

I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil.

16

They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

17

Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth.

24

Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.

25

O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I have known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me
(John 17: 1-25, King James Bible Online, n.d.).

And in particular these phrases within the verses:

John 17:1 - "The hour has come."

John 17: 11 and 13 - "I come to thee."

John 17: 11 - "No longer in the world."

John 17:14 and 16 - "I am not of the world."

John 17: 5 and 17 - "Existing before the foundation of the world" (King James Bible Online, n.d.).

These are the verses we want to isolate. Together, all the interrelations constitute an Event in which the ordinary idea of human birth and death are included, but there are alterities to both poles in the uncanny movement-release-transcendence. Ecstasy is englobing of the event without a geometric circumference. We interpret the text to think that Jesus is living in that moment (of his life's narrative) in the world while speaking these strange words. (Note the psychology of suicide is not relevant here because Jesus is not taking his life out of desperation because he is exasperated with living in general.) But the Christological substance, in fact, is saying something different, offering a complex ecstatic temporalization in relation to movement while anticipating what would be a human death. With the Christological substance, we have to keep in mind the two natures as one (say time and eternity) in which neither one can be separated

or mixed, and neither one changes nor divides the other, both true and complete to repeat the historic Creed of 451 C.E. (Chalcedonian Creed, n.d.). But no one but Jesus knew when the time would come: we only know because we have heard the story billions of times, and learned of it through the canonization of the Gospels long after his actual historical death. Yet, we are not focusing on the event of the actual death on the Cross; but rather the temporalization of the acceptance of the timing of death, the acceptance of being at one's time. As gruesome as Jesus's actual death was, at least, some might say, he had the comfort of knowing before anyone else (like his disciples for example) that he would live again. The first life and the living again share resemblances even though theologically they are not the same. We mortals do not have such comfort. Hence, we have to go back to Heidegger's text to articulate this temporal complexity by deconstructing the linear time frame of the Passion narrative that is told every Easter.

What Jesus is saying involves two temporal planes interacting in a way that is phenomenologically reduced away from the events that follow – physical death of a man and then miraculous resurrection. The two texts together – Heidegger and the *New Testament* – point to a third text waiting to be written. This is the text of double intertwining temporalizations in the relation of Jesus and the Father as an ultimate act-event of universal transcendence. The whole constitutes a complex Event.

Heidegger's secular attempt to describe the "finitude of temporality" (Heidegger 1962, 438) as the basis of "fate" and "authentic historicity" (Heidegger 1962, 437) leaves us in suspense. Maybe that is how fundamental ontology must face its limit: there can be no movement from the question of the meaning of Being (with time as the horizon for understanding Being) to the question of the meaning of time both in terms of the Being of Time and the Time of Being. We know that inauthentic, linear, flowing time of now points (present now, past as no longer now, and future yet to be now) is derived from a deeper, primordial "ecstatic temporalizing of temporality" in section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 377). We will attempt to contrast the two temporalizations in Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John with what Heidegger gives us in terms of the "primordial," "ecstatic," "authentic," "finite," unified "temporalizing of temporality" (Heidegger 1962, 380).

To recall Heidegger's credit in being philosophically innovative, the primordial temporalizing is not an 'entity that emerges out of itself' but is in itself the "process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstasies" (Heidegger 1962, 377). Process evokes a kind of movement. This unity is not a 'sequence' of past, present, and future on a spatialized line or circle, but "temporalizes itself in their equiprimordially" (Heidegger 1962, 378) within which each ecstasy – future as "coming towards," past as "I-am-as-having-been," present as "making present" (Heidegger 1962, 373-374) – temporalizes differently as "modes of temporalizing" (Heidegger 1962, 378). It would appear that each ecstasy temporalizes itself in relation to the other two differently, and therefore we have three triangles, or one

triangle with each point pointing to the other two in different ways. One triangle with three directions or three different triangles seems to be the case; either way, a fourth ecstasy is never articulated in *Being and Time*.

