

“A Superior Anthropological Perspective.” On Kant’s Anthro-cosmological Conception of Ideal

Fernando Silva

Abstract: The topic of the ideal, that is, the topic of the *possible or impossible human attainment of the absolute* is ascribed divergent treatments throughout Kant’s work. Namely, it is either promptly accepted as possible by the critical Kant, and seen as something attainable by *a means other than* an infinite approximation (which would indeed imply a violation of autonomy, but denies the genuineness of the ideal), or it is rejected as impossible by the non-critical Kant, that is, it is seen as something attainable *only through* an infinite approximation (which would involve an unconditional acceptance of heteronomy, but safeguards the authenticity of an aspiration to the ideal). Yet, the topic of the ideal receives a new, if not conciliatory, at least mutually explanatory approach in Kant’s Anthropology. Here – such is our proposition – Kant proposes a *terminus medius* between both conceptions of ideal, insofar as he is led to ponder on the mutual benefits of an autonomic possibility and an heteronomic impossibility of an infinite progression in thought; something which Kant proposes under the form of an almost-infinite, or an almost perennial, yet finite duration, to be endured until the attainment of an almost unreachable, yet indeed reachable *practical ideal*. A *terminus medius* which, we hope to prove, is none other than that at the root of Kant’s proposition of Pragmatic Anthropology as a mediating science in Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, and which therefore may be ultimately seen as the embodiment of Kant’s anthro-cosmological, or indeed cosmopolitical dimension of thought, as expressed in Kant’s political and/or historical writings.

Keywords: Anthropology, cosmopolitanism, Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics, practical ideal.

I. Introduction. The Ideal as a Kantian Problem

A core issue since the beginning of philosophical thought, the problem of the ideal, or the infinite, or the absolute, and its possible or impossible attainment by the human spirit, has been the subject to the most distinctive approaches by the most heterogenous authors. Now arising as Plato’s union between finite and infinite,¹ as the unfathomable eternity, as in Haller (1882, 149-154), or even as the unreachable concept of totality – of the *hen kai pan* – among German idealists, the problem has given rise to important and no less fertile debates, and has also helped shape the history of philosophy – all the more, since from this issue

¹ As visible in *Timaeus* and analyzed by F. W. J. Schelling in one of his youth texts, “Über den Geist der Platonischen Philosophie.” (Franz 1996, 282-320, Appendix II)

partially depend the boundaries, the task and destination of philosophical thought itself. One of the periods when this issue became most crucial, serving as the reflective propelling wheel of a whole philosophical era, was between the so-called Leibniz-Wolffian school and the German Idealism and Romanticism: a century during which the topic, until the first half of the 18th century handled as a strictly philosophical and/or metaphysical problem, outgrew philosophy and became a focus of discussion in Aesthetics, Literature, Psychology and Anthropology. As such, on the one hand, Leibniz, Wolff, all dealt with infinitude as an exclusively metaphysical problem, and in unison accept Man's proneness to tackle by thought – to perceive – the ideal of human knowledge, as well as to attain rational ideals; on the other, not one century later, young idealists such as Erhard, Novalis, Hölderlin or Forberg, conversely negated this metaphysical vision of the problem, rather asserting Man's possibility to attain the absolute, that is, the possibility of an infinite or endless approximation to an ideal;² and, in between both parties, stand those authors who, each in their own way, promoted a slow yet sure transition and fertile commerce from one side of the question to the other: singular authors such as Hamann, Baumgarten and, last but not the least, *Kant*.

Kant's treatment of the problem of the ideal – the focus of this article – is, in our view, evocative of such a transitive and expansive period in this private history of a philosophical problem, and this in more than one way. He himself an advocate of Man's necessary attainment of rational – regulative – ideals in his metaphysical writings, as well as, consequently, an accuser of Man's impossible attainment of aesthetic, historical, psychological – constitutive – ideals in his non-philosophical writings, Kant, however, did not limit his positions on the ideal, as above, to his *Metaphysics*, rather reexamined the problem from several other prisms, and reapplied such prisms, and their beneficial consequences, to several other dimensions of his work. Freeing himself from the limitation of having to solve the problem either by its unilateral negation – the primacy of the ideal over the human – or by its passionate acceptance – the opposite of the latter – it is our

² See Johann F. Hölderlin, "an infinite approximation (...), as is the approximation of the square to the circle." (1966-1969, 181) See also Novalis, "This absolute given to us is to be known only negatively, insofar as we act and find that what we seek is attained through no action." (1999, 181), Johann Benjamin Erhard: "This procedure of searching for the supreme grounds through reflections, of correctly subsuming the consequences and comparing the concordance of these consequences with that which was proved correct in experience, and of deeming this as true only in face of its harmony with experience (...), was to this day the method of the sane human understanding, and it is advisable that we abide by it until philosophical adepts are granted the opportunity to find the philosopher's stone or the supreme principle, of which all truths are to be weaved as from a ball of thread." (1970, 10) and Friedrich Karl Forberg: "That speculative reason is in want of a supreme principle, from which all truths are to be weaved as from a ball of thread, is undeniable. But I fear that what happened to alchemists, with their philosopher's stone, shall happen to philosophers and their supreme principle. They shall search for it endlessly and shall never find it. This is a task that nature gave reason not so that reason finds its resolution, but so that reason searches for it." (Frank 1998, 452-453)

view that upon laying the first bricks towards the foundation of Anthropology, Kant indeed inaugurates *a new hybrid, multi-relational field, a new discourse on Man and a new vision on Man and his conduct in the World*. But, not unrelated to this, and yet much beyond this, by paving the way towards a new comprehension of Man’s position and task in the universe, Kant at the same time inaugurates a new alternative, much neglected³ standpoint, as well as a singular perspective over the problem of Man’s relation to the ideal, devoid of the unilaterality of the other two positions. Namely, imbued with an anthro-cosmological, or practical vision of Man’s earthly destination, Kant proposes a finite, yet extremely remote course of Man’s formation, to which concur his ever growing historical, political, moral and cosmological self-cognition and action, thereby creating space for a new vision of human ideals in general.

As such, the present article envisages a double objective.

Firstly, to address Kant’s account of the problem of the ideal – here under the guise of the finite and the infinite – in his early *Lectures on Metaphysics*. The aim is to ascertain the essential traits of the problem between the possibility and impossibility of experiencing the ideal, and how Kant’s metaphysical view of this faces a necessary dilemma.

Secondly, to contrastingly analyze Kant’s position on the problem of the ideal in the *Lectures on Anthropology*. The aim here is to show how, by dealing with the problem of Anthropology’s position and task amid other akin and unfamiliar sciences, and by founding it in special, multi-relational connections with the latter, Kant simultaneously gains way towards a new cosmopolitical conception of an ideal of human knowledge.

II. The Problem of the Ideal from a Metaphysical Point of View

II. 1. Kant’s *Conceptions of Infinite* and Their Link to a Fundamental Division of Human Knowledges

As is known, Kant initiated his *Lectures on Metaphysics* with a fundamental scheme of human knowledges: more specifically, a scheme depicting the division, and respective opposing disposition, of the different human knowledges.⁴

³ Kant’s concept of ideal, though not recurrently approached, has received some attention in all dimensions of Kant’s thought. On this, see: Allison (2004) (especially the chapter “The Ideal of Pure Reason”); Schneider (2019); Zöllner (1991, 52-59); Kleingeld (2012); Gerwen (2009, 331-345). However, the suggestion of a third, cosmopolitical dimension of knowledge, endowed with its own specific manner of progression – that is, its own conception of the (un)attainability of the ideal – as far as we know, has not yet been contemplated, not even mentioned, in any of the aforementioned works. As such, we present it here as our own new contribution to the field, in the hope that it will be able to complement the previous studies on Kant’s conception of ideal.

⁴ Such a scheme resurfaces *Metaphysik-Mrongoivius* (Kant 1980, 747-940), *Metaphysik-Volckmann* (Kant 1968, 355-459), *Metaphysik L2* (Kant 1968, 525-610) or *Metaphysik-Dohna* (Kant 1968, 615-702), as well as in the *Lecture on Encyclopedism* (Kant 1980, 5-45) and the

According to this scheme, in Met.-Pölitz I, all knowledges are either an *aggregate*, or a *system*, and hence are opposed: “all knowledges are united either through coordination, or through subordination.” (Kant 1968, 171) Namely, according to Kant, knowledges are *subordinated* because they proceed as if they were on a “ladder.” (*Leiter*) (1968, 171) Subordinated cognitions compose a dimension of knowledge deemed “profound or grounded knowledge,” (Kant 1968, 171) which cannot interfere with experience, and hence, this dimension is *finite* when considered regarding “the limits of human knowledge, which the human understanding cannot supplant.” (Kant 1968, 171) On the other hand, knowledges are *coordinated* when they “proceed amongst themselves as parts in relation to a communitarian whole.” (Kant 1968, 171) These relate as if they were on a “plain soil” (*ebenen Boden*) (Kant 1968, 171) and compose a different dimension of knowledge deemed “extended knowledge,” (Kant 1968, 171) which diverges from rational knowledge and its principles by being *infinite*; for although “some sciences have limits that are determined by Nature and by reason itself” (Kant 1968, 172) – as do subordinating sciences – the limits of other sciences, however, “depend on the free will of men.” (Kant 1968, 171) And so, in a word, it is Kant’s view that given such a diametrically opposed divergence, the ‘ladder’ of rationality and the ‘plain soil’ of empirical knowledge form two lines of knowledge: one, a vertical, unitary, *finite*, line characteristic of intellectuality or rationality, which pervades the whole alignment of sciences from the least rational of the sciences of applied Metaphysics to the supreme transcendental philosophy; and another one, an horizontal, *infinite* line of experience, in time and space, engulfing all historical sciences, such as Empirical Physics, Empirical Psychology, or History.

Kant’s conception of finite and infinite, which indeed is enrooted in this fundamental scheme, and therefore blossoms in the Prolegomena to the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, is however duly expounded only shortly after, in the same lectures, namely, in the sections on the finite and the infinite, in the part on Ontology.⁵ This conception, (not without surprise) expounded in terms obedient to those of the previous fundamental scheme of human knowledges, presents the question of the appreciation of greatness, first and foremost, as a question of opposition between two different modes of consideration. The opposition, according to Kant in Met.-Volckmann, is one between quality and quantity (“per qualitatem qualitatis”) (Kant 1968, 439) Namely, the concept of whole (*toti, Ganze*) presupposes a qualitative concept of totality (*omnitudo*), whereas the concept of quantity (*quanti, Menge*) presupposes a quantitative concept of maximum (*maximi*).

According to Kant, on the one hand, “the maximum is a relative concept,” for it “gives me no determinate concept” (1968, 568) of what maximum that

much contested *Lectures on Geography, Geographie-Rink* and *Geographie-Vollmer*, unpublished in the *Akademie-Ausgabe*.

⁵ Namely, “De progressu et regressu in infinitum,” in Met.-Pölitz I (Kant 1968, 197-200); “Vom Endlichen und Unendlichen,” in Met.-L2 (An Pölitz 3.2) (Kant 1968, 568-569); “Vom endlichen und unendlichen,” in Met.-Volckmann (Kant 1968, 438-440).

maximum is. That is, quantity, because it is an extensive concept – “*quantitas est vel aggregate, dicitur extensiva*” (Kant 1968, 438) – proceeds by aggregation, or addition, which results in the eternal possibility of ever adducing something else to the line of addition (see Kant 1968, 568), and hence rendering the maximum ever more maximum. On the other hand, “the totality is an absolute concept,” (Kant 1968, 568) for it provides the final unity of the envisaged whole. That is, totality, because it is an intensive concept,⁶ proceeds via intensification, via ‘degrees,’ through ‘distension,’ and therefore greatly differs from the quantitative, which is an “expanded greatness” (Kant 1968, 438) – which results in a real and immediate possibility of attaining the totality. This contrasting view means that the manner of conception of the totality is qualitative, for totality itself is a *system* of degrees, or intensities, from the weakest to the strongest, but impervious to alteration; and the manner of conception of the maximum is quantitative, for the maximum itself is an *aggregate* of objects, of apparently neutral cognitive traits which, for this reason, are always exposed to further addition or subtraction. And so, Kant states, as many as the manners of conceiving greatness, there must be *two meanings of infinite*, which are distinguished insofar as they present themselves as the possible or impossible course of Man towards their obtainment: a first one, which is “a pure concept of understanding,” (1968, 568) is deemed by Kant as an “*infinitem reale*,” or “*infinitem metaphysicum*” (1968, 439): an infinite devoid of limitations or negations (see Kant 1968, 568), inasmuch as it contains the determinate concept of itself, and hence “contains all reality.” (1968, 439) A second one, “referring to space and time” (1968, 568) – concludes Kant – is the “*mathematical infinite*,” “which arises through the successive addition of one to one.” (1968, 568-9) This, which indeed is subjected to limitations or negations – for lack of a determinate concept – “does not possess all reality” (Kant 1968, 439) and is eternally incomplete. And so different are the two infinities, that they can only correspond to two human modes of assessing greatness between which there can be no connection, much less interference: namely, the *qualitative vision of totality*, because it is a closed totality and of a rational nature, is *finite* (hence the *infinitem* is real), and the *quantitative vision of the maximum*, because it is an eternally open quantity and of a spatial and/or temporal nature, is *infinite* (hence the *infinitem* is mathematicum).