Even though each of the ecstasies reside in relation to one another in an “equiprimordiality” (Heidegger 1962, 378), a soup-like unity, they relate to each other differently. This entire mysterious event of motion, given the different ‘modes of temporalizing’ of one ecstasy to the other two within the ‘equiprimordiality,’ is what derives our commonplace, inauthentic, linear, one-directional flow model of time as an “infinite” (Heidegger 1962, 379) sequence of now points that that are a “coming along” and “pass away” (Heidegger 1962, 475). In this irreversible, entropic, linear time, time travel would be impossible. Paramount for our task is an extreme focus on section 65 in Chapter III on this ecstatic temporality and the problem of movement, launched in Chapter V, particularly sections 72, 74, and 75. Heidegger is recognized for his breakthrough insights on death in *Being and Time*. But he is the first to admit the incompleteness of his investigation in neglecting to attend to the problem of ‘being-towards-birth’ at the outset of chapter V (Heidegger 1962, 424-425), and then later in the chapter, the “enigma of Being as...motion” (Heidegger 1962, 444).

In order to elaborate the “equiprimordiality” (Heidegger 1962, 378) of the ecstatic temporalizing of temporality in which each ecstasy temporalizes differently (Heidegger 1962, 378) while considering the problem of ‘motion’ (which is not a change of location), we come back to the Jesus passages about being at its time (John 17:1, King James Bible Online, n.d.), the coming to the Father (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.), and therefore no longer being in the world before his physical death, and this greatest of questions, the primordial urge, so to speak, of coming (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) to the “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.). To see past Heidegger is to see inside Jesus. But to speak for Jesus without being Jesus raises the question of ‘who’ is speaking. The uncanny resemblance between what is missing in Heidegger’s explication and what is not stated forthright in the Gospel, which must remain with the obscurity of faith, must be bracketed as a question. In other words, the Other in Jesus is the other Heidegger. How the two relate becomes the basis to formulate the criteria on how to craft the architecture of the missing Division Three.

We see the phrases not as a sequence of moments on a line as the narrative unfolds but a complex metaphysical conception in which there is something other to an origin and other to an end, but also other to non-origin and other to non-end. For sure, one cannot simply read the Gospel Chapter from beginning to end like a movie. Or one can, but we will not.

John 17:1 - “The hour has come.”

John 17:11 and 13 - “I come to thee.”

John 17:11 - “No longer in the world.”

The Buried Promise of Sections 74 and 75 of Chapter V...

John 17:14 and 16 – “I am not of the world.”

John 17:5 and 24 – “Existing before the foundation of the world” (King James Bible Online, n.d.)

The complex set of interrelations constituting the event gives us a type of content, which can never be verified empirically, and therefore is a product of the imagination. But it helps us flesh out what Heidegger does not with his ‘equiprimordially’ of the different “modes” (Heidegger 1962, 378) of ecstasies temporalizing themselves in relation to the others. The voice of Jesus in stating that he is no longer in the world while we still see in the scene that is he is obviously in the world (because he is praying in a garden before he dies on a cross) operates by the temporal plane that splits the world in two: in one level he is there praying and speaking the words of alterity in reference to the other plane, where only the Father can understand the transcendental relation. The ‘Coming’ to the ‘before the foundation of the world’ is not the same as Heidegger’s formulations in section 65 on ecstatic temporality:

Taking over thrownness, however, is possible only in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost ‘as-it-already-was’ – that is to say, its ‘been’ [sein ‘Gewesen’]. Only in so far as Dasein is as an ‘I-am-as-having-been,’ can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back. As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as ‘having been.’ Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost ‘been.’ Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the future (1962, 373).

The double intertwining of ‘futural’ and ‘having-been-ness’ cannot be mapped to the rich theological content we see in John 17:11 and 13 and John 17:5 and 24. For one, Jesus’s virginal birth and death on the Cross are not ordinary human events of birth and death even if they are mythic in nature. But then we have something prior to his birth in the Pre-Existent Logos (‘before the foundation of the world’ in John 17:5 and 24) and this ‘Coming to’ (John 17:11 and 13), which in the linear sequence of the narrative is before his physical death on the Cross while ‘no longer being-in-the world’ (John 17:11).

By being in the world but not of it (John 17:14-16, King James Bible Online, n.d.), Jesus points to the Christological substance, which is obviously irreducible to one plane, namely the human plane of lived, flowing, linear time. It contains that plane in relation to another because there are two natures involved, not compromising the unity from the Creed. If Dasein is in the world – as its “basic state” (Heidegger 1962, 78) – but incomplete and only complete at death, which is pure possibility, and never an actual event that is experienced or lived through, then with Jesus we have something more mind-bogglingly complex. If Dasein is “essentially futural” in its “Being” (Heidegger 1962, 437), then the priority is death even though it involves a ‘coming back’ to take up a responsibility from “inherited” possibilities (Heidegger 1962, 437). By doing so, Dasein can be in the “moment of vision for ‘its time’” (Heidegger 1962, 437). But Heidegger leaves us in abeyance

by concluding with the fact that his “finite” temporality makes possible anything like “fate” and “authentic historicity” (Heidegger 1962, 437). We, however, have the ambition to give metaphysical content to this ‘moment of vision for its time;’ but we do so by way of a metaphysics of Jesus’s non-cosmology, which is irreducible to the figure of Jesus Christ (one Person with Two Others – the Father and Holy Spirit) that constitutes the core of the dogmatic religion known as Christianity. Why does it have to be this way? Why extract a Dasein-like Jesus out of the *New Testament* and present it as an-other to the central revelation of the doctrinal truth of Christianity?

This is where the speculative imagination has to take flight as it did for Hegel in his time. But unlike Hegel, we will not operate with a three-moment dialectic or at least an ascription of that model to Hegelian philosophy. Rather, what we have in mind is fourfold in its essence, and hence not at all related to Christianity’s central revelation, namely a Trinitarian unity. One could ask whether the later Heidegger does go down this path since he too articulates a “fourfold” (Heidegger 2001, 171). Yes and no. Yes, he does with his “earth, sky, mortals, and divinities” (Heidegger 2001, 171). We, however, are expropriating, directly, biblical material straight from *New Testament* Christianity. If Heidegger left dogmatic, scholastic Catholicism or any identifiable tradition of Christianity, we are going inside it, but for opposite purposes than Heidegger. We are going inside it to try to imagine the missing Division Three of his own philosophical work, namely *Being and Time*, by turning to a moment that it could not possibly consider: another Jesus, other than Christianity.

Let us go inside that biblical world with renewed phenomenological language and conceptualizations. To do so, we must always consider that we are speaking about a transcendental relation, Son and Father, not within time; but this then makes possible the articulation about “coming to” (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) and the “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.). The four-dimensional temporalization-interrelations-movement-event, never circular, linear, or rectilinear, involves polarities and alterities about what is other to an origin. As stated before, the “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.) is other to the virginal birth through Mary. The “coming to” (John 17: 11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) is other than the physical death on the cross, or mere ending of an incarnate being as a human body. But, also, we have other than a non-origin because a simple idea of eternity would negate the complex ecstatic temporalization of the finitude of Jesus, which only derives any simple idea of eternity as the opposite of time, eternity as the negation of time, eternity as timelessness, eternity as time (time flowing on forever without a Big Bang or a Big Crunch), even the ‘moving-image’ as it is for Plato’s *Timaeus*. We also have other to non-end because we are not racing ahead to the Resurrection as the death of death, negation of negation, and the re-instantiation of eternal life as you would find in basic Christian faith. We must remain within the ecstatic event that is

Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John. Let us proceed further into its depths, which is the haziness of an occurrence trying to reveal itself.