Now, thus collocated our problem, the consonances between this position and Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges are too evident to be a mere contingency. For, in view of the two structuring lines of human knowledge, and especially their opposition, as well as the different conceptions of their limits, or lack thereof, it cannot be a coincidence that, upon assessing the possible maximum, or total greatness of such knowledges, Kant states that the “*infinitem reale*” or “*metaphysicum*,” a “mere concept of pure understanding” (1968, 438)⁷ –

⁶ “The greatness of that which is immediately represented as unity is intensive greatness.” (Kant 1968, 438)

⁷ See also Kant 1968, 568.

just as the rational 'ladder' in which it dwells – proceeds by subsumption, or by degrees of intensity and is an impermeable rational totality. Nor can it be a mere coincidence that Kant refers that, conversely, the 'infinitem mathematicum,' which refers to space and time – just as the 'plain soil' in which it dwells – proceeds by addition and is an ample, i.e., infinite aggregate. Indeed, we affirm, *these are no mere coincidences*. Quite on the contrary, *the 'infinitem reale' and the 'infinitem mathematicum' of human knowledge are, or constitute themselves, the above described rational and empirical lines of human knowledge and their sciences*; and, likewise, the vertical, or rational, and the horizontal, or empirical lines of knowledge encapsulate, or come to be formed in light of such infinities. This means, then, that Kant proposes a deliberate application of the fundamental methodological traits of his metaphysical reflection to one of its key-topics; just as he proposes a reapplication of this key-topic to the task and the destination of Metaphysics; a fact which, needless to say, cannot but have important implications to the development of the question.

As such, we say, already setting out in search for new implications: the problem at hand, more than just a problem of finitude or infinitude, and more than just a problem of the different natures of knowledge, is a problem of the possible limits, or possible non-constriction, of human knowledge in general. Namely, just as there are two kinds of knowledge, and two kinds of associated sciences – rational sciences and historical knowledges – so too are there two different procedures of the scientific approach in ascertaining the greatness of those knowledges – one could say, two scales of (human) measurement of knowledge: one reachable, the other unreachable; one bearing in mind the infinite of human reason, one bearing in mind the infinite of the World. Or, to put the question into more solid terms: one, the 'infinitem reale,' by which Kant alludes to the real – because finite – possibility of Man ascending in the ladder of rationality, thus attaining, through the metaphysical sciences in general – and, to be sure, transcendental philosophy – *the ideal(s) of reason*; the other one, the 'infinitem mathematicum,' in which Kant refers to the mathematical – for infinite – impossibility that Man progresses until the end of the ample field of historical knowledges, and hence his impossibility to attain the ideal, any ideal, by this means – *the ideal(s) of experience*. And if we think that, upon proposing the previous scheme of his metaphysical thought, Kant defends that such lines of human knowledges stand as dissociated, then, because one problem must reflect the other – *is the other* – exactly the same is to be applied to the (in)finitudes proposed: namely, they too, just as the knowledges which nourish them, are in irreconcilable separation from each other.

And so, we ask: how should we definitively enunciate the difference between such modes of measuring the maximum, or the totality, of human knowledges – now in their connection with the ideal? Apparently, by presenting these two as completely opposed: and this with different repercussions upon the problem of the ideal.

Namely, on the one hand, the ‘*infinito metaphysico*,’ which crosses the whole rational ‘ladder’ of human knowledge, is a “defined greatness” (Kant 1968, 439); that is, it is lesser than any number, and hence it is (at least) thinkable to the human understanding. In a word, one could say, the ideal is here a pure concept of the understanding in (or for) the understanding itself, and hence attainable. And so, one could say, the metaphysical infinite proposes a finite ideal, as finite are rational sciences; or, in other words, *an ideal which is not exactly an ideal*, for we do not have to aspire to it, not at least in the sense that its cognition may offer resistance, may hide from the understanding and be inaccessible to it (for, so Kant, it does not have negations, nor limitations). Of this sort are, for instance, the ideals of pure reason.⁸

Conversely, the mathematical infinite, or the ideal of the historical line of knowledge, is based upon the ‘plain soil’ of knowledge: a fruit of the negations and limitations that characterize it, and mark its infinitude, it offers the human understanding a resistance and is ideal by its own right. But, because the mathematical infinite is centered upon a “*omnitudem collectivam*,” (Kant 1968, 569) because it attempts to apprehend a “totality of phenomena,” (Kant 1968, 569) in a word, because it tends to assess and be a greatness that is “greater than any number” (“greater than that which I could ever measure”) (Kant 1968, 439)⁹ then it offers us a never entirely surmountable, for never entirely terminal, resistance. This, one could add, represents an ‘infinite progression,’ or an *infinite approximation* to the ideal, which, according to Kant, “is never to be thought” (1968, 440) and is forbidden to the human understanding: “The totality in the collective infinitude, which is opposed to the progressive – which is already given as infinite – must have consummated an infinite progression, and this is not to be thought; for in this precisely consists eternity, that the progression can never be consummated (...)” (1968, 440).¹⁰

⁸ See Kant 1911, 383-391.

⁹ “In the first one, *infinito metaphysico*, we have a determined greatness, for it contains all reality, whereas in the mathematical infinite we have no determinate greatness, rather we know only that it is greater than any number. (...) Hence, from mathematical infinite space I know nothing apart from the fact that it is greater than that which I could ever measure, for we know everything only through addition, and if this is not possible, then this surpasses all our means to know such a thing, hence I cannot cognize it entirely in relation to my understanding.” (Kant 1968, 439)

¹⁰ See Kant’s position on aesthetic ideals in the third *Critique*, namely, “the impossibility of the absolute totality of an unending progression.” (1913, 255) The topic is once again resumed, only to be once again denied, in Kant’s position on mental disturbances, in the *Lectures on Anthropology*. For, so Kant, the demented believes he can attain the absolute totality, inasmuch as “The demented goes beyond the senses (...), demented is then he which substitutes the things of imagination as real.” (1997, 108) That is, “they believe they feel in things more than what is really there.” (Kant 1997, 108) This happens, according to Kant, because the demented does not envisage the ideal in abstracto, that is, regulatively, “as a means of appreciation (*principium dijudicandi*).” (1997, 108) Instead, he considers it constitutively, “as the object of desire that we

Of this sort are, for instance, aesthetic ideals.¹¹

Therefore, we conclude with Kant, between one infinite and the other infinite – just as between the two lines of human knowledge, and their sciences – there seems to be nothing in common, and these are *rigorously opposed*: “The collective universality, *universitas*, can never be thought when the omnitude distributiva, *universalitas*, is thought.” (1968, 439)

II.2. The Possibility of a *Third Plain of Knowledge*. A Third Infinite, or a Different Manner of Conceiving the Ideal

The previous section – we would say in retrospect – conveyed two important conclusions, which we again present here.

A *first conclusion, of a purely metaphysical order*, concerns the infinities' different position in Kant's scheme of human knowledges. Kant's dissociated infinities are different not so much due to their intrinsic characteristics, but especially due to the diverging lines of human knowledge, and the nature of the knowledges themselves, whereupon they labor. For this reason, a Rational Cosmology, a Rational Psychology, an Ontology obey to pure principles and thereby know their qualitative gradation, they (re)cognize themselves intensively and apprehend each other as a totality; whereas an Empirical Psychology, a History, an Empirical Physics depart from the (infinite) cumulation of phenomena and thereby orient themselves quantitatively, (re)cognizing each other by their extension and progressing towards an eternally unattainable maximum.

A *second conclusion, of an ontological order*, concerns their actual reach within this scheme. Namely, since the infinities are the consummated image of their lines of knowledge, and since these knowledges are, in both cases, directed at a supreme point, then the infinities are no mere infinities: they rather foreshadow the question of the ideal and are at the basis of all rational and non-rational ideals. A question which is divided between the possibility of attaining the ideal – a finite progression in which the ideal is real –, which Kant does not reject; and the impossibility of attaining the ideal – an infinite progression, through approximation, in which the ideal is ideal – which Kant rejects promptly. Thus could be seen, and thus could be concluded, our presentation of the different infinities in Kant's *Metaphysics*.

However, it just so happens that precisely here, where it seems to be resolved, *begins the true problem of the ideal* – and this because the problem of the infinities does not end here, in this apparent irreconcilability, just as the problem of Kant's division of human knowledges does not cease here, in the apparent

seek (*principium practicum*).” (Kant 1997, 108) But, Kant concludes, in this way, that is, “In its most complete degree it [the ideal] is in concreto impossible.” (1997, 106)

¹¹ See Annotations 16 and 17 of this article.

separation between the infinites, and their lines of knowledge. The reason for this assertion demands for prior explanation.

As was seen, it is Kant's view, in the Prolegomena to his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, that the 'ladder' of rational knowledges is opposed, in its finitude, in its distributive character, its systematic nature, to the 'plain soil' of historical sciences, which is infinite, associative and aggregational by nature. And the same happens with the 'reale' and 'mathematicum' infinites, and hence with the two conceptions of ideal that derive from them. But, so suggests Kant, and not by chance precisely on occasion of the exposition of such a fundamental scheme: just because these lines are opposed, and neither can nor should interfere with one another – for they are irremediably different – *this does not mean that they can or should be completely separated*. Quite on the contrary, the lines of human knowledge are not, nor could they be separated – for, according to Kant, “all our knowledge starts with experience (...) but does not come from it.” (1968, 615) Instead, *both lines must be united by at least one point*; and if this point cannot be composed by the furthest lengths of each line, which indeed cannot be united, then it should and must be united by the closest point between the two: namely, the point which unites the lowest stadium of the rational line of knowledge to the first one in the horizontal line, and vice-versa. Thus are necessarily united both planes of human knowledge; and thus is constituted, in Kant's perspective, a *perpendicular scheme* in the division of human knowledges, a scheme united by a vertex opening for the communication and connection between rational and empirical sciences, which therefore either permits, or forbids – according to the circumstances – a more or less productive commerce between both.¹²

Now, if this is so, if there can and should be a point of contact, a correspondence between lines and soils of knowledge which nonetheless are opposite, then, since the problem of the fundamental lines of knowledge is indeed the same as that of their infinites, so will this have to apply to this question, and subsequently to that of the ideal. That is, between the reale, rational, finite infinite – the attainable ideal – and the mathematicum, empirical, infinite infinite – the eternally unattainable ideal – *there must also be a relation, perhaps a field of interconnection or mutual dialogue*. Surely not in such a way that the real infinite acts upon the mathematical one, which would be the same as confounding finite and infinite or mistaking the finitude of rational knowledge for the infinitude of the empirical. Nor in such a way that the mathematical infinite claims to be the real infinite, which would be the same as claiming that, according to Kant, the infinite approximation is something to be sustained by reason, and hence, for

¹² A fact which is proved not only by the scheme's own geometrical disposition (a 'ladder' as based upon a 'soil'), but rather theoretically, insofar as some of the lower sciences of applied Metaphysics, such as Rational Psychology and Rational Physics, or Somatology (that is, Rational Cosmology) have a direct correspondence in the horizontal line of knowledge, namely in Empirical Psychology and Empirical Physics (that is, Empirical Cosmology); which means that both must be united by more than just a mere geometrical, formal parallelism.

reason itself, the ideal of reason would be something chimerical. No. The two infinities are indeed different, their knowledges are different, and cannot be united as such. But perhaps one should think that, given the impossibility of merging these two manners of conceiving the ideal, there should emerge *a third one between the latter*: a manner of conceiving the ideal which is neither one, nor the other, yet bears something of both, thereby enhancing what is good in them, their potentialities towards the progression of human knowledge, and at the same time suppressing what is restrictive and negative in both, the limitations they impose to human knowledge. Namely, perhaps it is possible to conceive, in light of Kant's dividing scheme of human knowledges, *a different way to conceive the ideal, one which may operate in a soil which possesses such hybrid characteristics, therefore harboring the vertex between the rational and the empirical and opening for an unsuspected yet very fertile practical field of dialogue between the opposing parties*. In a word, we add, a soil where Kant definitively rethinks the question of the ideal and may set into motion not just another way of conceiving the infinite, or the ideal, but another manner of human knowing and feeling.

For this reason, we inaugurate the third and last section of this article with two guiding questions: 1) Even if we assume that just as there are two modes of cognizing, there are two manners of perceiving the infinite, and that the latter, just as the former, are rigorously opposed – something which Kant unequivocally says – does Kant's work enable us to think a third manner of conceiving the infinite, perhaps one between the *infinitum reale* and the *infinitum mathematicum*? And 2) if this proposal is thinkable, in which special soil does Kant see a field for the reception of this third manner of conceiving the ideal, as well as for a new manner of knowing and feeling the I in the World?