We seek to articulate the mystery of the ontological movement, not of “fate,” “historizing,” or “historicality” as Heidegger tries to do in Chapter V (1962, 437, 441). Rather, we want to see how the four points of the four others move towards one another in a dynamic Event: namely, other to origin, other to end, other to non-origin, and other to non-end. These four, of course, presuppose that there are entities like origin, end, non-origin, and non-end; these are the classic cosmological antinomies that go back through the Western philosophical tradition from Plato’s metaphysical texts on time and movement up to Kant’s dialectical antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998, 470). Many in many traditions would think that origin and end refer to some sense of time, and non-origin and non-end evoke an idea of eternity. We do not suggest the negation of these definitions or senses; nor do we want to dismiss or reduce the complexity of treatment of these problems by the giants, such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel all of whom have to be remembered and appropriated at the same time. Nevertheless, we want to open the space of alterities by reinscribing in the biblical text the passage to the missing Division Three of *Being and Time*. In other words, we have to go into the Gospel to go out of it to go into the missing spaces of *Being and Time* to go out of it onto a new horizon.

The interrelations of the four points as a complex event of movement supersede even the English translators’ attempt to make some sense of Heidegger’s original German on the usage of the term “vision” (Heidegger 1962, 436). This takes place in the page of the text that precedes the “moment of vision for its time” (Heidegger 1962, 437). The translators tell us that “Hellsichtigkeit” means “clairvoyance,” and that the German reader might interpret this as a “seer’s mystical trance” (Heidegger, 1962, 436). We will have to come back to not only this moment in Macquarrie’s and Robinson’s English translation of the original German (which is offered in the footnote of the English translation of the Harper and Row 1962 Edition). But for now, the ‘mystical trance’ by a Christian or even non-Christian devotee enthralled in some kind of religious mysticism is distinct from the inner self-consciousness of Jesus Himself in the moment of his agony but also ecstatic release in no longer being in the world. The mystic may have a genuine intuition, an impossible repetition of Jesus’s suffering, which one cannot easily dismiss. That is not the point. The real question is the speculative metaphysical complexity in the “moment of vision” (Heidegger 1962, 437) superimposing Heidegger’s philosophical insights into the Gospel, for which Heidegger would not admit in *Being and Time* and the mystic must pass over in silence.

Let us return to Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John. The arrival of the hour for Jesus is not physical death as one would normally assume for humans at the moment of their death; common language would say ‘their time has come,’ for example someone in hospice with the end approaching. Instead, it connotes the

reverse of the kenosis, or the emptying out of the Godhead when Jesus is incarnate as a human being, but also the emptying out on the Cross in which death – as sacrifice – through unconditional love is what accomplishes the overcoming of death and sin for those humans who believe in Jesus’s resurrection. For those who believe in the Resurrection will also receive eternal life; which, if you think about it, is quite paradoxical because belief would mark the origin of an eternity when an eternity is not supposed to have an origin. Leaving that aside, we can come back to Jesus’s opening declaration of Chapter 17. But this coming of the “hour” (John 17:1, King James Bible Online, n.d.) in relation to the coming to the Father (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) is not an emptying out but a filling up. It is an anti-kenosis. One can think of a bulging of time that takes the exteriorities on either side of Jesus’s being-in-the world and gives us the plenitude of a seemingly salvific moment for no one but Jesus. In other words, at the Cross, Jesus dies for humanity. But here he dies for himself in relation to the Father. What is going on?

We can bring this back to the uncanny singularity of Dasein too, which is no single human being, self, subject, or ego. But that does not mean that it does not involve a “radical individuation” (Heidegger 1962, 62) in the relation of transcendence even though one is not starting as a point in time or space. Towards the end of Part II of the Introduction, which is the very end of the Introduction as a whole, before Heidegger announces the “Design of the Treatise” (Heidegger 1962, 63), he gives us the full thrust of what he wants to accomplish in his work. Ironically, this passage precedes the announcement of the ‘third division’ of Part One – “time and Being” (Heidegger 1962, 64), which, as we know, was never included in the publication of *Being and Time* with its First Part and Two Divisions. We quote it here because it will help us return to Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John with the full philosophical armature. This way we can get into the mystery of the ontological movement of Jesus’s double temporalization; again, the latter is that which spits and interrelates the ‘coming to’ and the ‘before the foundation of the world’ in which the linear sequence of events we see in the Passion narrative is but one moment in the whole of a much larger temporalization.

Quoting Heidegger:

Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is *veritas transcendentalis* (Heidegger 1962, 62).