III. The Problem of the Ideal from an Anthropological Point of View

III. 1. The Different Ideals. The Singularity of the *Practical Ideal*

As was said in Section II of this text, the other field where Kant approaches the problem of the ideal is that of Anthropology. The problem is raised twice in the *Lectures on Anthropology* (in Kant 1997, 99-100 and Kant 1997, 324-326) and although very brief, and quite similar to that of the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, such a collocation deserves our attention precisely due to that which in it, despite apparently insignificant, is to be distinguished from the others.

According to Kant, the ideal "is the first and most perfect image, according to which all things are possible, or it is an idea in concreto." (1997, 99, 325) And this "idea in concreto" – or "maximum in concreto" (Kant 1997, 325) can be of a triple kind: 1. An "aesthetic ideal"; 2. An "intellectual ideal" (or "ideal of speculative

reason”) (Kant 1997, 325); or, at last, 3. A “practical ideal.”¹³ As if the triple designation was not in itself brief and insufficient, and its theoretical surrounding scarce, Kant approaches only the aesthetic ideal – and briefly at that – considering that this ideal is impossible insofar as *no ideal can be formed merely by sensations*.¹⁴ As to the intellectual-rational and the practical ideals, Kant leaves them unapproached.

In spite of Kant’s vague words, it is possible to draw some conclusions on this; especially conclusions which in part confirm the disposition of Section II of this text. For, indeed, Kant refers here first and foremost to two ideals, or two manners of dealing with the problem between finite and infinite. They are, on the one hand, the ‘intellectual ideal,’ the course of which is the totality of the vertical line of human knowledge and, as such, to paraphrase Kant, is the most perfect image according to which all rational things, thoughts and cognitions are possible – in a word, the most perfect image of a possible, attainable ‘*infinitem reale*.’ And, on the other hand, the ‘aesthetic ideal,’ which is the maximum of the horizontal line of knowledge, and, without surprise, is the most perfect image according to which all aesthetic things and cognitions are possible – the most perfect image of an impossible, unattainable ‘*infinitem mathematicum*.’ The first one, as we know, is possible for a number of reasons, already adduced. The second one, Kant again denies; now for several other reasons, which, we think, are worth mentioning. Firstly, because the aesthetic ideal is naturally linked with Aesthetics, and Aesthetics, at least in the vision of the pre-critical Kant – as is here the case, in Collins (1772/73) and Parow (1772/73) – cannot be considered, nor could ever become, a science.¹⁵ Secondly, because since Aesthetics was not a science, and had nothing to do with the laws of reason, it had to be included among the empirical knowledges, along the extensive, infinite line of human knowledge: namely, it constituted a corpus of knowledge which better suited an historical science, and as such had its place among the latter. Finally, if Aesthetics is an historical science,

¹³ “We can have three kinds of ideals: 1.) Aesthetic, 2.) Intellectual, 3.) Practical.” (Kant 1997, 99) Also: “The ideal is either that from speculative reason, or the aesthetic, or the practical ideal.” (Kant 1997, 325)

¹⁴ “As far as the aesthetic [ideal] is concerned, let it be noted that it is not possible to create something from sensations, and, as such, to have an ideal from sensations” (Kant 1997, 99); “In what concerns the aesthetic ideal, no ideal can be formed only from sensations, insofar as that which is said from other-worldly blissfulness are words to which we lack the *concretum*.” (Kant 1997, 325)

¹⁵ “The Germans are the only ones who now employ the word ‘aesthetics’ to designate that which others call the critique of taste. The ground for this is a failed hope, held by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing the critical judging of the beautiful under principles of reason, and elevating its rules to a science. But this effort is futile. For the putative rules or criteria are merely empirical as far as their sources are concerned, and can therefore never serve as *a priori* rules according to which our judgments of taste must be directed, rather the latter constitutes the genuine touchstone of the correctness of the former.” (Kant 1911, 50; CPJ: xix). The same is reiterated throughout the text of *Logik-Jäsche*, “Immanuel Kant’s Logik. Ein handbuch zu Vorlesungen.” (Kant 1923b, 1-87)

then the 'aesthetic ideal,' that is, the most perfect image according to which all aesthetic objects, all empirical feelings and intuitions, are possible, must simply obey the disposition of the line which embodies it: namely, it must be of an impossible attainment, or to be attainable only through an infinite approximation to the ideal, which for Kant, as is known, is simply unthinkable. In a word, we could then conclude that the intellectual ideal is here evoked in a way reminiscent of that in the *Lectures on Metaphysics*: by confirming its reach, and possibility, under the form of an idea in concreto; as is the aesthetic ideal: as an example of an infinitum mathematicum, as an idea in abstracto, which, just as in Empirical Psychology, in Empirical Physics, in Natural History, is in infinite retraction, as well as in infinite separation, due to its inexhaustible character.

All that is left in the equation is the 'practical ideal' – which Kant does not contemplate in the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, and of which, in truth, we know nothing apart from the fact that it seems to be somehow connected to Kant's anthropological reflection. Yet, by departing from the abovementioned belief that this ideal is no amalgamation of the others, rather an alternative to their rigidity, we propose to resume the guiding vision of our problem – that of the perpendicular scheme of human knowledges – and therein think the possibility of a third dimension of knowledge, as well as *a third ideal*; or, in Kant's words, *a practical ideal*. For, upon doing so, we are imbued with at least one certainty: that, just as the intellectual ideal is the perfect image of a whole set of intellectual objects, and the aesthetic ideal is the perfect image of a set of aesthetic objects, then the practical ideal is to ensure the existence and possible conceivability of a whole series of practical objects – between pure theory and sheer experience – of which the practical ideal must be a perfect image: a truly auspicious belief which we intend to ascertain as well as possible.

III.2. Pragmatic Anthropology, the Abode of the Practical Ideal

In the 1760s and 70s, Kant devotes much care and thought to the question of the mutual reference between the fields of human knowledge – namely, *the task of an encyclopedism of the human spirit* – a problem all the more complex, because not just one, or some, but all domains of human thought demand complete positional and objectual reciprocity amongst themselves.

One of the sciences which, we think, was at the very core of this difficult concatenation of knowledges – for its centrality, for its amplitude, but especially for its unique singularity among all knowledges – is that of *Anthropology*. The reason for this assertion, as well as for these epithets, is quite simple. Anthropology, if not by its attributes as a study of the human being, or by its intimate tone and apparently well-known task,¹⁶ position and destination, seems

¹⁶ "The fault resides certainly in the difficulty of placing this kind of observations, as well as in the singular illusion according to which one believes to know that with which we are accustomed to coexist." (Kant 1997, 7)

to be either nowhere, or everywhere – which is why until the 1770s it had not yet been elevated to science.¹⁷ For, if seen regarding the vertical line of human thought, and its metaphysical sciences, Anthropology, which is indeed anchored upon the empirical and the physiological, seems to have no relation whatsoever with, nor to produce anything of value for the latter; and hence, it seems to have no reference to an ‘infinitem reale,’ or an intellectual ideal. And yet, quite on the contrary, if seen among the historical sciences, Anthropology seems to pass off as all of these – to be, or to be present in History, Empirical Physics, Empirical Psychology, Medicine, Aesthetics, and hence merely to incur in an infinite model of knowledge, and an infinite ideal: something which the history of modern Anthropology itself proves and ultimately resulted in a rarefaction of the concept of Anthropology, as was often denounced by Kant himself.¹⁸

Among the many points in Kant’s work where the Anthropology is stated in the abovementioned diffuse condition, and where Kant therefore attempts to correct this, by dissociating it from, and reconnecting it to other fields of knowledge, we could stress several. One of them, however, is essential for our line of thought, because it arises precisely in Kant’s *Lectures on Metaphysics*, and deals precisely with the position of Anthropology in the perpendicular scheme of human knowledges. For, upon reading these Lectures, one would say that Kant places the Anthropology among the historical sciences; that Kant dissociates Anthropology from rationality and voids it of all contact with reason; in a word, that Kant’s voice joins the choir of those which, before him and in his time, considered that Anthropology, its cognitions, its progress as a science, were fixed in the extensive, horizontal line of human knowledge. This because not only here, but in other Lectures on Metaphysics, and other texts, *Kant associates Anthropology and Empirical Psychology, and as such considers it to be an historical science.*¹⁹ And since, according to Kant, Empirical Psychology is merely empirical;²⁰ since it

¹⁷ Kant refers to this often, specifically in Kant 1997, 7, by asking “Why has a coherent science not derived from the great stock of observations of English authors?” and in Kant 1997, 859, by stating that, by then, “no other book on Anthropology exist[ed].”

¹⁸ Such ambiguity is rendered patent by the very titles of anthropology, or anthropology-like manuals of the time, wherein Anthropology is still very much intertwined with Medicine, Psychology or Physiology, among others: namely, Otto Casmann’s *Psychologia Anthropologica* (1594); Riolan’s *Anthropographia et Osteologia* (1618); Meisner’s *Anthropologia Sacra* (1619); Kyper’s *Anthropologia Corporis Humanum* (1647); Sperling’s *Synopsis Anthropologiae Physicae* (1659); Hartmann’s *Anthropologiae Physico-Medico-Anatomicae* (1696); Teichmeyer’s *Elementa Anthropologiae Sive Theoria Corporis Humani* (1719); or even Platner’s *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweisen* (1772), which was of great influence for Kant.

¹⁹ See, regarding Kant’s *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Kant 1968, 367; Kant 1980, 757; Kant 1980, 11; see also “Immanuel Kant’s Logik. Ein handbuch zu Vorlesungen.” (Kant 1923b, 1-87)

²⁰ “The genuine empirical doctrine of the body most certainly does not belong in Metaphysics; for I cannot speak of air, etc., in metaphysics, for the latter requires empirical principles and therefore belongs to Empirical Physics. The same must I say from the doctrine of the soul; so is Psychology, which serves itself from empirical principles, no pure philosophy.” (Kant 1968, 367)

possesses a psychologizing character, just as others have a physiological, or medicinal or anatomical character; since it was once erroneously inscribed in rational soil (in *Metaphysics*), but does not belong there;²¹ since, as such, it cannot be *paired with reason*²² – that is, it cannot have an express connection with reason, nor, from the reunion of phenomena from experience, provide reason with empirical principles; since it cannot convey a complete knowledge of the human soul, for it has not yet grown to that condition, and, as a result of all the previous, since it cannot be elevated to the condition of philosophical science, nor to that of an academic discipline:²³ then, no doubt, these arguments against Empirical Psychology, which Kant again and again reiterates in the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, must also be the less than favorable attributes of Anthropology, which means that Anthropology is chained to the sciences of erudition and their essential characteristics – the lesser of which is not, to be sure, that of an ideal whose attainment requires an infinite progression, or an infinite approximation – and is impossible. Such must be also, so it seems, Kant’s conception of an anthropological (or anthropologically conceived) ideal.

It just so happens, however, that this view of Kant’s Anthropology, which seems infallibly right, is taken down in one blow once we compare *Empirical Psychology as Anthropology* – so would Kant often present Anthropology – and *Pragmatic Anthropology*, which emerges in the form of lectures in 1772, but arises much earlier in Kant’s thought. For, let it be noted, Empirical Psychology is entirely Anthropology; but Anthropology is not Empirical Psychology except in one of its parts; a part which, already in the text *Logik-Jäsche*, is by Kant surrounded of a Natural Logic and a Natural Aesthetics: namely, Natural Logic=theoretical part of the Anthropology; Natural Aesthetics=Practical part of the Anthropology.²⁴ And why is this so? Because Kant does indeed refer doubly to Anthropology; and if on the one hand Kant does so under the form of an Empirical Psychology, thereby seeming to reduce the boundaries and the scope of Anthropology merely because this is confined to an historical science, on the other hand, when Anthropology appears tacitly (as in the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, or *Logic*) or expressly (as in the *Lectures on Anthropology*) dissociated from Empirical Psychology, then Anthropology, here understood in a pragmatic focus, engulfs Empirical Psychology and has due relations not only with Moral and Religion, but also with *Metaphysics*.²⁵ Precisely this says Kant when he refers that Empirical Psychology

²¹ On the incorrect inclusion of Anthropology – or even Empirical Psychology – in *Metaphysics*, see the *Lectures on Anthropology*, Kant 1997, 7-8; Kant 1997, 243; Kant 1997, 473; as well as the *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Kant 1968, 175; Kant 1968, 541; Kant 1980, 750; Kant 1968, 367.

²² See Kant 1980, 757.

²³ “Psychology has not yet grown to the point that it may convey sufficient data for the knowledge of the soul, so that from it one may create a separate collegium.” (Kant 1968, 367)

²⁴ See Kant 1923b, 16-17.