As we move towards our provisional conclusion, we must stay with this paragraph for a while. As Division Two will ultimately show, the basic constitution of Dasein’s Being as Care/Concern is grounded in the “equiprimordiality” of the “ecstatical” temporalizing of temporality (Heidegger 1962, 380). By substitution,

one can say that “ecstatical” temporalizing of temporality (Heidegger 1962, 380) is what is “distinctive in that it implies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation” (Heidegger 1962, 62). In other words, it is so individuated and so radical that nothing can be compared to it, seemingly incomparable, unique, and non-relational in an infinite sense. However, infinite is not endless, a nefarious regression to harken Hegel. But paradoxically, we are talking about a relation that is such, and hence a relation to which no other or no other relation can be related. One such relation, as an obvious candidate, is the relation between Jesus and the Father. In Heidegger’s work, it is the relation of the “transcendence of Dasein’s Being” (grounded in primordial, ecstatic temporality) and the “Phenomenological truth” (disclosedness of Being) (Heidegger 1962, 62). But *Being and Time* cannot reveal this truth, and it cannot answer its own question of the meaning of Being by way of time. It leaves us hanging, gasping for more, and the whole treatise ends with a question: “Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?” (Heidegger 1962, 488).

To answer that question, for Heidegger but not on his behalf, we venture our hypothesis. Four-dimensional time is akin to a Hegelian speculative metaphysical will to expound the mysteries of a complex temporalization ‘radically individuated’ to Jesus’s Christological substance. The effort, to restate again, is not theological and not for the faithful. In Chapter 17, the substance gives us a glimpse of its heretofore undisclosed truth. The Being of God truly revealed (even after the sequence of events in Christianity the religion and its theological pillars – Pre-Existent Logos, Virginal Birth, Life, Miracles, Death on the Cross, Resurrection, Ascension, Sending of the Holy Spirit during the Time of the Earthly Church, the Apocalyptic Revelation, the Second Coming, the Final Defeat of Evil, and Eternity Regained with a New Heaven and Earth) relates to the Being of God’s Time in a fundamentally primordial and ecstatic way. In order to articulate that, we would have to marry this passage in Part II of the Introduction in section 7 (‘Being as transcendens,’ ‘radical individuation,’ ‘Phenomenological truth’) with section 65 (on ‘primordial ecstatic temporalizing of temporality’) of Chapter III of Division Two with sections 74 (on the ‘moment of vision’) and 75 (on the ‘enigma of Being as motion’) in Chapter V of Division Two. This prepares the way for the passage into the Gospel. We can articulate, in preliminary fashion, the question of the meaning of Being of God’s Time and the question of the meaning of the Timing of God’s Being revealed above and beyond Christian dogmatics of a Trinity. Two intertwining questions will add to Heidegger’s title, *Being and Time*, four other terms – Time of Being and Being of Time.

Conclusion

What comes out of these passages is not a new interpretation of *Being and Time*. However, it is also not the re-instantiation of faith in its Trinitarian structure. It makes no claim to defending Christian faith or aggressively and atheistically trying to attack and dismiss it. It works from within, in which the motive force to reveal

what is hidden in the Gospel has some fundamental relation to the problem of 'fate' and 'historicality' that Heidegger could not articulate in Chapter V. To set out on this work, we must develop new terms and registers that can link the question of the meaning of God's Being as a transcendental relation – irreducible to linear time – with the question of the meaning of the Being of God's Time as a four-dimensional temporalization; but this also requires linking with the question of the meaning of the Timing of God's Being, which is irreducible to the history of Western (and Eastern) Christian theological concepts as revelatory and truth-disclosing. This four-dimensional temporalization would be inclusive of linear time (with its past as no longer now or prior, present as now and here, and future as yet to be now or after) and therefore derive it, thus confirming that Heidegger was on the path so to speak. But by articulating that four-dimensional time, it is a place that neither Heidegger nor *Being and Time* can go. To go there, we have to go inside the Gospel with the aim of shooting out of it into a universe that the Gospel had no aim to articulate. Maybe we might meet Hegel again. We shall see.

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