²⁵ “The field of Philosophy in sensu cosmopolitico is to be reconducted to the following questions: 1) What can I know? This much is shown by *Metaphysics*. 2) What should I do? This much is shown by *Moral*. 3) What should I expect? This much is taught by *Religion*. 4) What is

was always unduly placed under the wing of Metaphysics, and that as such it is “*Metabasis eis allo genos*,”²⁶ whereas (Pragmatic) Anthropology has valid and mutually profitable relations with Metaphysics. As such, we could say, thus answering previous accusations, Pragmatic Anthropology is not merely empirical, rather proceeds by gathering phenomena which it then conveys under the form of principles to Metaphysics – and, therefore, *Anthropology can indeed be paired with reason*.²⁷ Pragmatic Anthropology bears no foreign character but its own, which characterizes it as the science for the observation of the natural, of the practical, of Man’s prudent application in the World – in a word, of the *pragmatic in the human being*. Furthermore, Pragmatic Anthropology has a scope of action and observation much broader than that of Empirical Psychology, to the extent that, *if any science can provide a full knowledge of the human soul, it is Pragmatic Anthropology*; lastly, due to all these reasons, not only is Pragmatic Anthropology, unlike Empirical Psychology, *a science in its own right*, but it could and should be instituted as *an academic discipline* – which it was, precisely by Kant, since 1772. And hence, one may conclude that not only the capacities, the scopes, the positions, the boundaries, the very scientific reach itself, of Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology are not the same, but, what is here key, that Empirical Psychology as Anthropology and Anthropology as Pragmatic Anthropology are not the same and must be rigorously distinguished: “of this [Empirical Psychology] may be still distinguished an Anthropology, if by this one understands a knowledge of the human being insofar as it is pragmatic.” (Kant 1980, 757)

Now, we ask: what is the result of this *singularization of Pragmatic Anthropology*? This, we think, bears two important repercussions on Kant’s scheme of human knowledges, and ultimately on Kant’s discussion of the ideals.

The first repercussion has to do with *the position of Pragmatic Anthropology in this scheme*. Namely, if Anthropology, taken in a pragmatic focus, is dissociated from Metaphysics but maintains with it valid relations, and if it is dissociated from historical sciences but still preserves its informative basis in the latter, then this means that Pragmatic Anthropology is due a truly singular, truly hybrid and, at the same time, unique position in the scheme of human knowledges. For, to be sure, Anthropology, which has no real place in any of the lines, but is in both latent, is reserved a place *between* the rational and empirical lines: *a third dimension of human knowledge*, set precisely in the curvilinear space, in the concave wing that opens between the latter. In a word, Pragmatic Anthropology departs from the vertex of the scheme, and engulfs the whole of the angle that opens between

Man? This much is taught by Anthropology. One could deem all of the latter Anthropology, insofar as the first three questions refer to the last one.” (Kant 1968, 533-534)

²⁶ A “*μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*,” that is, loosely translated, a *complete subversion of the genus of Metaphysics*. See on this Kant 1968, 367; Kant 1980, 757.

²⁷ According to Kant, Pragmatic Anthropology searches for the “first grounds of the possibility of modification of human nature in general” (1922, 145) and therefore conveys “the subjective principles for all sciences.” (1997, 734-735)

intellectual and empirical sciences; but, since it is not meant to be a fusion between the two, then it must acquire the singular, intermediate, mediating characteristics of a whole new knowledge: it, as was said, sets in contact rational laws and empirical cognitions, thus providing these with a possible general validity, and at the same time promoting the reapplication of such empirical data, now under the form of rational laws, upon experience.

The second, final repercussion, even more pungent in our eyes, has to do with *the manner of knowing thus promoted by Pragmatic Anthropology* – which once and for all brings us back to the question of the ideal. For, if before, as he seemed to include Anthropology among the historical sciences and promptly dissociate it from Metaphysics, Kant was in fact collocating part of the Anthropology under the limitations of a line of knowledge which is extensive, which proceeds through addition and is infinite, and separating it from a line of knowledge which proceeds through subsumption, which is intensive and finite, now, however, upon singularizing Pragmatic Anthropology between these two lines, what Kant proposes is *a whole new position for Anthropology*, and hence a *whole new manner of knowing*, hitherto unknown, and yet certainly useful to the latter. What this means, then, is that Pragmatic Anthropology does not obtain its knowledge neither through rational subsumption, nor through empirical addition; its line of knowledge, which is not even a line, rather *a whole dimension*, does not work neither intensively, nor extensively; and as such *its progress towards a totality, or a maximum of cognitions is neither finite, nor infinite*. That is, in Pragmatic Anthropology the question is not that of a finite or an infinite, and much less of an ideal which is restricted to a real or a mathematical infinite: and this because, from the midst of its hybridity, Anthropology not only deals with an indeed apparently inexhaustible collection of data on the human being, and is therefore unquenchable, but it proposes to work towards principles, which are to be general laws of reason, and is therefore quenchable. And hence, what this means is that Anthropology, upon being placed between these more extreme lines of knowledge, thereby occupying an intermediary and mediating function between the two, ensures that this very characteristic and differentiating function is applied to, or embodies, its manner of knowing and hence its knowledge. That is, *its conception of totality, or maximum – its ideal – cannot be but one that is also intermediary, to be found between said real and/or mathematical infinities, and hence between the rational and/or aesthetic ideals*. Namely, Kant proposes here an ideal that, unlike the one which is immediately cognizable and attainable, and unlike the one that is simply incognizable and therefore forever unattainable, *is in fact attainable, yet only through a long progression: one could say, a quasi-infinite – yet indeed finite – duration or progression, thus depriving the rational ideal of what in it is not an ideal, or is insufficiently ideal – its more than possible attainment –, and at the same time depriving the aesthetic-empirical ideal of what is most genuinely ideal in it: its impossible attainment*. This leads us to the conclusion, then, that the ideal proposed by a Pragmatic Anthropology is indeed one consonant

with its dimension in the scheme of knowledges, and with what such a place instils in its manner of knowing: it is a non-rational, non-empirical, rather a *practical ideal*, that is, an ideal which, through a quasi-infinite, and yet also pseudo-finite progression, offers a knowledge that is always an empirical-rational reapplication of itself. To know the natural, or the practical, in Man, is precisely this: not a rational, nor an empirical knowledge of Man’s position in the World, rather an extremely long and arduous, yet in the end attainable knowledge which seeks a possible consonance between the rational and the empirical, or, if one prefers, which studies the laws of Nature and their perception by, or integration in, Man’s intellect. In a word, the study of the intellect of the I (*Ich als Seele*) within Nature, or the World (*Ich als Mensch*): a “superior anthropological perspective” (Kant 1923a, 374) of Man and the World, or a cosmopolitical doctrine of the World (*Weltlehre*) in the strict sense of the word.

This “superior anthropological perspective” (Kant 1923a, 374) which Kant always connects directly with the possible, yet long and arduous attainment of a practical ideal of knowledge or action, is indeed only alluded to in the *Lectures on Metaphysics*. However, it is not as singular, nor as rare, that it cannot be felt elsewhere. Quite on the contrary, we believe, it arises expressly throughout Kant’s whole work, in *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755) in the *Lectures on Anthropology* (1772-1796), in the texts *Idea for a Universal History* (1784), *On the Common Saying: that may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice* (1793), *Toward a Perpetual Peace* (1795) and in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) – therefore summoning, and congregating around its intermediary position, its mediating scope, its finite-infinite manner of knowing, in a word, its extremely long yet finite search for an ideal of humanity, fields as apparently distant as those of Education, Morals, History, Politics or Cosmology.

To convey but a few examples of this quest for a long, yet finite practical ideal, and therewith conclude our line of thought, we summon Kant’s words.

As such, already in *Universal Natural History* (1755), the young Kant elevates Man, and the human species, to a teleological understanding of the systematic constitution of the World between Nature and God. Here, Man, as a privileged species, may aspire to “discover the systematic which connects the great members of creation in the great extension of infinity” (Kant 1910, 221) and, by (teleoformally) peering into the secret internal mechanism of the latter, work towards its full formation, and subsequent final perfection. But, so Kant, the attainment of such a practical ideal, which is indeed attainable, may require “millions and mountains of millions of centuries until always new worlds and orders of worlds, ones after the others, may come to form and reach perfection.” (Kant 1910, 313)

This “superior perspective” once again emerges in a lecture on Anthropology, *Anthropologie-Friedländer* (1775),²⁸ a sure precursor of the text *Idea for a Universal History* (1784), where Kant again raises the problem of the necessary full formation of Man’s natural dispositions, as, so the title of the lecture, “the character of humanity in general.” Here, it is Kant’s view that for the attainment of such a desideratum, or a practical ideal of the “supreme degree of perfection” (1997, 697) of the human species, “thousands of years are still required.” (1997, 696) Yet, Kant adduces in conformity with said ideal, this practical ideal, though extremely remote and hardly obtainable, “is possible.” (1997, 696)²⁹

The “superior anthropological perspective” again resurfaces in the text *Idea for a Universal History* (1784). Here, faced with the design of the foundation of a universal history in a cosmopolitical purpose, and the difficulty of its natural consideration merely as “a romance,” (Kant 1923a, 29) Kant shows how Man can elevate himself to the condition through work (namely, the anthropological, or practical study and comprehension of his position and teleoformic formation in the World) and, as a species, be himself an integrating and central part in this systematic scheme of things; even though – Kant adds – such a practical ideal may require “a perhaps unending series of generations, each transmitting the other its enlightenment, so as to finally impel [Nature’s] germs in our genus towards that degree of development which is completely suitable to its purpose.” (Kant 1923a, 19)

And, lastly, this ‘superior perspective’ emerges in both *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795) and *On the Common Saying: that may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice* (1793), as the superior stage of the comprehension of a relation between the We (or the I as species) and the World: namely, that this superior perspective is superior, and alternative and singular not because it is merely the result of human efforts, or the mere result of an ordination of Nature; that is, to put it in Kantian terms, neither as a merely pragmatic perspective, which inquires on what “as a free-acting being, Man makes of himself, and can and should make [of himself],” (Kant 1917, 119) nor as a merely physiological perspective, which approaches “what Nature makes of Man.” (id.; Kant 1923a, 310) Instead, this superior anthropo-cosmological perspective commands us to ponder not what Man makes of himself, nor what Nature makes of Man, *but that which Man makes of himself in consonance with, or along with, what Nature makes of him;*³⁰ a

²⁸ “Vom Charackter der Menschheit überhaupt.” (Kant 1997, 675-697)

²⁹ “This consideration is very agreeable, insofar as it is an idea that is possible, for which, however, thousands of years are still required. Nature will always be sufficient, until one such Paradise emerges on Earth. Just as Nature has always formed itself and still does (...), so does the human species, and precisely those many years [140000 years] may pass until the supreme degree of perfection is attained.” (Kant 1997, 696-697)

³⁰ “It [a constant progression towards what is better] depends not so much upon what we do (...), or the method according to which we proceed to bring it about, rather upon what Nature

perspective, an “immeasurably distant success,” (Kant 1923a, 310) an ideal to which Man is indeed to elevate himself, and to which Man, once imbued of such a practical disposition, is to access, regardless of its appearance as an ideal between duty and happiness, or a union between politics or morals, or a perpetual peace, or God’s kingdom on Earth. A proof, in our opinion, that all these more or less anthropological fields were indeed intimately interconnected in Kant’s superior cosmopolitical vision of them; and that, as such, the practical ideal of one is in fact the practical ideal of all others, and this because, in Kant’s spirit, the attainment of one was ultimately dependent on the attainment of all others, and vice versa.

References

- Allison, Henry E. 2004. *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*; Revised and Enlarged Edition. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press.
- Erhard, Johann Benjamin. 1970. *Über das Recht des Volks zu einer Revolution und andere Schriften*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag.
- Frank, Manfred. 1998. ›Unendliche Annäherung‹. *Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Franz, Michael. 1996. *Schellings Tübinger Platon-Studien*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Gerwen, Rob van. 2009. “Kant’s Regulative Principle of Aesthetic Excellence: The Ideal Aesthetic Experience.” *Kant-Studien* 86 (3): 331-345.
- Haller, Albrecht von. 1882. “[Unvollkommenes Gedicht] über die Ewigkeit.” In *Versuch schweizerischer Gedichte*, 149-154. Frauenfeld: J. Huber.
- Hölderlin, Johann Friedrich. 1966-1969. *Sämtliche Werke. Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe*. Edited by Friedrich Beissner. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1901ff. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Hrsg. Von der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1910. *Vorkritische Schriften I. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. I* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1911. *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. III* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1913. *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft. Kritik der Urtheilskraft. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. V* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1917. *Der Streit der Fakultäten. Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. VII* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.

makes in us and with us so as to force us to a track to which we would not easily comply by ourselves”. (Kant 1923a, 310) A sentence whose content is replicated throughout *Towards Perpetual Peace*, namely, in the section “Of the guarantee of perpetual peace.” (Kant 1923a, 360-368)

Fernando Silva

- . 1922. *Briefwechsel I. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. X* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1923a. *Abhandlungen nach 1781. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. VIII* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1923b. *Logik. Physische Geographie. Pädagogik. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. IX* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1968. *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. XVIII* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 1980. *Kleinere Vorlesungen und Ergänzungen. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. XXIX* (Akademie-Ausgabe). Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- . 2000. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kleingeld, Pauline. 2012. *Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Novalis. 1999. *Schriften. Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs*. Edited by Hans-Joachim Mähl and Richard Samuel. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Schneider, Ruben. 2019. "Kant and the Infinity of Reason." In *The Infinity of God: New Perspectives in Theology and Philosophy*, edited by Benedikt Paul Göcke and Christian Tapp, 78-96. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Zöller, Günter. 1991. "Kant's Aesthetic Idealism." *The Iowa Review* 21 (2): 52-59.